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JUVENILE OBSCENITY STATUTES:
A PROPOSAL AND ANALYSIS
Jerold H. Israel*
Rita Ann Burns**
PROPOSED STATUTE ON DISSEMINATION
OF OBSCENE MATTER TO MINORSt
Section 1. The following definitions apply in this Act:
(a) "Disseminate" means to (sell, lend, give, exhibit, or show) (sell,
lend, exhibit, or show for monetary consideration) or to offer or agree
to do the same.
(b) "Erotic fondling" means touching a male's or female's [clothed or]
unclothed genitals, pubic area, [or buttocks,] or a female's breast, for the
purpose of sexual stimulation.
(c) "Exhibit" means to do any of the following:
(i) (Present a performance) (Present a performance for monetary
consideration).
(ii) (Sell, give, or offer or agree to sell or give) (Sell or offer or
agree to sell) a ticket to a performance.
(iii) Admit a minor to premises where a performance (is being
presented or is about to be presented) (is being presented or is about to
be presented for monetary consideration).
(d) "Knowingly." A person knowingly disseminates sexually explicit
matter to a minor when the person knows both the nature of the mat-
ter and the status of the minor to whom the matter is disseminated.
A person knows the nature of matter when either of the following cir-
cumstances exists:
[Alternative A of subparagraph (d) (i)]
(i) The person is aware of the character and content of the matter.
[Alternative B of subparagraph (d) (i) ]
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.B.A., 1956, Western Reserve Uni-
versity; J.D., 1959, Yale University.
**B.S., 1973, Iowa State University; J.D., 1976, University of Michigan.
tWe have placed in brackets material covering areas that arguably should not be in-
cluded in the statute. Where some coverage of the general area clearly is needed, but a
choice is presented between alternative provisions, the alternatives are placed in
parentheses alongside each other. See, e.g., lines 1 and 2 of paragraph 1(a). An ex-
ception is paragraph 1(d), where the alternatives are so lengthy that they could not
be accommodated by use of parentheses. The alternatives there have been stated in
separate paragraphs designated as alternatives A, B, and C.
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(i) The person is aware of both the sexually explicit content of the
matter and the fact that the matter will appeal to the prurient interest
of minors.
[Alternative C of subparagraph (d) (i)]
(i) The person is aware of both the sexually explicit content of the
matter and the fact that the matter appeals to the prurient interest, is
patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value for minors.
[Alternative A of subparagraph (d) (ii)]
(ii) The person recklessly disregards circumstances suggesting the
character and content of the matter.
[Alternative B of subparagraph (d) (ii)]
(ii) The person recklessly disregards a substantial risk both that
the matter contains sexually explicit material and that the matter ap-
peals to the prurient interest of minors.
[Alternative C of subparagraph (d) (ii)]
(ii) The person recklessly disregards a substantial risk both that
the matter contains sexually explicit material and that the matter ap-
peals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for minors.
A person knows the status of a minor when either of the following
circumstances exists:
(i) The person is aware that the minor is under (16) (17) years
of age.
(ii) The person recklessly disregards a substantial risk that the
minor is under (16) (17) years of age.
A person knowingly makes a false representation as to the age of a
minor or as to the status of being a parent or guardian of a minor when
that person either is aware that the representation is false or recklessly
disregards a substantial risk that the representation is false.
(e) "Masturbation" means manipulation, by hand or instrument, of
the human genitals, whether one's own or another's, for the purpose of
sexual stimulation.
(f) "Minor" means any person under (16) (17) years of age.
(g) "Nudity" means the lewd showing of the genitals or pubic area
of a person of the age of puberty or older.
(h) "Obscene for minors." Sexually explicit matter is "obscene for
minors" when the matter meets all of the following criteria:
(i) Considered as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest of
minors as determined by the experience of minors in the contemporary
(local) (statewide) community.
(ii) It affronts contemporary (local) (statewide) community stand-
ards of adults as to what is suitable matter for minors.
(iii) Considered as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
and scientific value for minors.
In determining whether sexually explicit matter appeals to the prurient
interest of minors, affronts community standards as to suitable matter
[VOL.9:413416
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for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value
for minors, the matter shall be judged with reference to the average minor
of ((15) (16) years of age) (the general age of the minor to whom the
matter was disseminated). [Where the circumstances of presentation, sale,
distribution, or publicity indicate that sexually explicit matter is being com-
mercially exploited by the defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal,
such evidence may be probative in determining whether the matter ap-
peals to the prurient interest of minors, affronts community standards as to
suitable matter for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
and scientific value for minors.]
(i) "Prurient interest." Sexually explicit matter appeals to the prurient
interest if it has a tendency to cause intense sexual stimulation. In de-
termining whether sexually explicit matter appeals to the "prurient
interest," the matter shall be judged with reference to average minors
with ordinary sexual interests unless it appears from the character
of the matter that it is designed to appeal to persons with deviant sexual
interests, including, but not limited to, homosexuals, or sado-masochists.
In that case, the matter shall be judged with reference to average minors
within the particular group for which it appears to be designed.
(j) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means either of the following:
(i) Flagellation or torture, for the purpose of sexual stimulation, by
or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in a revealing
or bizarre costume.
(ii) The condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically
restrained, for the purpose of sexual stimulation, of a person who is nude
or clad in undergarments or in a revealing or bizarre costume.
(k) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or fe-
male genitals when in a state of sexual [stimulation or] arousal.
(1) "Sexual intercourse" means intercourse, real or simulated, whether
genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal.
(m) "Sexually explicit matter" means any sexually explicit visual ma-
terial [, sexually explicit verbal material,] or sexually explicit performance.
(n) "Sexually explicit performance" means a motion picture, exhi-
bition, show, representation, or other presentation, which, in whole or in
part, depicts [nudity,] [sexual excitement,] erotic fondling, sexual inter-
course, or sado-masochistic abuse.
(o) ["Sexually explicit verbal material" means a book, pamphlet,
magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which
contains an explicit and detailed verbal description or narrative account
of [sexual excitement,] [erotic fondling,] masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or sado-masochistic abuse.]
(p) "Sexually explicit visual material" means a picture, photograph,
drawing, sculpture, film, or similar visual representation which depicts
[nudity,] [sexual excitement,] [erotic fondling,] masturbation, sexual in-
tercourse, or sado-masochistic abuse, or a book, magazine, or pamphlet
which contains such a visual representation. Undeveloped photographs,
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molds, and similar visual material may be sexually explicit material not-
withstanding that processing or other acts may be required to make its
sexually explicit content apparent.
Section 2(1). A person is guilty of distributing obscene matter to a
minor if that person does either of the following:
(a) Knowingly disseminates to a minor any sexually explicit visual or
verbal material that is obscene for minors.
(b) Knowingly exhibits to a minor, unaccompanied by a parent or
guardian, a sexually explicit performance that is obscene for minors.
(2) This section does not apply to the dissemination of sexually ex-
plicit matter to a minor by any of the following persons:
(a) A parent or guardian who disseminates sexually explicit matter
to his child or ward.
(b) A teacher or administrator at any accredited school who dis-
seminates sexually explicit matter to students as part of a school program.
(c) A licensed physician or certified psychologist who disseminates
sexually explicit matter in the treatment of a patient.
(d) A librarian employed by a library of an accredited school or a
public library who disseminates sexually explicit matter in the course
of his employment.
(e) Any other person who disseminates sexually explicit matter for a
legitimate medical, scientific, educational, governmental, or judicial pur-
pose.
(3) Distributing obscene matter to a minor is a misdemeanor, pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or by a fine of not
more than $10,000.00, or both. In imposing the fine authorized for this
offense, the court shall consider the scope of the defendant's commercial
activity in distributing obscene matter to minors.
Section 3(1). A person is guilty of facilitative misrepresentation when
that person knowingly makes a false representation that he is the parent
or guardian of a minor, or that a minor is (16) (17) years of age or
older, with the intent to facilitate the dissemination to the minor of sex-
ually explicit matter that is obscene for minors.
(2) Facilitative misrepresentation is a misdemeanor.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
The article that follows is based largely upon a Study Report on juvenile
obscenity statutes prepared for the Michigan Law Revision Commission.'
The objectives of the Report were (1) to analyze the various issues pre-
sented in drafting a juvenile obscenity provision, (2) to survey the treat-
1 Israel & Burns, Study Report on Juvenile Obscenity Laws, MICHIGAN LAW RE-
VISION COMMISSION, 10TI ANNUAL REPORT 133-297 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Study Report]. The Study Report was prepared at the request of a subcommittee of
the Michigan House Judiciary Committee studying obscenity provisions.
[VOL. 9:413
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ment of those issues in statutes adopted by various states2 and statutes
proposed by several distinguished commissions,3 and (3) to propose a
comprehensive model statute that offers a choice of alternative provisions
on key areas of controversy. Certain limitations placed upon the scope
of the Report (and this article) should be noted. First, we were not asked
to discuss whether the state should adopt a provision regulating the dis-
semination of sexually oriented material to juveniles. The Report assumed
that a juvenile obscenity provision would be adopted and the issue before
us was what should be included in that statute.4 Second, the Report as-
sumed that the provision would be in the form of a criminal statute. We
2 The current juvenile obscenity statutes given special consideration were those from
California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 313 (West Supp. 1976)); Colorado (CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18-7-101 to -105 (1973)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.011-.013
(Supp. 1975)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 712-1210 to -1217 (Special
Supp. 1972)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-20 to -22 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1975)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 725.1-.10 (Supp. 1975)); Kentucky (KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 531.010-.080 (Cum. Supp. 1974)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 750.142, .143, .343e, .344, .345 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975));
Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.256-.265 (1973)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:115-1.1-.11 (Supp. 1975)); New York (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20-.21 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1975)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-27.1-01 to -02
(Special Supp. 1975)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, .31, .37 (Page 1975));
Oregon (ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060-.100 (1974)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1201 to -1211
(Supp. 1975)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-390 to -391 (1975)); Washington
(WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68.010-.120 (Supp. 1974)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 61-8A-1 to -7 (Supp. 1974)); and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.25 (Supp.
1975)). These twenty statutes were selected for various reasons. Several are from
states Michigan traditionally looks to for models in drafting legislation. Others
contain somewhat unusual responses to basic issues presented in juvenile obscenity
provisions. All of the statutes examined were adopted or amended after Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See note 347 infra. As a group, they include ex-
amples of almost every type of juvenile provision currently found in this country.
See notes 54, 347 infra. Because of its special significance in Michigan, the Detroit
obscenity ordinance, DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18 (1974), also was given special
attention.
. The proposals given special consideration were: the PROPOSED REVISION OF THE
MICHIGAN CRIMINAL CODE § 6310 (Mich. State Bar 1967); the PROPOSED ARIZONA
REVISED CRIMINAL CODE § 3504 (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975); a model statute
recommended by fourteen members of the Commission on Obscenity and Por-
nography [hereinafter cited as OBSCENITY COMMISSION MODEL STATUTE], see RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 56, 66 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT]; and a model statute proposed by
dissenting Commission members Hill and Link, concurred in by Commissioner
Keating [hereinafter cited as HILL-LINK MODEL STATUTE]. See OBSCENITY COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra, at 463.
4 At the same time, we were to assume that Michigan might not adopt a general
obscenity provision barring distribution of obscene material to consenting adults.
In People v. Bloss, 394 Mich. 79, 228 N.W.2d 384 (1975), the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction for selling obscene matter to adults on
the ground that the Michigan statute had not been construed in compliance with
federal constitutional standards announced after Bloss' trial in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). The court also added the following comment on the current
validity of the Michigan obscenity provisions:
We are unanimously of the opinion that the Michigan statutes regu-
lating the dissemination of "obscene" materials as applied to juveniles
and unconsenting adults are valid and enforceable.
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did not consider the possibility of utilizing a civil proceeding as the basic
means of regulation. 5 Third, it was assumed that the statute would be
based upon essentially the same premises as supported the New York
juvenile obscenity statute upheld in Ginsberg v. New York.6 Those prem-
ises are discussed in part I below.
I. BASIC OBJECTIVES
In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a New York
criminal statute that barred commercial dissemination to minors of ma-
terial found obscene for minors.7 The defendant in Ginsberg contended
We are divided as to whether such statutes can properly be construed
by us without further legislative expression as proscribing the dissemina-
tion of "obscene" material to consenting adults. See Const. 1963, art.
1, § 5.
394 Mich. at 81, 228 N.W.2d at 385. The Bloss reference to art. 1, § 5 of the Mich-
igan constitution, which prohibits enactment of any law "to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech," suggests that the division among the justices may relate to
the legislature's constitutional authority to prohibit dissemination to consenting adults,
rather than the court's authority to substantially reconstruct the broad language of
the current statutes to render these provisions acceptable under the first amendment.
Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
McKinney v. Birmingham, 292 Ala. 726, 727, 296 So. 2d 236, 237 (1974) (Jones,
J., dissenting).
Aside from state constitutional limitations, a general obscenity statute may be
rejected as a matter of legislative policy, as recommended in OBSCENITY COMMIS-
SION REPORT, supra note 3, at 51-56. Several states have decided against adopting
a general obscenity statute. See Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Ex-
plicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 535 (1975) (noting that
Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia now have ob-
scenity statutes governing dissemination only to juveniles).
5 Several states prohibit institution of a criminal proceeding unless the material
disseminated has been adjudged obscene in a civil proceeding and the disseminator
has been so notified by the prosecuting attorney prior to the dissemination that
serves as the basis of the prosecution. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1365(j) (1974);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-05 (Special Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.060
(d) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(10)(b) (Supp. 1975). See also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 106(F) (1974) (prior civil adjudication required except for
materials showing actual ultimate sexual acts and certain simulations of such acts);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2809 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (prior civil proceeding required
for verbal matter).
While Michigan has long provided for injunctive proceedings, it has not made a
prior civil adjudication a prerequisite for criminal prosecution, and the Study Report
proceeded on the assumption that this policy would be continued. See MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2938 (1968). For the arguments for and against requiring a prior
civil adjudication, see Lockhart, supra note 4, at 569-86; Note, The Scienter Re-
quirement in Criminal Obscenity Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 791, 810-19 (1966).
See also Study Report, supra note 1, at 289.
6 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Justices Douglas and Black dissented on the ground that
obscene material is protected by the first amendment. Justice Fortas, in a separate
dissent, accepted the premises that a state could regulate the dissemination of cb-
scenity and could distinguish between adults and children in defining obscenity, but
contended that the majority could not uphold defendant's conviction without "in-
quiry as to whether the material [distributed] is 'obscene' and without any evidence
of pushing or pandering." Id. at 674. See note 308 infra.
7 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h, [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as amended N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See 390 U.S. at 37.
[VOL. 9:413
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that the state statute violated the first amendment. In response, the Court
stressed that the statute applied only to sexually oriented material that
was found obscene under a constitutionally acceptable definition of ob-
scenity. There was no first amendment violation since, as the Court
had noted in prior decisions involving "general" (adult) obscenity statutes,
obscene material is not protected speech under the first amendment.
The Ginsberg opinion also noted that the state had ample justification
to sustain its regulation of an activity that was not protected by the first
amendment. The Court noted two state interests that combined to sup-
port the New York prohibition against the commercial dissemination of
obscene material to minors. First, the legislature could "rationally con-
clude" that the exposure of minors to obscene material was "harmful"
to the youths' "ethical and moral development," although there were no
decisive scientific studies supporting that conclusion.8 Second, the state
could appropriately seek to support the interest of parents in controlling
their children's access to obscene material.
As noted above, our Report assumed that any juvenile obscenity pro-
vision adopted in Michigan would be based on the dual state interests
noted in Ginsberg. Both interests are well established in Michigan legis-
lative precedent. Michigan has long regulated the flow of sexually oriented
material to minors on the ground that at least certain types of sexually ori-
ented material may be "harmful" to the minors.9 Other Michigan legislation
8 Available scientific evidence remains inconclusive. The OBSCENITY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 27, concluded that
empirical research designed to clarify the question has found no evi-
dence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a signifi-
cant role in the causation of delinquent.., behavior among youth....
See also M. GOLDSTEIN & H. KANT, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL DEVIANCE (1973). A
contrary view apparently is held by many persons who work with delinquents. See
OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 160-63 (noting opinion polls of
police chiefs, social workers, and others). It should be emphasized, moreover, that the
state's interest in the behavior of youth extends beyond controlling acts formally
classified as "delinquent." The state also may be concerned with various aspects of
juvenile sexual behavior that are viewed as "socially deleterious." Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 n.8 (1973). See also Gaylin, Book Review, 77
YALE L.J. 579, 595 (1968) (noting the need to "keep the lid on" the sexual drive of
adolescents to limit neuroses "built on frustration of sexual drive"). There is sub-
stantial evidence that significant exposure to obscenity may have an impact upon
other juvenile sexual behavior that is not classified as delinquency. See OBSCENITY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 182-94 and the studies cited therein. But the
large number of factors that contribute to such behavior, and the limited range of
the currently available studies, preclude any firm conclusions. See id. at 381 (state-
ment of Commissioners Lipton and Greenwood that "a significant deficiency in the
work of the Commission was the failure to comprehensively study the effects of
erotica in children and juveniles whose sexual behavior is not yet fixed"). See also
Waaben, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, in II COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL REPORT 127-28 (1971) (noting that foreign jurisdictions
that have decriminalized obscenity have nevertheless retained certain prohibitions
against commercial dissemination to minors).
9 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.142, .143, .343e (Supp. 1975) (prohibiting
dissemination of obscene materials as matter "tending to corrupt the morals of
youth").
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has recognized the importance of supplementing parental control over
the exposure of children to sex-related material. 10 Similar legislative
precedent is found in many jurisdictions."
Of course, the two state interests noted in Ginsberg may sometimes
conflict. As between the two, we assume that, as in the New York pro-
vision upheld in Ginsberg, the parental interest in controlling a child's ac-
cess to sexually oriented materials should prevail over the public's more
general interest in restricting the flow of potentially harmful materials to
minors. Thus, even though the state provision extends only to obscene
materials, it should not prohibit parents from showing such materials
to their children. The interest of parents should prevail, notwithstanding
the potentially harmful impact of obscene materials, because, inter alia,
(1) the harmful impact is not so well established as to overcome the usual
presumption that the care and development of the minor should be left
to the discretion of the parent, and (2) the harmful impact, even if ac-
cepted as almost inevitable under certain circumstances, can be neutralized
or even reversed in an appropriate context, such as that likely to be
created with careful parental guidance. 12 Similar factors also justify recog-
10 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.789c (Supp. 1975) (recognizing parental
control over sex education in the schools).11See the state statutes cited in note 2 supra. The Ginsberg opinion listed thirty-
six states that had separate obscenity provisions applicable to distributions to juveniles.
See 390 U.S. at 647-48. After Ginsberg, several additional states adopted juvenile
obscenity provisions, and more than forty states currently have such provisions.
See Friedman, State Obscenity Statutes, in II COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND POR-
NOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL REPORT 37, 45 (1971).
12 Consider in this connection the potential value of "gradual and age-appro-
priate exposure" as suggested in OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
381-82 (separate statements of Commissioners Lipton and Greenwood):
It appears well-established that sexual interests are instinctually derived
and that they are present from infancy through old age with different
degrees of intensity. Consequently, it is impossible to fully protect
children from exposure to sexual stimuli.... One may, therefore, ask
whether such an exposure may not be an inevitable part of growing
up in any culture and whether it may even serve a purpose. Gradual
and age-appropriate exposure to erotic stimuli may lead to the de-
velopment of socially appropriate defense mechanisms like sublimation,
repression, postponement and self-control. Although the analogy may be
somewhat far-fetched, it seems possible that graded exposure may
immunize in somewhat the same fashion that exposure to bacteria
and viruses builds resistance. If this analogy has merit, total lack of
exposure would render the child who is totally unexposed as helpless
as the animal raised in a totally sterile environment who later en-
counters the invariably contaminated real world. The finding that sex
offenders tend to come from highly restricted families and have had
less than the usual exposure to erotica suggests that they may not have
had the opportunity to develop appropriate self-control.
To continue the analogy, overwhelming exposure might cause ill-
ness rather than immunization. An especially vulnerable period is
likely following puberty when sexual impulses of increasing intensity
emerge. A major problem of adolescence is that of impulse control,
and in our troubled and rapidly changing world youngsters are already
hyper-stimulated. To add to this stimulation by a completely per-
missive attitude with respect to the availability of sexual materials
appears imprudent. For this reason, we have voted for the juvenile
legislation.
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nition of the interest of various professionals (such as physicians and
teachers) in using obscene materials with minors for educational or scien-
tific purposes. The training and professional standards of such persons
provides considerable assurance that their use of obscene material
in a controlled context will be designed to benefit rather than harm the
child. Moreover, their work with the children ordinarily is subject to
parental control.
While acceptance of the dual interests noted in Ginsberg provides a
foundation for drafting a juvenile obscenity statute, it does not automat-
ically determine the appropriate scope of such a statute. This article seeks
primarily to explore the various issues presented in determining that scope.
Of course, those issues must be analyzed in light of the legislation's basic
objective of supporting the parents' interest in controlling their children's
access to potentially harmful sex-related material. However, several other
objectives should be considered along with the most efficient achievement
of that basic function.
First, consideration should be given to limiting the administrative
burden placed upon commercial disseminators of sexually oriented ma-
terial. Limiting that burden is not simply for the benefit of the dissem-
inators. If disseminators find it too difficult to identify what the law
permits minors to purchase, they may simply refuse to sell any sex-related
material, including clearly beneficial material, to minors. Similarly, if the
disseminators find that the burden of identifying customers as minors is
too great, they may simply refuse to carry sex-related materials prohibited
for minors, thereby restricting the availability of such materials to adults as
well as minors.
Second, the legislation should seek to avoid placing restrictions on the
dissemination of non-obscene, sexually oriented materials which, far from
being potentially harmful, are legitimate and helpful for minors. Over-
breadth has been a constitutional hurdle upon which numerous obscenity
statutes have fallen. Potential overbreadth also has been the source of
much of the opposition to adoption of obscenity provisions relating to
minors. Very few people have argued that young persons should be per-
mitted, without parental approval, to see X-rated films. The primary con-
cern has been that statutes not be drafted so broadly that one can legiti-
mately question the legality of disseminating to a minor a novel like
The Catcher in the Rye or a copy of Time magazine that contains a picture
of a nude. Although there may be little likelihood that a prosecutor would
utilize an overly broad statute to reach such publications, the mere
existence of such a statute has been challenged as having a pernicious
impact upon the exercise of free speech.
Third, the legislation should seek to avoid placing unnecessary burdens
upon parents (and assisting professionals) who seek to expose their
children to material which might be viewed as obscene. Of course, the
prohibition of commercial dissemination directly to minors naturally
inhibits, to some extent, the parents' and assisting professionals' capacity
to expose children to the regulated material. The existence of a criminal
prohibition, even though it exempts parental distribution, necessarily
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reinforces public opposition to such material and strengthens community
pressures against parents who desire to expose their children to such
material. Also, the prohibition against sales directly to minors places upon
the parent the burden of distribution, since the parent must purchase the
book and then give it to his child, or, in the case of performances, ac-
company the child to the performance. These burdens cannot readily be
eliminated if the statute is to remain supportive of those parents who
desire state aid in keeping obscene material from their children. However,
the statute can establish the legality of dissemination by parents and as-
sisting professionals in a manner sufficiently clear to relieve them of any
fear of criminal prosecution. It can clearly indicate, for example, that
the legislative objective of supporting parental control permits parents
and professionals to utilize obscene material with children and that no
justification for such use is required beyond a showing of the parent's or
professional's relationship to the child.
Consideration of the three objectives noted above suggests that two
principles should be particularly stressed in drafting a juvenile obscenity
statute. First, the statute should be as specific in coverage as possible. The
matter encompassed by the statute, the degree of mens rea required,
and the exemptions from coverage should be stated as clearly as possible.
Reference to specific examples should not be avoided where they can
supplement a general characterization. Second, where any significant
legislative doubt exists as to statutory coverage of a particular category of
sexually oriented material, whether because the harmful quality of the ma-
terial is doubtful or because the category creates a significant potential for
over-application of the statute to bar dissemination of beneficial materials,
dissemination of that material should not be regulated under the statute.
In determining the scope of the statute, consideration also should
be given to the fact that the range of sexually oriented materials avail-
able to minors will be limited by the structure of the market as well as
by the coverage of a particular state statute. 13 Publishers and producers
of material exploiting prurient appeal operate largely within a national
market. Moreover, it is a market that looks primarily to adult customers
rather than to juvenile customers. In light of this market structure, a
juvenile obscenity statute that prohibits a somewhat narrower range of ma-
terials may be just as effective in restricting the flow of potentially harmful
13 Statements in this article relating to the marketing of sexually oriented
material are based primarily on studies cited in OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 7-22, 72-137. Consideration was given, however, to certain obvious
changes in marketing that have occurred since those studies were published. Today
there is considerably more sexual explicitness in material available to most adults
and many minors. Consider, for example, the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 14, describing Playboy magazine as of 1970 ("[i]n most cases, there
is only breast and buttock exposure, although on occasion very discrete photographs
of feminine public hair have been printed"). We have also noted what appears to be
a significant increase in "adult-only" bookstores and movies. We have not been able
to consider other possible marketing changes that would not be as apparent to the
casual observer (such as any change in the percentage of material being distributed
by mail).
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material as a broader statute that would more readily be subject to overly
broad application. The producer ordinarily is not in a position to care-
fully tailor his publication so that it retains its prurient appeal but never-
theless has a sexual content that is permissible under the statute with
somewhat narrower coverage. If a Michigan provision, for example, did
not prohibit the lewd portrayal of nudity, but did prohibit the depiction
of sexual acts, producers of publications exploiting prurient appeal could
not readily seek to avoid the statute's impact by limiting their material to de-
pictions of nudity. To be commercially successful, prurient material designed
for the adult market generally must portray far more than nudity alone.
14
Even if the juvenile market were viewed as sufficiently significant to support
publications aimed primarily at juveniles, that market, for most forms
of publications, would have to encompass a multistate area. Accordingly,
the producer could not tailor the content to take advantage of the narrower
range of restrictions in a particular state statute. If the Michigan Legis-
lature concluded, for example, that the state's juvenile statute need not
encompass the portrayal of nudity, that determination would not signifi-
cantly encourage publication of a magazine aimed at juveniles and com-
posed largely of nude pin-ups. Such a magazine still could not be sold to
minors in Ohio, Illinois, and other Midwest States since those states all
have youth provisions that reach depictions of nudity. Thus, carefully re-
stricting coverage not only will serve the subsidiary objectives noted above,
but it may do so without any significant loss, as compared to a broader
provision, in the statute's effectiveness in restricting dissemination of ma-
terial exploiting prurient appeal.
A final factor to consider in establishing the range of the statute is the
inherent limitation upon the effectiveness of any statute in restricting dis-
semination to minors of material that is freely available to adults. No mat-
ter how extensive its coverage, a juvenile statute is unlikely to keep from
minors all of even the most clearly pornographic material. While the
threat of criminal sanctions should constitute a substantial deterrent to
direct commercial distribution to juveniles, it is not likely to have nearly
as significant an impact upon noncommercial, "second-hand" distribution
of materials originally purchased by adults for their own consumption. 15
The most that can be expected of a juvenile provision, given the wide
range of material legally disseminated to adults,', is that it assist parents
opposed to such material by restricting the variety of sources available
to juveniles. An effective statute is likely to do no more than keep the
flow of materials from becoming a tidal wave, and its capacity to serve
this function may actually be strengthened by narrower coverage that
ensures strong public support for its enforcement.
14 See generally Skin Trouble, TIME, Sept. 22, 1975, at 50. But consider the
"nudity" magazines described in People v. Berger, - Colo. -, 521 P.2d 1244
(1974).
15 See notes 364-66 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the impact
of dissemination by peers.
16 See notes 4 supra, 363 infra.
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II. DEFINING OBSCENITY: THE TRIPARTITE TEST
In determining the appropriate scope of a juvenile obscenity statute,
a good starting point is the definition of the material subject to regulation
by the statute.17 The New York statute' 8 upheld in Ginsberg utilized a
two-part definition of such material. First, the encompassed material was
limited to matter depicting nudity or specified sexual activity. Even if the
material had such content, it was not subject to regulation unless it also
fell within the second segment of the definition, a tripartite constitutional
standard for defining obscenity. Most of the more recently adopted state
juvenile obscenity provisions have followed the two-step approach of the
Ginsberg statute. The next two sections of this article will consider the
desirability of including each segment of the two-part definition and the
contents of the segments if included. For more convenient analysis, we
will consider initially various issues relating to the second segment of the
definition, the modified tripartite test, and then will treat the first segment.
A. Basic Functions
The tripartite test utilized in the Ginsberg statute was derived from a
series of Supreme Court decisions involving the dissemination of sexually
oriented materials to adults. Those decisions hold that a state has
authority to prohibit the dissemination of sexually oriented material to
consenting adults only if the material involved can be classified consti-
tutionally as "obscene."' 9 If the material is not obscene, the first amend-
ment prohibits its regulation. The state's interests in prohibiting the dis-
semination of sexually oriented materials is not sufficient to meet the
standard of overwhelming justification (such as the need to respond
to a clear and present danger of violence) required to uphold state
regulation of protected speech. .0 Sexually oriented material which is
17 Statutes commonly describe such material as matter "harmful to minors," in
order to avoid any confusion with the category of "obscene" materials proscribed
under general statutes dealing with dissemination to adults. Our proposed provision
uses the phrase "obscene for minors" because it more readily conveys the emphasis
upon sexual depictions. Compare OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E)(3) (Page
1975) which also encompasses depictions of "extreme or bizarre violence, cruelty,
or brutality."
18 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h, [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as amended
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
19 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). (When the citation order departs
from the ordering system suggested by A Uniform System of Citation (1 Ith ed. 1967),
the cases are listed in the order of interest or in the order of chronological develop-
ment.) See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), decided after Ginsberg. The
Court has been divided on this point, with as many as four Justices, in dissent, con-
tending that state provisions barring dissemination of obscene material to consenting
adults violate the first amendment. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 The fact that speech falls within the protection of the first amendment does
not necessarily prohibit its regulation. The state may still impose certain restrictions
if supported by an extraordinarily strong showing of need. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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"obscene," however, does not fall within the protection of the first amend-
ment.21 Obscene material, the Court has noted, does not serve the ex-
pository function that the first amendment is designed to protect. Obscene
material constitutes "no essential part of any exposition of ideas."22
Obscenity is of "such slight social value as a step to truth" that its distribu-
tion may be prohibited even though the potential harm flowing from such
distribution falls far short of the overwhelming state interest needed to
regulate protected speech.23
While a majority of the Supreme Court has consistently accepted the
state's authority to prohibit the dissemination of obscenity to adults, the Jus-
tices were unable to agree, for a substantial period of time, on a test for dis-
tinguishing obscene material from other sexually oriented material that
is protected under the first amendment.2 4 In Miller v. California,25 the
majority finally agreed upon a tripartite test as the constitutionally re-
quired definition of obscenity. Miller described that test as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether
"the average person applying contemporary community stand-
ards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957)]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the ap-
plicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 26
The three elements of the tripartite test are commonly characterized
as the "prurient interest," "patent offensiveness" and "social value"
standards..27 Each of these elements is designed to ensure that sexually
21 The majority's classification of "obscenity" as unprotected splech has been
the topic of considerable debate both among the Justices and commentators, but
it is generally recognized as the foundation for the majority's position. See Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-79 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mon-
aghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod,
76 YALE L.J. 127, 131-34 (1966).
22 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)) (emphasis by Court in both Miller and Roth).
23 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)) (emphasis by Court in both Miller and Roth); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). See also note 145 and accompanying
text infra (describing the state interest in prohibiting the dissemination of obscenity
to consenting adults).
24 In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), three dissenting Justices
concluded that no standard could "separate obscenity from other sexually oriented
but constitutionally protected speech," without creating a constitutionally unaccept-
able "risk to encroachment upon the guarantees of the due process clause and the
first amendment." Id. at 79-80, 84-85. See also id. at 103, 112-13. The dissenters
accordingly rejected the constitutionality of prohibiting dissemination of obscene
material to consenting adults, but also found it unnecessary "to consider the extent
of state power to regulate the distribution of sexually oriented materials to juveniles.
... Id. at 78.
25413 U.S. 15 (1973).
26 Id. at 24.
27 The phase "social value" is merely a shorthand reference to lack of literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. It does not refer to a general concept of having
"social importance," which the Court specifically rejected in Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 n.7.
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oriented material which meets the tripartite standard lacks the expository
quality of protected speech. The elements of prurient appeal and patent
offensiveness describe the major characteristics of pornography. As the
Court has noted, material classified as "obscene" under the tripartite test
is more accurately described as "obscene, pornographic" material or
"hard-core pornography. '12 8 Pornographic material, by its very nature,
almost invariably fails to make a contribution to the exposition of ideas.
Where material depicts "hard-core" sexual conduct, appeals to the pru-
rient interest, and has the allure of "forbidden fruit" associated with that
which patently offends community standards, those qualities strongly
indicate that the material represents an effort simply to arouse sexual
stimulation, rather than to contribute to the communication of ideas or
artistic value. Moreover, those qualities also suggest that the average
viewer will utilize such material for the purpose of titillation and not as
a source of ideas or artistic value.2 9 Finally, even though the prurient ap-
peal and patent offensiveness elements establish the pornographic quality of
the material being challenged, the social value element of the tripartite test
is applied to ensure that the material does indeed fail to serve the expos-
itory function of protected speech. That element requires a specific find-
ing that the material does not seriously advance the exposition of literary,
artistic, political, or scientific ideas or values. 30
B. Application to Minors
The juvenile provisions proposed by the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography 3' and the Arizona Criminal Code Commission 3 2 both
28 The Court noted in Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 n.2, that its use of the term "ob-
scene" to describe material not protected under the first amendment "does not re-
flect the precise meaning of 'obscene' as traditionally used in the English language."
The material in question, the Court noted, is more accurately described as "porno-
graphic" in its portrayal of sex and "obscene" in being "grossly repugnant to the
generally accepted notions of what is appropriate" (quoting from Webster's dic-
tionary). Thus, the better reference is to "obscene, pornographic material," id. at 22,
or, as Miller also describes it, " 'hard-core' pornography," id. at 28. But see Lockhart,
supra note 4, arguing that the illustrations of "obscenity" offered in Miller are not
limited to what would be commonly described as "hard-core pornography." See also
notes 302-06 and accompanying text infra.
29 For a discussion of the function and impact of pornography, see the materials
collected in Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 62-67 (1960) and I COMMISSION ON OB-
SCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL REPORT 5-101 (1971).
30 Compare this explanation of the tripartite test with Note, Community Standards,
Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840
(1975) ("the standard of obscenity relates in no predetermined way to any par-
ticular view of the first amendment").
31 The juvenile statute proposed by the Commission majority, see note 3 supra,
prohibits the commercial dissemination of materials depicting specified sexual con-
duct or emphasizing the depiction of unclothed genitals, except where such materials
constitute "works of art or of anthropological significance." See OBSCENITY COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 66. The statute does not refer to the tripartite
standard, and this omission apparently was based on the assumption that the tri-
partite test was not an essential element of the governing constitutional standard.
Thus, the commentary in the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, written before Miller,
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apparently assume that a state need not apply the tripartite test in bar-
ring dissemination to minors of at least material depicting sexual conduct.
The constitutionality of this assumption is doubtful. While there is no
Supreme Court holding directly on point,33 the basic rationale of both
took the following view of the Ginsberg ruling.
The definition used in the statute approved in the Ginsberg case is a
complex one. Essentially, to be prohibited for distribution to minors,
material must fall within one or more objectively defined categories
of explicit sexual material, and must also be "harmful to minors,"
a term defined through the use of a three-part test similar to that used
under the Roth case, but modified to require appeal to the prurient
interest of minors, patent offensiveness in light of prevailing standards
in the adult community with respect to what is suitable for minors,
and utter lack of redeeming social importance for minors. The Ginsberg
case, however, does not appear to require that minors statutes conform
in their application to this particular definition. Rather, the Court's
opinion states that definitions in minors statutes may be constitutionally
applied so long as it is "not irrational for the legislature to find that
exposure to material condemned by the statute is harmful to minors."
OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 322-23 (footnotes omitted). At
other points, where the Commission viewed application of portions of the tripartite
standard as constitutionally required or desirable as a matter of policy, those portions
were included in the statute. See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
42 (using an element of the tripartite standard in a draft of a provision applicable
to dissemination to adults), at 58 (suggesting application of a "social value" test if
verbal material were included in a juvenile obscenity provision), at 463 (juvenile
statute proposed by dissenting Commission members, including a pre-Miller version
of the tripartite standard). See also id. at 40 (criticizing the subjectivity and vague-
ness of the tripartite standard).
Other statutory proposals that do not rely upon the tripartite standard are ad-
vanced in Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions: Analysis, Impact,
and Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 906, 941 (1974); Dibble, Ob-
scenity: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 354-55
(1966).
32 PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3504 (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975) pro-
hibits dissemination of material depicting specified sexual conduct by persons other
than parents, teachers, and the like. The provision does not refer to the tripartite
test, although that test is included in the general obscenity provision applicable to
adults. See PROPOSED AIz. CRIM. CODE §§ 3500(i), 3501 (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n
1975).
Oregon also fails to refer to the tripartite test in its juvenile provision, although
it includes a tripartite test in the general obscenity provision. ORE. REV. STAT. §§
167.060-.070 (1974); Ch. 699, § 4(2), [1973] 1 Ore. Laws 1594. The two obscenity
provisions were adopted at different times, however, and it may be that the juvenile
statute, adopted before Miller, was drafted on the assumption that the courts
would incorporate the prevailing constitutional standard as part of the offense. See
notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra. The Oregon juvenile provision was cited in
Miller as an example of a statute limited in application to material depicting specific
sexual conduct, but the Court noted that the citation should "not be understood as
approving ... [that statute] in all other respects." 413 U.S. at 24 n.6. See also the
Ohio statute discussed in note 40 infra.
The Michigan provision, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.343e (1968), also fails to
refer to the tripartite test, but it is a very general provision that invites judicial in-
corporation of that standard. See note 54 infra.
33 Consider, however, Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975)
(described in note 309 infra):
In Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of the adult obscenity
standards enunciated in Roth v. United States [354 U.S. 476 (1957)] and
Memoirs v. Massachusetts [383 U.S. 413 (1966)] (plurality opinion).
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Miller and Ginsberg suggests that the state may only reach sexually
oriented material classified as "obscene" under the tripartite test as
adapted to minors.
The New York juvenile statute34 upheld in Ginsberg utilized a pre-
Miller version of the tripartite standard, which was modified to fit an
audience of minors. Material obscene for minors was identified by ap-
plying the prurient interest, patent offensiveness, and social value tests.
Each of these tests was applied in light of the experience and capacity of
youth; the prurient appeal test, for example, was met if the material ap-
pealed to the prurient interest of minors, even if not to the prurient interest
of adults. Aside from this adaptation, however, the three tests were iden-
tical to the elements of the tripartite standard applied to general obscenity
prosecutions.
Although the majority opinion in Ginsberg upheld the New York
statute, it did not state that a juvenile provision would be constitutional
only if it closely followed the New York formula. The primary issue of
concern was whether a state could proscribe distribution to minors of
material that would not be obscene for adults.3 5 In holding that the state
could distinguish between adults and minors, the Court did not focus upon
New York's particular adaptation of the tripartite standard to fit an
atdience of minors. On the other hand, the opinion did rest upon an an-
alysis that strongly suggests, in light of Miller, that the state must use some
version of the tripartite test as the core of its definition of proscribed
material.
The Ginsberg majority noted that a juvenile obscenity provision might
well be unconstitutional if tested by the "clear and present danger" stand-
ard applied to regulations of other types of speech.3 6 However, since the
New York provision dealt only with material that was "obscene" for
minors and obscenity was not "protected expression" under the first
amendment, the state could act without scientific proof clearly establish-
ing that the exposure of juveniles to proscribed material created a clear
and present danger. While the Ginsberg opinion did not discuss the
limits of the definition that a state could apply to ensure that its regula-
tion was limited to material "obscene" for minors, the opinion did note
that New York's reliance upon the tripartite standard provided such
assurance. 31 In light of the Miller analysis, it is extremely doubtful that
any standard other than the tripartite test would provide satisfactory first
amendment protection. If each element of the tripartite test is an essen-
In Miller v. California,... we abandoned the Roth-Memoirs test forjudging obscenity with respect to adults. We have not had occasion to
decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formulation.
See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 686-87 (1968) (discussed in
note 77 infra).
34 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h, [19651 N.Y. Laws 480, as amended
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
35 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
36 Id. at 641.
37 ld. at 635.
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tial tool in ensuring that the material does not make a contribution to the
exposition of ideas as applied to a general adult audience, the same ele-
ments would appear to be necessary to ensure that there is no significant
expository value as applied to a juvenile audience. Of course, as Ginsberg
clearly indicates, each element of the tripartite test may be measured in
terms of the capacity and experience of minors, but the basic character-
istics of "obscenity" should not otherwise differ. Thus, the first amend-
ment analysis of the Ginsberg opinion constitutes a warning, in light of
Miller, against attempting to discard any or all elements of the tripartite
standard as applied to juveniles-at least while the legislature lacks evi-
dence which would so clearly establish an immediate harm to juveniles
that it would sustain a statute regulating material otherwise protected
under the first amendment.
C. Inclusion in Statute
Accepting the premise that a state may bar only material that falls
within the tripartite test as modified for minors, the issue arises as to
who should apply that test. Since the tripartite test is a first amendment
standard, the trial court must apply the test as a legal limitation in re-
viewing a constitutional challenge to a conviction.3 8 However, if the test
is included in the statutory description of the proscribed material, obscenity
becomes an element of the offense, and the test also must be applied by
the trier of fact, which often will be a jury.
Almost all of the state provisions examined have sought to include the
constitutional test for obscenity as part of the statutory description of the
proscribed material. 39 Several of the provisions adopted prior to Miller
do not refer to all of the elements of the current tripartite test,40 but courts
applying obscenity statutes traditionally have incorporated missing ele-
38 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184 (1964); United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973).
3 9 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.013(1)(f) (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §
201.257 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(11) (Supp. 1975). The only ex-
ceptions are the Oregon provision, ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060-.075 (1974), and the
Michigan provision, MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.343e (1968), both discussed in
note 32 supra.
40 See HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210 (Special Supp. 1972) (lacking patently
offensive); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1l-21(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (lacking
an independent social value element); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.7 (Supp. 1975)
(lacking patently offensive and social value elements); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
11-31-10 (Supp. 1974) (similar to the New Jersey provision). See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (Page 1975) (prohibiting dissemination of material "harmful
to juveniles" and defining such material as being patently offensive and either
appealing to the prurient interest or, inter alia, depicting "sexual activity, masturba-
tion, sexual excitement, or nudity"); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E) (Page
1974). The Ohio obscenity standard for dissemination to adults also treats prurient
appeal as an alternative test in determining obscenity. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.01(F) (Page 1975). But see Hollington v. Ricco, 40 Ohio App. 2d 57, 65-66,
318 N.E.2d 442, 448-49 (1973) (holding that all elements of the Miller tripartite
standard apply to definition of obscenity under the general provision). See also note
32 supra.
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ments of the tripartite standard in the course of interpreting these statutes. 41
Indeed, the pattern of including the constitutional standard is so common
that exclusion of the standard probably could be ensured only by stating
in the statute that the tripartite standard was not a part of the offense and
its application should not be submitted to the trier of fact. 42
Excluding the tripartite standard from the elements of the offense
clearly would risk invalidation of the statute. Such action would not only
be unique, but it readily could be viewed as contrary to Miller and Gins-
berg. The Miller opinion referred several times to the tripartite test as a
standard to be applied by the jury as the trier of fact. Of course, Miller
did not squarely present this issue, since the state provision there spe-
cifically incorporated an earlier version of the tripartite standard. Never-
theless, the Court's references to jury application of the tripartite standard
were not directed at the particular statute involved in Miller, but at ob-
scenity provisions generally. The Court referred initially to the three ele-
ments of the tripartite standard as "the basic guidelines for the trier of
fact."'43 Further on, the Court noted that "[i]n resolving the inevitable sens-
itive questions of fact and law [presented under the tripartite standard],
we must continue to rely on the jury system."'44 Finally, in discussing the
appropriate scope of the community standard utilized in applying the tri-
partite test, the Court again assumed that the standard would be applied
by the "lay jurors as the usual ultimate fact finders," noting that the test
was designed to permit jurors to draw on the practices of their own com-
munity. 45
While Ginsberg did not discuss the role of the trier of fact, the first
amendment analysis of Ginsberg suggests that the Miller statements re-
garding jury responsibility would apply also to a juvenile statute. The
variation between a juvenile and an adult audience would not appear to
have a significant bearing on the role of the jury in applying the tripartite
4 1 See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 476-77, 296 So. 2d 218, 220-21 (1974);
State ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 232, 229
N.W.2d 389, 394 (1975), leave to appeal granted, 394 Mich. 803 (1975); Hamar
Theatre, Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312, 1323 (D.N.J. 1973) (collecting cases);
Hollington v. Ricco, 40 Ohio App. 2d 57, 318 N.E.2d 442 (1973) (described in
note 40 supra). Although these decisions involved general obscenity statutes, the
opinions offer no basis for assuming that state courts will not be as willing to in-
corporate missing elements of the tripartite test in a juvenile provision. Courts have
been less willing to incorporate the specific definitions of encompassed sexual
conduct required by Miller, but that task requires a considerably more extensive
rewriting of the statute. See State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (col-
lecting cases); note 250 infra; Study Report, supra note 1, at 156.
42 Cf. State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974) (although the New
Jersey Legislature in 1969 passed an amendment deleting reference to the social
value element, the court interpreted the legislation as incorporating the social value
element as stated in Miller, since Miller established the constitutional necessity of
that element).
43 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), quoted in text accompanying
note 26 supra.
44 Id. at 26.
45 Id. at 30.
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test.46 It is noteworthy also that the New York juvenile statute upheld in
Ginsberg specifically incorporated the tripartite test as an element of the
offense. 47
Since the issue was not squarely presented in either Miller or Ginsberg,
and since the Court has not insisted upon a jury adjudication in noncrim-
inal proceedings in which the tripartite test is applied, 48 the possibility
of excluding the tripartite standard from the statutory offense should not
be viewed by the legislature as absolutely foreclosed. If excluding the
tripartite standard from the province of the trier of fact would provide
significant administrative or substantive advantages, it might be worth
the risk of directly challenging the Miller dictum. But excluding the stand-
ard is not likely to be helpful either in fulfilling the substantive objectives
of the statute or in reducing the complexity of an obscenity trial.
From the viewpoint of convenience of trial administration, there is little
to be gained by excluding jury application of the tripartite standard. Evi-
dence relating to the tripartite standard will have to be introduced in any
event since a court will have to apply that standard in response to an
almost certain constitutional challenge to any prosecution. Indeed, a
portion of that evidence often would be presented before the jury even
if the tripartite standard were not an element of the offense. Proof of the
requisite mens rea for conviction often requires evidence that the de-
fendant was aware, or should have been aware, of at least some of those
characteristics of the material that bring it within the tripartite standard.4 9
Permitting jury application of the standard itself probably serves to elim-
inate considerable dispute as to whether evidence relating to erotic quality
and community standards is "relevant" to mens rea or to other statutory
46 One aspect of jury participation is that the jurors can judge the possible
prurient appeal and patent offensiveness of the material in terms of community
standards as they know them. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
Expert testimony, the Court has noted, is not essential to sustain a determination
that material is obscene uinder the tripartite standard. See Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
Paris Adult Theatre did, however,
reserve judgment .... [as to] the extreme case . . . where contested ma-
terials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the experience
of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the
material appeals to the prurient interest.
413 U.S. at 56 n.6. The interests and responses of juveniles do not appear to be so
far removed from the jurors' experience as to fall within this reservation. In Ham-
ling, the Court compared the jury's application of the prurient interest and patent
offensiveness standard to the jury's application of the "reasonable person" standard
in tort law. 418 U.S. at 104-05. There are several areas of tort law where the jury
may determine, without expert witnesses, the proclivities and capacities of those
who are young.
47 See 390 U.S. at 646.
48 Juries are not required in declaratory judgment or injunctive proceedings re-
lating to the dissemination of allegedly obscene material. See Kingsley Books v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973). But see
McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975) (jury determination required in an
injunctive proceeding to ensure proper application of community standards).
49 See notes 416-25, 433-36 and accompanying text infra.
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issues, such as whether a depiction of nudity meets the statutory standard
of "lewdness."
In terms of the legislation's substantive objectives, excluding the tri-
partite standard from the statute could result in significant disadvantages
rather than advantages. Treating the standard as an element of the of-
fense provides an extra safeguard against restricting dissemination of
legitimate materials since it means that the jury, as well as the judge, must
find that the matter in question falls within the standard. 50 Moreover, the
50 The Supreme Court has not had occasion to describe the scope of the trial
court's obligation in applying the tripartite test as a first amendment limitation.
Precedent in comparable areas suggests that the trial court's obligation is to make
its own independent determination as to the application of the tripartite standard,
rather than merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to present the
issue to the jury. Cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964). Over the years the Court has divided on
whether a similar standard of independent review should apply on appellate review
of obscenity convictions, with some Justices suggesting that a determination of ob-
scenity should be treated as a factual finding and upheld if there is significant evidence
supporting that finding. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 101-02
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting opinions on both sides). Miller arguably
rejected that view when it recognized "the ultimate power of an appellate court to
conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary," 413 U.S.
at 25, 22 n.3, but Miller also stressed the role of the jury as the "ultimate fact-
finders" on the issues of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. Id. at 30.
Commentators accordingly have suggested that the independent appellate review
required by Miller is likely to be exercised only as the social value element of the
tripartite test. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1030 (4th ed. 1975); Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions,
59 A.B.A.J. 1261, 1264-65 (1973); Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and
Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1844 (1975). See also
authorities cited in note 197 infra, discussing the difficulty in obtaining effective
appellate review as to prurient appeal and patent offensiveness when a local (as
opposed to statewide) community standard is applied. But cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 161 (1974), in which the Court reversed an obscenity conviction on the
ground that the movie in question "could not be found under the Miller standard
to depict sexual conduct in a patently offensive way." The Court noted that
[e]ven though questions of appeal to the "prurient interest" or of patent
offensiveness are "essentially questions of fact," it would be a serious
misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion
in determining what is "patently offensive."
Id. at 60.
Lower courts have divided as to the scope of the independent appellate review
required by Miller. See Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 576, 217 N.W.2d 676, 679
(1974) (only the issue of serious social value "may be determined independently
by the appellate court"); State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 320 A.2d 646 (1974)
(whether material meets tripartite test is issue of fact for the jury, with the appel-
late court determining only whether the material contained the specified sexual
content); State v. American Theatre Corp., 194 Neb. 84, -, 230 N.W.2d 209, 213
(1975) ("whether a particular work is obscene is an issue which must be decided
by the court as a matter of law, in reviewing such cases").
Even if appellate review does not require an extensive independent determination
of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness, the task of the appellate court may be
distinguished from that of the trial judge. Unlike the appellate court, the trial judge
is in a much more appropriate position to exercise independent judgment on local
community standards. Cf. note 48 supra. Various appellate court cases have empha-
sized the trial judge's obligation to make an independent determination of obscenity
as a matter of law. See, e.g., People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 320 n.1, 307 N.E.2d
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jury must be persuaded of the standard's application beyond a reasonable
doubt, while the court apparently may apply a less rigorous standard of
persuasion in making its first amendment determination. 51 Jury participa-
tion is also valuable because (1) the substance of the tripartite test, at
least insofar as it is tied to community standards, is particularly appropri-
ate for jury determination, 52 and (2) in an area likely to be controversial,
such as prosecution for dissemination of obscenity, confidence in both the
correctness of the law and any resulting convictions is evidenced by our
willingness to assign to the jury, with its capacity for nullification, the task
of ruling on every element necessary for a conviction. 53
D. Nature of the Definition
Assuming that the tripartite test will be included in the statute, various
issues arise in determining the appropriate statement of the test. First,
should the definition be quite specific or phrased in general terms? Perhaps
the most general statement would be one that merely notes that the statu-
tory reference to "obscene matter" does not include "constitutionally pro-
tected speech." None of the statutes examined utilize this approach.54
Those state provisions incorporating the constitutional definition of
805, 809 n.l, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 n.1 (1973); Clicque v. United States, 514
F.2d 923, 926-27 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). Cf. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975). But see State v.
Thompkins, 263 S.C. 472, 211 S.E.2d 549 (1975).
51 Assuming that the trial court applies its own independent judgment, see note 50
supra, a question remains as to the appropriate standard of proof. In other constitu-
tional areas, the Court has held that the Constitution does not require that factual
issues be resolved in accordance with a standard higher than the preponderance of the
evidence standard. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (involving a deter-
mination as to the voluntariness of a confession).
52 See notes 162, 173-77, 189-92 and accompanying text infra. See also McNary v.
Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975).
53 Compare, in this regard, the classic debate of the 1790's over the role of the
jury in the prosecution of seditious libel. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 351 (1883); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESION (1960). See also
Pines, The Obscenity Quagmire, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 509, 514, 561-62 (1974) (jury re-
fusals to find films such as "Deep Throat" obscene suggests juror rejection of statute's
application to consenting adults).
54 Various jurisdictions, however, have adopted a somewhat similar approach in
general obscenity statutes by simply describing the proscribed material as "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile." 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966). See, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2901 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.280 (Vernon, Cum.
Supp. 1976). A few juvenile provisions rely solely upon similar descriptions. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2903 (1965); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.343e
(1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.310 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1976). Such general descrip-
tions of proscribed material traditionally have been interpreted as incorporating the
current constitutional definition of obscenity. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87 (1974) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1966)); B & A Co. v. State, 24 Md.
App. 367, 330 A.2d 701 (1975); State ex rel. Calahan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp.,
59 Mich. App. 223, 232, 229 N.W.2d 389, 394 (1975), leave to appeal granted, 394
Mich. 803 (1975). But see Kansas City v. O'Connor, 510 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1974)
(Seiler, J., dissenting) (arguing that a local ordinance which specifically required that
the term "obscenity" be construed as incorporating any majority position adopted by
the Supreme Court violated due process because "what is prohibited by the ordinance
changes from day to day"). See also notes 41 supra, 57 inira.
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obscenity have sought to provide a full definition derived from the latest
Supreme Court decisions. 55
Utilizing a full definition based upon current precedent appears to be
the preferable drafting approach, although it carries with it an obvious
risk. With a change in composition, the Court could readily change its
view, rendering the definition incorporated in the statute invalid56 or more
limited in coverage than is constitutionally necessary.57 However, the
legislature should be able to quickly amend a statute to reflect any such
change. Moreover, as to some issues relating to the tripartite standard, such
as defining the relevant community standard, the legislature can choose
among several options that are constitutionally acceptable. If a very
general definition is used, decision on these issues then will be left to
the judiciary. This is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the issues relate
to the basic policies supporting the statute and therefore should be re-
solved by the legislature that adopts the statute. Second, the state appellate
courts may not resolve these issues for a considerable period of time, re-
sulting in different standards being applied in the various trial courts.58
Accordingly, section 1 of our proposed statute contains, primarily in para-
graphs (h) and (i), a fairly detailed definition of the tripartite standard,
derived initially from Miller and then adapted to a youthful audience.
55 All of the state provisions cited in note 2 supra, except for the Michigan and
Oregon provisions, apparently sought to incorporate specifically the prevailing con-
stitutional standard. See note 32 supra. See also note 31 supra. Several of these
provisions, however, failed to incorporate all of the elements of the current standard.
See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
56 But see decisions cited in notes 40 supra, 250 infra, suggesting a judicial will-
ingness to add elements to quite specific state provisions so as to uphold their con-
stitutionality. Consider, in particular, Hollington v. Ricco, 40 Ohio App. 2d 57, 318
N.E.2d 442 (1973) (described in note 40 supra). When a criminal obscenity statute
is reinterpreted to incorporate the latest judicial ruling, and that ruling narrows the
constitutional definition of obscenity, a defendant on appeal will receive the benefit
of that narrower definition. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102-03
(1974); State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974); State v. DeSantis,
65 N.J. 462, 323 A.2d 489 (1974).
57 Thus, several of the state statutes examined used the tripartite standard as
stated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which may provide broader first amendment
protection in its statement of the social value element than the Miller formulation.
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
847.013(1)(f) (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.050(2) (Supp. 1974). It is not
clear whether these states have decided to maintain the Memoirs standard as a matter
of policy or have simply neglected to revise the standard in light of Miller.
Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-1201(11) (Supp. 1975) (amending statement of social value element in
light of Miller). See also West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
(holding that when the statute used Memoirs standard, the court would not substitute
Miller social value formulation even though it might have been the legislative intent
to reach all material not constitutionally protected); People v. Tabron, - Colo. -,
544 P.2d 372 (1976) (legislative redrafting needed in light of "substantial" nature
of Miller change); State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 320 A.2d 646 (1974) (statutory
provision incorporating Memoirs language will be interpreted in light of Miller).
58 See, e.g., Study Report, supra note 1, at 174-216 (discussing the sparse Michigan
precedent governing such issues as the appropriate community standard, adaptation
of the prurient appeal standard to minors, and the treatment of special audiences).
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The remainder of part 11 will discuss major issues that were considered
in drafting these two paragraphs.
E. Defining the Prurient Interest Element
1. The Nature of Prurient Appeal-As Judge Moore noted, the phrase
" 'prurient interest' . . . certainly [is] not self-defining. '59 After describing
"obscene material" as "material which deals with sex in a manner appeal-
ing to prurient interest," the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States 0
added the following footnote:
I.e., material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.
Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged, 2d ed.,
1949) defines prurient, in pertinent part, as follows: ". . . Itch-
ing; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of persons, having
itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or
propensity, lewd. .. ."
We perceive no significant difference between the meaning of
obscenity developed in the case law and the definition of the
A.L.I., Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957), viz.: " . . . A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole,
its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes sub-
stantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation of such matters ... "61
The various state obscenity statutes we examined either do not define
prurient interest,6 2 or use the American Law Institute (ALI) definition
quoted in Roth.6 3
Of course, the statute need not define prurient interest. While the term
should be defined for the jury, the Roth footnote 64 always can be utilized
for that purpose. That footnote, however, cites a variety of definitions,
and it would be desirable to have a single statutory standard that could
serve as the foundation for a jury charge in all cases.6 5 Proposed para-
graph (i) of section 1 seeks to provide such a standard.
59 United States v. Darnell, 316 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
6o 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
61 Id. at 487 n.20.
62 See, e.g., HAwAiI REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(6)(a) (Special Supp. 1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.1 (Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E)(1)
(Page 1975). The Rhode Island provision does not use the term "prurient interest"
but does require that the material be "posed or presented in a manner to provoke or
arouse lust or passion or to exploit sex, lust, or perversion .... " R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974).
63 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-21(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg
modified the ALI standard by referring to material that appeals to a "prurient,
shameful, or morbid" interest. 390 U.S. at 646. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(f)
(Supp. 1975).
64 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
65 Lockhart, supra note 4, at 540, notes that the Court's failure to settle on a
single definition of prurient interest, although creating some "ambiguity," apparently
has caused "no real problem in submitting obscenity to trial courts or juries for
decision." But cf. Combs v. State, 536 P.2d 373, 374 (Okla. Crim. 1975); Ebert v.
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Proposed paragraph (i) does not follow the ALI definition because
the wording of that definition may be misleading. 66 The reference in the
ALI definition to a "shameful" or "morbid" interest in sex may suggest
to some that the prurient interest must relate to deviant sexual activity.
The ALI definition clearly was not intended to impose such a require-
ment.67 The terms "shameful" and "morbid" were used to describe a
sexual response that, at the same time, evokes feelings both of "desire
and pleasure" and of shamefulness "in gaining such pleasure in a man-
ner that conflicts with social convention. '6 8 To some extent, the element
of patent offensiveness in pornographic material often does produce a
sense of shame in the viewer. Pornographic material also can have a
morbid, compelling attraction that produces a combined reaction of
revulsion and excitement. 69 From the viewpoint of the first amendment
analysis of Miller and Roth, however, the element of shamefulness or
revulsion in the viewer reaction is not crucial. The key trait of prurient
appeal, that trait which contributes to the characterization of obscenity as
unprotected speech, is its production of an intense sexual excitement that
is largely inconsistent with the communication of ideas.70 Such incon-
sistency exists whether the sexual excitement is accompanied by desire
for sexual gratification alone, a sexual desire mixed with shame, or even
Maryland State Board of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 317, 313 A.2d 536, 546 (1973);
State v. Little Art Corp., 191 Neb. 448, 451-52, 215 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1974)
(illustrating varying interpretations of the prurient appeal element).
66 We do not suggest that the ALI standard presents constitutional difficulties.
See Lockhart, supra note 4, at 539-40:
In our 1960 article, Professor McClure and I concluded that the dif-
ference [in the definitions cited in Roth] was not of constitutional di-
mensions, and that the Court intended the prurient appeal factor to be
satisfied by any one of the current formulations in the obscenity laws
and decisions, most of which required some kind of erotic appeal.
Since Roth, the Court has simply carried this factor forward into its
newer reformulations of the standard without modification or further
discussion.
o7 See MODEL PENAL CODE 29-30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); Schwartz, Morals
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679 (1963). The Model
Code's reference to a prurient interest in "excretion" may contribute to the potential
for misinterpretation. Depictions of excretion that do not relate to the genitals
ordinarily would appeal only to a deviant sexual interest. See note 280 infra.
68 See MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
The prurient interest is an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted interest
growing out of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the
individual and equally universal social controls of sexual activity. The
wall of secrecy with which society has surrounded sexual behavior
tends to build up in the individual strong feelings of the shamefulness
of sexuality other than (and sometimes including) private, heterosexual,
marital relations. Literary or graphic material which disregards the
social convention evokes "repression-tensions," i.e., mixed feelings
of desire and pleasure on one hand, and dirtiness, ugliness, revulsion
on the other.... Society may legitimately seek to deter the deliberate
stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from the
conflict between social convention and the individual's sex drive.
Id. at 20-30.
69 See text accompanying note 104 infra. See also note 71 infra.
70 See text accompanying note 28 supra. See also the discussion of the element of
patent offensiveness accompanying notes 105, 163 infra.
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a sense of repulsion. 71 Describing the prurient interest as "shameful" or
"morbid" suggests a far too narrow range of reactions that may accom-
pany sexual stimulation, and the ALI definition consequently has caused
some confusion. 72 Paragraph (i) seeks to avoid this difficulty by em-
phasizing the element of sexual excitement without seeking to identify the
variety of emotional reactions that may accompany such stimulation. Thus,
paragraph (i) simply states that material appeals to the prurient interest
if it has a tendency to cause "intense sexual stimulation." The reference
to "intense" stimulation is designed to distinguish between material de-
signed to arouse a casual sexual interest and that calling forth the much
stronger reaction suggested by Roth's reference to promoting "lustful
thoughts" or "lascivious longings. '7 3 Paragraph (i) does not seek to sug-
gest this stronger reaction by reference to the promotion of lust or lascivious
longings since, as noted above, other emotional responses also may accom-
pany sexual stimulation.74
It may be suggested that, with respect to minors, it is inappropriate to
define prurient appeal solely in terms of sexual stimulation. The hypo-
thetical is presented, for example, of the distribution of hard-core pornog-
71 On the variety of psychological responses accompanying sexual stimulation,
see OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 164-82, and the studies cited
therein. As these studies note, "exposure to sex stimuli typically produces multiple
and often ambivalent emotional reactions.... [M]any persons experience, in addition
to arousal, feelings of guilt and disgust .. " Id. at 165-66. See also Gaylin, Book
Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 583 (1968); Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679 (1963):
Not recognizing that material may be repellent and appealing at the
same time, two distinguished commentators on the Code's obscenity
provisions have criticized the "appeal" formula, asserting that "hard-
core pornography," ... has no appeal for "ordinary adults," who in-
stead would be merely repelled by the material. Common experience
suggests the contrary. It is well known that policemen, lawyers, and
judges involved in obscenity cases not infrequently regale their fellows
with viewings of the criminal material.
72 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
The Court has never explained its rather confusing assertion [in Roth]
of equivalency between material tending to "excite lust" and material
appealing to "shameful" or "morbid" interests in sex. In practice, a
tendency to excite sexual arousal has appeared to be the principal in-
gredient of "prurient" interest.
Id. at 312 n.79. See also Gaylin, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 579, 583 (1968):
If the justices insist on considering offensive and disgusting as anti-
thetical to prurient, they ought at least to decide which characterizes
obscenity. I think their difficulty lies in the somewhat priggish assump-
tion that something which is "disgusting" cannot be "exciting." It is
here that the psychiatrist would consider the jurist "naive."
But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(1) (Supp. 1975) (requiring that material appeal
to a "prurient, shameful, or morbid interest"); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155,
166-67 (2d Cir. 1965).
73 See United States v. Stewart, 336 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1971), noting this
distinction.
74 "Lust" is viewed most commonly as a reaction consisting solely of an overriding
desire for sexual gratification. See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1968 ed.). Compare Combs v. State, 536 P.2d 373 (Okla. Crim. 1975) (statement
of expert witness) with State v. Little Art Corp., 191 Neb. 448, 451-52, 215 N.W.2d
853, 856 (1974).
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raphy to a ten-year-old girl. Such a child, it is argued, would not be sex-
ually aroused, but, instead, simply would be shocked by the material.
Yet, the argument continues, the impact of that shock could be as harmful
to this child as the arousal of lustful desires in an older child, and there-
fore this dissemination also should fall within the statute.75 In response
to this argument, it should be noted initially that the proposed statute
probably would apply to such dissemination without any expansion of
the definition of prurient interest. A child who has sufficient interest in
pornography to be shocked by what he or she sees is likely to be reflecting
intense sexual stimulation rather than a reaction to any otherwise horrify-
ing quality of the act portrayed. As noted above, the definition in para-
graph (i) concentrates on the material's capacity to arouse sexual excite-
ment and the fact that such excitement may be partially reflected by re-
vulsion does not detract from its prurient nature. Moreover, even if the
shock were totally unrelated to sexual excitement in the particular case,
the material would not be measured in terms of the particular recipient,
but in terms of the general audience of minors to whom it was made
available, including more mature juveniles. 76
Although the challenge to the emphasis upon sexual stimulation may
not be well taken as applied to the distribution of pornography to a ten-
year-old, it does raise a significant issue as to the coverage of sexually
related material that conceivably could shock a very youthful audience
without significant sexual stimulation. If the statute is broadened to apply
to dissemination of such material without regard to the material's tendency
to cause intense sexual stimulation, there appears to be little ground for
failing to encompass also nonsexually oriented material that may be
equally shocking and upsetting to immature youth, such as extreme por-
trayals of violence. While the state may have a legitimate interest in con-
trolling the dissemination of such material, the first amendment protection
granted such material may be far more extensive than that granted ob-
scenity. The Supreme Court's ruling that obscenity is not protected speech
rests in large part on qualities of material designed to arouse sexual
excitement that may or may not be present in other types of material
that could be just as harmful to the child's development. 77 If prurient
75 In discussions of a proposed Michigan juvenile provision, this argument of
shock without prurient appeal in the case of a ten-year-old has been advanced both
by persons urging that the statute be expanded to include reference to a "prurient,
shameful, or morbid interest," see note 63 supra, and by persons who argue that
there is no reason to regulate dissemination of obscenity when the state is willing
to leave unregulated the dissemination of materials dealing with violence, the super-
natural, and other matters likely to upset children.
76 See text accompanying note 136 infra.
77 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 686-87 n.15 (1968):
Appellants also contend here that, in addition to its vagueness, the
ordinance is invalid because it authorizes the restraint of films on
constitutionally impermissible grounds, arguing that the limits on
regulation of expression are those of obscenity, or at least obscenity
as judged for children. In light of our disposition on vagueness grounds,
we do not reach that issue.
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appeal were not defined in terms of a tendency to produce an intense
sexual stimulation, the statute would be extended beyond the basic con-
cept of obscenity and raise issues beyond the scope of our project.
2. Special Audience-The proposed definition of prurient interest in
paragraph (i) states that if material is designed for a special audience
such as a deviant sexual group, then the appeal to the prurient interest
is determined in light of the special sexual interest of that group. This
concept of a variable prurient interest standard was recognized in Mishkin
v. New York. 78 Most of the statutes examined do not include a specific
provision which recognizes the special prurient interests of special audi-
ences. 79 In light of Mishkin (where the statute interpreted did not contain
such a provision), a court probably would accept the variable prurient
interest concept as naturally incorporated in the basic function of the
prurient interest standard. Nevertheless, a specific statutory provision
is desirable. It would provide specific notice to the distributor of such
materials without requiring an examination of the case law. It would
also ensure that the variable prurient interest concept is appropriately
limited in application by a specific statutory standard as to the discrete
nature of the special audience. Finally, a statutory provision can empha-
size, as does proposed paragraph (i), that even within that discrete group,
the standard must be applied in terms of prurient appeal to the average
person and not to the persons who may be most suspectible. 80
There is some variation among statutory provisions describing the vari-
able prurient interest concept. The Illinois statute speaks in terms of
material "designed for specially susceptible groups."'81 This goes beyond
Mishkin, which spoke of "deviant" sexual groups.8 2 A group may be
"deviant" because its members have a different sexual interest than people
generally, but this does not necessarily make those members more "suscep-
tible" in the sense that it takes less to arouse their prurient interest.
The California provision follows the language of Mishkin and refers to
"deviant sexual groups. '8 3 The Detroit ordinance avoids any statutory
characterization of particular groups as "deviant," but refers by two illus-
trations (homosexuals and sado-masochists) to groups having special
sexual interests. 84 Proposed paragraph (i) combines the California and
Detroit provisions, as it both describes the groups as deviant and offers
two illustrations.
In determining whether material is designed for a special audience,
paragraph (i) directs the trier of fact to consider the "character" of the
78 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
79 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 725.1-.9
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20-.22 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
80 See text accompanying note 136 infra.
81 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). Cf. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(4) (Special Supp. 1975).
82 383 U.S. at 508-09.
83CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a)(1) (West Supp. 1976).
84 DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(12) (1974).
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material. The California provision, on the other hand, directs attention
to both the character of the material and "the circumstances of its dis-
semination, distribution or exhibition."'8 5 The California reference to the
circumstances of distribution was viewed as unnecessary in a statute lim-
ited to the depiction of specific sexual conduct.8 6 If, as discussed later,8 7
the juvenile provision is limited to the depiction of such advanced sexual
activity as coitus, sodomy, sado-masochistic abuse, and masturbation, the
nature of the conduct depicted should be sufficient in itself to indicate
that the material was aimed at a specific group. The circumstances of
distribution are likely to provide needed additional evidence where the
material depicts persons engaged in activities that might be innocuous on
their face, but have a special meaning for a deviant group (such as
posing in a certain costume).88 However, a statute limited to the depiction
of specified sexual conduct would not encompass the depiction of such
potentially innocuous activity even if the depiction did appeal to the pru-
rient interest of a deviant group.
F. Defining the Patent Offensiveness Element
The patent offensiveness element of the tripartite test was first recog-
nized as a distinct aspect of the constitutional definition of obscenity in
Justice Harlan's separate opinion in Manual Enterprises v. Day.8 9
[W]e find lacking in these magazines an element which, no less
than "prurient interest," is essential to a valid determination of
obscenity under [18 U.S.C.] § 1461 . . . : These magazines can-
not be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current
community standards of decency-a quality that we shall here-
after refer to as "patent offensiveness" or "indecency." Lacking
that quality, the magazines cannot be deemed legally "ob-
scene .... 90
Justice Harlan noted that the element of patent offensiveness had been
included in the ALL definition of obscenity, which Roth described as
not significantly different from the definition adopted in that case.
The thoughtful studies of the American Law Institute reflect the
same twofold concept of obscenity. Its earlier draft of a Model
Penal Code contains the following definition of "obscene": "A
85 CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a)(1) (West Supp. 1976).
86 See part III A infra, for a discussion of the Miller requirement that the statu-
tory coverage be limited to the depiction of specific sexual conduct. Although
Mishkin spoke of obscene materials depicting "fetishism," 383 U.S. at 508, that
description of encompassed materials must be read in light of the sexual conduct
limitation of Miller.
87 See text accompanying notes 276-80 infra.
88 Defining sado-masochistic abuse presents considerable problems in this regard.
The definition in proposed paragraph (j) is designed to reach only material which,
on its face, clearly portrays such abuse. See part III C infra.
89 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Justice Harlan's opinion, joined by Justice Stewart, an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. Four Justices concurred in the judgment, but
not in the opinion.
90Id. at 482.
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thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal
is to prurient interest . . . and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters." A.L.I., Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 6
(1957), § 207.10(2). (Emphasis added). The same organiza-
tion's currently proposed definition reads: "Material is obscene
if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient in-
terest... and if in addition it goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in describing or representing such matters."
A.L.I., Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (May 4,
1962), § 251.4(1). (Emphasis added)."'
Opinions of individual Justices in subsequent cases sometimes described
the element of patent offensiveness as exceeding customary limits of
candor, 92 and at other times described it as requiring that the material
"affront contemporary community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters. ' 93 In Miller v. California, where the
element was first accepted in an opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Burger
simply noted that material was not obscene unless it depicted sexual con-
duct in a "patently offensive way."'94
The Miller opinion did not discuss the concept of patent offensiveness
other than noting that patent offensiveness was to be determined by con-
temporary community standards. The trial court in Miller had instructed
the jury that material is not obscene unless it "goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary community stand-
ards of decency" in the "State of California." '9 5 The Supreme Court con-
sidered at length the acceptability of using a statewide rather than a national
community standard, but did not comment upon the remainder of the
charge. Presumably, the Court also would have commented upon the
trial judge's reference to "customary limits of candor" and "community
standards of decency" if either of those aspects of the charge also raised
any substantial constitutional questions. Similarily, since the Court in
Miller discussed at length Justice Brennan's proposed version of the
tripartite test in Memoirs and rejected one element thereof, 96 it apparently
91 Id. at 485-86. See also State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J. 247, 256, 196
A.2d 225, 229 (1963) (finding that the requirement of patent offensiveness was "in-
herent in the Roth opinion").
92 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (separate opinion of
Justice Brennan joined by Justice Goldberg).
93 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (separate opinion by Justice Brennan joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas). But see Stewart, J., dissenting in Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966):
The Court there [in Roth] characterized obscenity as that which...
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description
or representation... [of sex] .... In Manual Enterprises v. Day, I
joined.Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion adding "patent indecency" as a
further essentialelement. (emphasis added).
94 413 U.S. at 24.
95 Id. at 31.
96 The Miller majority rejected Justice Brennan's formulation of the social value
element as requiring an affirmative showing that the material is "utterly without
redeeming social value." See text accompanying note 111 infra.
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had no objection to the Memoirs' formulation of patent offensiveness as
"affront[ing] contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters. 97 Thus, Miller does not seem to
prescribe any particular formulation of the patent offensiveness standard.
Any formulation is acceptable constitutionally if it clearly requires that
obscene material depict sexual conduct in a manner that goes beyond
commonly accepted social conventions and thereby contributes to the
depiction's presentation as "hard-core pornography."9 8
State obscenity statutes vary in their description of the patent offensive-
ness element. Some follow the ALI language and require that the matter
"goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or
representation" of sexual matters. 99 The Washington juvenile provision
contains a Memoirs type standard: the material must be "patently offen-
sive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters." 00 Several provisions
follow Miller in simply noting that listed sexual conduct must be described
"in a patently offensive way."''1 1 Several juvenile statutes follow the New
York provision applied in Ginsberg: the material must be "patently of-
fensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors."' 0 2 All of the foregoing pro-
visions are consistent with the basic concept of patent offensiveness as
described above, and should be constitutionally acceptable.
Proposed paragraph (h) (ii) is patterned after the definitions of patent
offensiveness contained in the New York juvenile obscenity statute and
97 383 U.S. at 418.
98 See part II A supra, for a discussion of the function of the various elements
of the tripartite test. With respect to the flexibility allowed the states in defining
patent offensiveness, consider the Court's similar treatment of the element of
prurient appeal, discussed in note 65 supra and text accompanying notes 59-65 supra.
9 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-7-101(l)(b) (1973) (also including reference to the adult community as to
what is suitable for minors, see note 102 infra); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975).
100 WASH. REV. STAT. § 968.050 (Supp. 1974).
101 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.010(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-8A-l(7)(b) (Supp. 1974); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(11)
(1974).
102 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(f)(2) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6)
(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E) (Page 1975).
Hawaii includes a "customary limit of candor" standard in describing obscenity for
adults, but does not use such a standard in its juvenile provision. Compare HAWAII
REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(5)(b) (Special Supp. 1972) with HAWAII REV. STAT.
tit. 37, § 712-1210(6)(a) (Special Supp. 1972). The apparent assumption of the Ha-
waii Legislature is that material which both depicts the sexual conduct specified in its
juvenile statute and appeals to the prurient interest of minors inevitably goes beyond
the customary limits of candor for presentation to minors. Miller proceeded on the
assumption that the erotic portrayal even of "ultimate sex acts" was not necessarily
patently offensive under community standards for adults. 413 U.S. at 25, 27. While
a stronger case may be made that, for minors, the depiction of ultimate sex acts
is inevitably patently offensive, exceptions can be noted. See, e.g., text accompanying
notes 258-59 infra. Moreover, the Hawaii provision, like the other state provisions
examined, reaches depictions of nudity, which often will not be patently offensive
for minors. See note 309 inIra and text accompanying note 312 infra.
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Justice Brennan's Memoirs opinion. The proposed paragraph requires
that the sexually explicit matter "affront" contemporary community
standards "as to what is suitable matter for minors." The ALI definition
was rejected on the ground that the phrase "customary limits of candor"
emphasizes only the "frankness" or "brazenness" of the presentation.
Other characteristics, such as presentation in a salacious or leering man-
ner, also may render the portrayal of sexual conduct so debasing as to be
patently offensive under community standards.
We also rejected as potentially misleading the approach taken in sev-
eral state provisions which simply note that sexually explicit matter must
be presented in a "patently offensive way." If the statute fails to note that
"offensiveness" is to be judged by the "suitability" or "acceptability" of
the material from a community viewpoint, the phrase "patently offensive"
might be taken as requiring that the material be repulsive to the average
viewer. That view of the offensiveness standard has led some to question
the consistency of requiring both offensiveness and prurient appeal. 103 Pru-
rient appeal requires a tendency to cause sexual excitement, and while
such excitement may be accompanied by a feeling of revulsion, many
persons view it as primarily pleasurable. 0 4 A primary reaction of pleasure
is hardly inconsistent, however, with a correct interpretation of the patent
offensiveness standard. The role of patent offensiveness in characterizing
obscenity as unprotected speech does not require that the material produce
a strong negative reaction in the viewer. The material need "offend" only
in the sense that it creates a quality of illicitness in viewing what one might
find alluring, yet knows to be clearly contrary to the accepted mores of
society. Indeed, the very tension created by this illicit quality often adds
to the material's allure as matter designed primarily to titillate. 105
The proposed draft seeks to ensure that the "offensiveness" standard
is viewed only in the narrower sense noted above. The standard is de-
scribed simply as "affronting" the community standard as to the "suit-
ability" of material for minors.'0 6 No reference is made to the term
"offensive" since the violation of the community standard itself constitutes
offensiveness. Similarly, the term "affront" encompasses the "patent"
quality of the offensiveness standard since it requires a direct and open
defiance of the community standard. The relevant community standard
103 See Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 7, 15
n.43; Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 679 (1963) (both recognizing the claim of inconsistency by others). A similar
claim of inconsistency has been raised against the ALI definition of prurient appeal.
See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
10 4 See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
105 This attribute of patent offensiveness is viewed also as contributing to the
limited communicative function of pornographic material that places such material
outside the protection of the first amendment. See part II A supra. See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
106 If thought desirable, the term "patently offensive" could be included in para-
graph (h)(ii) by following the structure of the Memoirs statement: material is
"patently offensive because it affronts community standards. .. "
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is defined as that of "suitability," rather than "decency,"' 10 7 to avoid any
suggestion that the standard is based solely on moral judgments. 0 8 The
community standard as to what materials are suitable for minors may be
based upon judgments relating primarily to behavioral factors, such as the
need to limit juveniles' sexual frustrations, as readily as upon standards
of morality. 10 9
G. Defining the Social Value Element
In Miller v. California,110 a social value standard was first recognized
in a majority opinion as an independent element of the tripartite test.
Miller rejected Justice Brennan's suggestion in Memoirs that material must
be "utterly without redeeming social value" to be classified as "ob-
scene." '' In holding that obscenity was not constitutionally protected
speech, Roth v. United States characterized obscenity as having "such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from [it] is clearly outweighed by the state's interest in order and moral-
ity."'1 12 This characterization, the Miller opinion noted, does not require
that the state prove that a publication is unqualifiedly without any social
value; it is sufficient that the publication, "taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 113 If material depicts hard-
core sexual conduct, appeals to the prurient interest, is patently offensive,
and lacks "serious" social value, then it meets the Roth justification for
refusing to classify obscenity as protected speech-that is, it performs
such an insignificant function, if any, in the exposition of ideas as to be
107 Compare Justice Harlan's description in Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 482 (1962) (quoted in text accompanying note 90 supra).
108 The term "suitability" also emphasizes that the proper test is community ac-
ceptance of a publication as appropriate for minors, which is not necessarily
established by the publication's availability to minors in the community. See United
States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 375-80 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. One Reel
of 33 mm Color Motion Picture Film, 491 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1974); Mathery v.
State, 55 Ala. App. 119, 313 So. 2d 547 (1975). Establishing the availability of
similarly candid publications remains, however, a common method used by the
defense to show that the challenged publication is not patently offensive. For a
discussion of what constitutes a "similar" publication for this purpose, see United
States v. Womack, supra. See also IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.7(2) (Cum. Pamphlet 1975)
(specifically authorizing admission of expert testimony pertaining to "the degree of
public acceptance" of material "of similar character").
109 See the authorities cited in note 4 supra.
110413 U.S. 15 (1973).
111 Id. at 21-23.
112 354 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added). The Roth reference is to a quote from
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), describing "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech," including the "lewd and ob-
scene," the "prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem."
113 413 U.S. at 24. Although the Court referred to the lack of serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, the opinion makes clear that the material must
lack all of these values. If it has serious value in one sphere, but not in another, it
is still protected. See id. at 23.
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"utterly without social importance" for first amendment purposes.11 4
Proposed paragraph (h) (iii) incorporates the Miller social value stand-
ard and adapts it to an audience of minors. The proposed paragraph
largely quotes the Miller description of that standard: "taken as a whole,"
the matter must lack "serious literary, artistic, political and scientific
value." This standard is not without ambiguity. The question has been
raised, for example, as to whether the four values mentioned in Miller-
literary, artistic, political, and scientific-"constitute an exhaustive cata-
logue." 115 Judge Leventhal suggests that the list cannot rationally be
viewed as exhaustive. The presence of other values also can establish
that the material is not the "portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for
its own sake"" 6 which the tripartite standard seeks to identify. As an
illustration of a potential addition to the four listed values, Judge Leven-
thai points to educational value, which might be found in a serious sex-
education book." 7 Certainly, the failure of Miller to mention educational
value does not imply that the communication of ideas for a genuine edu-
cational purpose is not protected by the first amendment. It seems likely
that education was not mentioned in Miller because education was viewed
as an aspect of the four listed categories; sex education, for example,
could be characterized as having scientific or even political value. 118
Perhaps, as an initial matter, a reference to educational value should
have been included in the Miller listing, but the issue now presented to a
draftsman of obscenity legislation is somewhat different. Adding "educa-
tional value" to the statutory listing might contribute to an inappropriately
narrow reading of the "political" and "scientific" categories. If scientific
value does not include sex education, and a special reference to education
therefore is required, what significance will be attached to the legislature's
failure to add a reference to such subjects as "philosophical" value?119
If the four Miller categories are not themselves sufficiently elastic, it
would be preferable to add the phrase "or other similar values," rather
114 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957):
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-un-
orthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevail-
ing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guarantees, un-
less excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the first amendment
is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im-
portance.
115 Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Decisions, 59 A.B.A.J. 1261, 1264
(1973).
116 413 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added). See also part II A supra.
117 See Leventhal, supra note 115, at 1264. See also Lockhart, Escape from the
Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 555
(1975).
118 But see Lockhart, supra note 117, at 556 (arguing that such an interpretation
"would require distortion of the meaning of the words to achieve the interpretation
[of the Court's listing of values as nonexhaustive]").
119 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 316: "As to the values
which qualify as social values, presumably political, philosophical, literary, artistic,
educational, scientific and other similar values are included." (emphasis added).
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than add more specific categories. 120 While Miller rejected reliance upon
"the ambiguous concept of 'social importance,' "121 the addition of a
catch-all reference, tied to the Miller listing, would not add considerably
more ambiguity than is present in that listing already.
The Miller reference to a "serious" literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value also has been criticized as ambiguous. 122 While the term "seri-
ous" could, in the abstract, be viewed as excluding that which is humorous,
any interpretation of the social value element as failing to encompass the
comic side of literary or artistic expression would be entirely inconsistent
with the underlying first amendment analysis of Miller.123
A more significant concern is that a presentation may be viewed as
lacking "serious" value because it does not have substantial literary, artis-
tic, political, or scientific merit. Here again, the first amendment analysis
of Miller should preclude such an interpretation. At the outset, the Miller
opinion stressed the need to protect against "any infringement on gen-
uinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression."1 24 The
opinon also quoted the statement in Roth that "all ideas having the slightest
redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion," are within the pro-
tection of the first amendment. 1 25 At another point, the opinion noted that
regulation of obscenity did not invite exercise of "the harsh hand of
censorship of ideas-good or bad, sound or unsound."' 26 These statements
and others indicate that the social value element is directed only at de-
termining whether the material presents ideas, and not at evaluation of
the ideas presented. Thus, the social value element, unlike the patent of-
fensiveness element, is not judged according to the contemporary com-
munity standards. Value exists in the expression of ideas without regard
to the community's evaluation of those ideas. 12 The reference to a "seri-
ous" value is necessary only to ensure that the communication of ideas
is a basic aspect of the work. 128 While obscene material seeks essen-
120See Lockhart, supra note 117, at 555 (describing Miller's failure to include
"some general expression such as 'other social value'" as a "critical deficiency in
the opinion"). Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(11)(iii) (Supp. 1975) ("seri-
ous value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors") (emphasis added).
121 413 U.S. at 25 n.7.
122 See Hunsaker, The 1973 Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 906, 914 (1974).
123 See Leventhal, supra note 115, at 1264-65.
124 413 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 20 (quoting 354 U.S. at 484).
12 6 1d. at 35-36.
127 See id. at 34; Lockhart, supra note 117, at 553. Arguably, the social value
element should be stated in terms of literary, artistic, political, or scientific "ideas"
rather than "values." See, e.g., the discussion in Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-35. However,
with reference to artistic presentations, the term "value" might be more appropriate.
See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 n.3 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
128Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 42-43 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957) (explaining the "predominant appeal" requirement). The Illinois juvenile
provision, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975), requires
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tially to stimulate and exploit the "emotional tensions arising from the
conflict between social convention and the individual's sex drive, '129 it
may be presented in a superficial manner as art, literature, or science.
Just as a serious novel should not be judged obscene because it contains
an occasional erotic passage, basically pornographic material should not
claim first amendment protection because of a veneer portraying some
artistic or literary objective. 130 The requirement of a "serious" value sup-
plements the requirement that the matter be viewed "as a whole" in en-
suring that the basic function of the tripartite standard is served. While
other terms such as "true" or "meaningful" could be substituted for "seri-
ous," they are not likely to be more precise in conveying the thrust of
the social value standard.13 1 Whatever ambiguity exists in the term "seri-
ous" can readily be cured only by an extended discussion that would
be inappropriate in a statute. The legislation must rely on the premise
that the serious social value element will be read in light of the Miller first
amendment analysis.
H. Adaptation to Minors
1. Age Variation-Once the appropriate definition of each element
of the tripartite test is determined, those definitions should be adapted to
fit the application of the tripartite test to the dissemination of materials
to juveniles. As Chief Justice Warren noted in Jacobellis v. United States:132
[Tihe use to which various materials are put-not just the
words and pictures themselves-must be considered in determin-
ing whether or not the materials are obscene. A technical or legal
treatise on pornography may well be inoffensive under most cir-
cumstances, but, at the same time, "obscene" in the extreme
when sold or displayed to children.
A major issue presented in adapting the tripartite test to minors is
whether the audience of minors should be treated as a general class or
whether distinctions should be drawn between minors of different age
that "the redeeming social importance" of the material be "substantially less than its
prurient appeal." Miller's use of the term "serious" clearly does not suggest a
balancing of social value against prurient appeal and nothing in Ginsberg suggests
such a balancing approach would be acceptable for minors.
129 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
13oSee Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 209 S.E.2d 166 (1974); People v. Heller, 33
N.Y.2d 314, 321, 307 N.E.2d 805, 809, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601, 606 (1973); Note,
Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1855 (1975) ("'genuinely serious' [Miller, 413 U.S. at 23]
suggests a criterion not of significance but of authenticity").
131 Compare Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 LOYOLA
OF L.A.L. REV. 207, 211-13 (1974) (noting that more precise direction could be
provided for distinguishing the "aesthetic experience promoted by works of art from
the mere stimulation of elemental sensuality which is the work of pornography")
with Lockhart, supra note 117, at 556 ("Whatever adjectives might be used for this
purpose, whether 'serious' or 'genuine,' 'real,' or 'substantial,' the line that must be
drawn calls for a subjective, judgmental decision in each case applied to particular
material.").
132 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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levels. Most juvenile statutes apparently utilize the former approach.
They simply provide that the element of prurient appeal, for example,
should be measured in terms of the appeal of the particular material to
the prurient interest "of minors. ' 133 The Illinois juvenile statute, on the
other hand, provides that prurient appeal shall be judged in terms of the
prurient interest of minors "of the same general age of the [minor] to
whom such material was offered, distributed, sent or exhibited. '134 A
similar formulation is utilized in the Colorado provision and the model
legislation proposed by Obscenity Commission members Hill and Link. 35
The Illinois formulation raises a fundamental issue as to the extent to
which the characteristics of the individual juvenile recipient should be con-
sidered in applying the tripartite test. In resolving that issue, it is helpful
to consider initially the treatment of the same problem in the context of
dissemination of sexually oriented material to adults.
Adult obscenity provisions traditionally do not look to the individual
recipient of allegedly obscene material. In part, this approach reflects
the constitutional prohibition, established initially in Butler v. Michigan,136
against restricting general access to sexually oriented materials according to
the material's potential impact upon the most susceptible persons in the
community. In Butler, the Court held that the state could not seek to shield
youth from material potentially harmful only to them by barring general
distribution of that material, as such legislation would "reduce the adult
population ... to reading only what is fit for children."'13 The same prin-
ciple denies the state authority to keep from the adult community as a
whole material that appeals to the prurient interest of only the most
sensitive adults in the community. 138 Neither can it appropriately place
upon the disseminator the task of determining which of his prospective
purchasers, from the otherwise indistinguishable adult community, are
most likely to fall within the especially sensitive category.
The refusal of adult obscenity provisions to look at the individual re-
cipient is based on more, however, than the Butler prohibition against
looking to the impact upon the most susceptible person. The Supreme
Court has noted that material must be "judged by its impact on an average
person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person-or in-
133 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(1)(f)(1) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 235.20(b)(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(11)(i)
(Supp. 1975).
134 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975).
135 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-7-101(8) (1973) provides that material "shall be
judged with reference to the average minor in the age group for which the thing
appears to be designed or to which it is made available." The Hill-Link proposal,
see note 3 supra, requires that prurient appeal be judged "with reference to an
average person in the community of the actual age of the minor to whom such
material is distributed, or exhibited." HILL-LINK MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3,
§ 1(6).
136 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
137 Id. at 383.
138 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
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deed a totally insensitive one."'139 Thus, if the material appeals to the pru-
rient interest of the average adult in the community, the disseminator may
not raise as a defense that the only sale established by the prosecution
was to an individual who was totally oblivious to the ordinary appeal
of the material. 140 The refusal to recognize such a defense follows, in part,
from the role of the tripartite standard as a test to determine whether
sexually oriented material is protected by the first amendment. That de-
termination does not rest so much on the potential harmful consequences
of the material upon the audience as it does upon whether the characteris-
tics of the material are such that it might make a contribution to the
exposition of ideas.' 41 The underlying premise of Miller is that "hard-core
pornography" does not serve the expository function protected by the
first amendment and that the tripartite test will adequately ensure that
the state reaches only such "obscene, pornographic material."'1 42 In deter-
mining whether material portraying sexual conduct has the pornographic
objective of sexual arousal "for its own sake,"'1 43 it is appropriate to judge
the material in terms of its appeal to the general population to whom it
is offered, as measured by the average person in the audience. If the ma-
terial does have a pornographic objective, it is not likely to have significant
expository value for the average member or any other member of that audi-
ence. Even though hard-core pornographic material happens not to appeal
to the prurient interest of a particularly nonsusceptible member of the
audience, its basic character ensures that it will not have significantly
more value in the exposition of ideas for him than for the person with
the average prurient interest. 44
The refusal to recognize a defense based upon the insensitivity of the
particular recipient also is justified by the state's objective in restricting
the dissemination of obscenity. Adult obscenity provisions generally are
justified on the ground that obscenity has a harmful impact upon the
audience in shaping their attitudes towards sex and thereby encouraging
inappropriate (although not necessarily criminal) conduct. 145 Preventing
139 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) (emphasis added); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974).
140 This assumes that the material was not knowingly distributed to a person for
scientific use. See United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle o/ Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
834, 847-52 (1964).
141 See part H1 A supra.
142 See 413 U.S. at 19 n.2, 34-35.
143 Id. at 35.
-144 This again assumes that the material is not distributed for scientific use. See
note 140 supra.
145 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-63 (1973); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 501-02 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); OBSCENITY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 390-413. Arguably, the state's interest in pro-
hibiting the public dissemination of obscenity need not be tied to the impact of the
obscenity upon the audience but may rest upon a general concern for communal
decency and morality, without regard to the influence of obscenity upon audience
behavior. See Henkin, Morals and the Constitution, The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 391 (1963). This basis for obscenity legislation appears to have been recog-
nized, in part, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, at 58-59. Juvenile obscenity
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that harmful impact may require that a disseminator be held liable even
though the distribution in the particular case was to a person who was
totally oblivious to the impact of obscene materials. Obscene materials
ordinarily are offered to all members of the adult community. The fact
that a particular recipient is especially insensitive to such material does
not relieve the distributor of his liability for making the material avail-
able to other adults also. 146 While dealers may sometimes screen their
audience, through advance warning as to content, in order to exclude
those persons most likely to be repelled by the material, they certainly do
not attempt to screen out persons for whom the material might be most
arousing. Aside from dissemination to scientists or educators for pro-
fessional use, the pornographic nature of the material puts the dissem-
inator on notice that the audience will consist largely of persons for whom
the material principally has a prurient appeal.
When material is sold to minors, the above arguments similarly justify
a refusal to consider the personal background of the particular juvenile
recipient. In determining whether the material is an essential part of the
exposition of ideas, the appropriate reference again should be to the
average person in the recipient's group, rather than to the particularly
sensitive or insensitive recipient. In seeking to preclude the harm re-
sulting from the obscenity, liability again is based upon the disseminator's
willingness to distribute to persons in the recipient's group, rather than
upon the personal characteristics of the individual recipient.
A special case may be made, however, for considering the recipient's
age, as is done in the Illinois statute. 147 In determining whether material
falls within the category of protected speech, the general age category
of the recipient is a peculiarly relevant factor. Unlike material that falls
within the tripartite test as applied to adults, material that meets the test
for minors cannot be categorized as generally having no significant value
in the exposition of ideas. The variable obscenity concept accepted in
Ginsberg recognizes that material may not serve the function of protected
speech as to the average minor, yet clearly serve that function as to the
average adult. Similarly, material that might not have any value in the
exposition of ideas for the average twelve-year-old may clearly serve
that function for the sixteen-year-old. What appeals to the prurient inter-
est, is patently offensive, or lacks serious social value obviously may vary
with the general age grouping of the juveniles involved. The court has
recognized that the elements of prurient interest may vary with the ex-
provisions, however, generally have not been supported on grounds of public
morality alone, but have been based upon the potential harmful impact of obscenity
upon minors receiving such material and the parental interest in controlling access
of their children to such potentially harmful materials. See, e.g., Fagan, Obscenity
Controls and Minors, 10 CATHOLIC LAW. 270, 274-78 (1964); Schwartz, Morals
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 (1963).
146 In utilizing the standards of the average person in the community, the trial
court in Roth noted that this standard was designed to "test the effect of the book,
picture or publication... upon all those whom it is likely to reach." 354 U.S. at 490.
147 See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
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perience of the general adult population in a particular community or
with a particular deviant group in that community which constitutes a
special audience. For juveniles, the age grouping may be an equally sig-
nificant element in defining the appropriate class. Indeed, failure to con-
sider the age of the audience may be contrary to the principle of Butler.
Just as the state cannot keep material from adults because it is obscene
for minors, perhaps it cannot keep from sixteen-year-olds material that
would be obscene only for twelve-year-olds.
Consideration of the age group of the recipient also is consistent with
achieving the state's objective of preventing the harm that flows from
obscenity. If material obscene only for a twelve-year-old is sold to a sixteen-
year-old, no harm will flow from that sale. 148 Moreover, unlike the situa-
tion presented in the sale to a particularly insensitive adult, we cannot
readily assume that the seller here would sell to a more susceptible per-
son. Age is a characteristic of the recipient with which the seller will be
familiar. A dealer who sells to an older teenager is not suggesting thereby
that he necessarily would sell the same item to a twelve-year-old.
Thus, the Illinois approach, 149 although it looks to one characteristic of
the recipient, is not inconsistent with the rationale underlying the usual
refusal to look at the recipient's personal characteristics. Indeed, as
noted above, there may be situations where failure to judge material in
light of the age group of the recipient imposes an unconstitutional burden
on the access of minors in the highest age bracket to material protected
as to them. The Illinois formulation may not be necessary, however, to
avoid this constitutional difficulty while adequately serving the state's en-
forcement interests. Under the more common formulation, the statute
requires that the material in question fall within the tripartite standard as
applied "to minors."'15 0 This reference is to minors as a group and pre-
sumably requires a jury determination that the material would have pru-
rient appeal, lack social value, and be considered patently offensive for
the typical minor at each level of the age range to which the material is
likely to be distributed (that is, excluding the most youthful). Thus, no
matter what the age of the particular recipient, under this formulation the
prosecution apparently must show that the material falls within the tri-
partite standard for the typical youth at the highest age level within the
definition of "minor." If the prosecution makes such a showing, the de-
fendant is not placed at a disadvantage if the particular recipient was
younger since the tripartite test presumably encompasses its narrowest
148 Consideration is not given to the possibility that the purchaser subsequently
might give the material to a more youthful viewer. But cf. OBSCENITY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 3, at 401 (Hill-Link minority statement); Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 120 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1973)
(general obscenity statute supported, in part, on a similar theory). Determining
what constitutes "obscenity" in light of subsequent distributions to younger persons
would be inconsistent with the Court's analysis in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957). See notes 135-38 and accompanying text supra.
149 See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
150 See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
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range of material at the highest age level.' 5 ' Material that fails to com-
municate ideas for sixteen-year-olds, who should have a broader range
of understanding and greater experience with sexually oriented materials,
presumably would also not be entitled to first amendment protection
when distributed to a twelve-year-old.
Concentrating on the highest age level may place the prosecution at a
disadvantage where the particular distribution is to a twelve-year-old and
the state nevertheless must show that the material would have prurient
appeal and lack social value for a sixteen-year-old. Such situations would
appear to be unusual, however. Most often prosecution is brought where
the material would be obscene for a sixteen-year-old as readily as for a
twelve-year-old. Providing for the exceptional case might not be worth
the complications that would be presented in tying the proof in every case
to the age level of the recipient. Proposed paragraph (h) is drafted to
offer alternative treatment of the recipient's age. One alternative provides
that each element of the tripartite test be determined with reference to
the average youth at the highest age level for minors. The other alternative
refers to the average youth within the general age grouping of the particular
recipient. Both alternatives extend to all elements of the tripartite test. If the
Illinois formulation is worth the effort, the reference to the age range of the
particular recipient logically should extend to the determination of patent
offensiveness and social value as well as prurient interest (the only element
of the tripartite test adapted to the recipient's age under the Illinois statute).
2. Adult Viewpoint-State juvenile provisions are fairly uniform in
their adaptation of the prurient appeal and social value standards to an
audience of minors.'5 2 In each instance, the standard is applied in relation
to the experience and capacity of minors. 153 Proposed paragraph (h) fol-
151 It might be argued that material appealing to a sixteen-year-old would not
appeal to the prurient interest of a more youthful recipient, such as one of ten or
eleven, since such minors do not yearn for sexual participation. As discussed in text
accompanying note 75 supra, however, sexual stimulation may take various forms and
the interest of such youthful minors in obtaining and examining sexually explicit
material may reflect in itself the capacity of such material to sexually stimulate
minors of that age.
152 The West Virginia juvenile obscenity statute refers to the interests of the
"average individual," rather than the interests of "minors," in describing the tri-
partite test. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-1(6) (Supp. 1974). However, since the
statute applies only to dissemination to minors, the phrase "average individual" may be
read as referring to the "average minor." See also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390(6)
(1975). But see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.010(3) (Cum. Supp. 1974), described
in note 321 infra.
153 See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-101(1) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
847.012 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975). A few
of the state provisions examined do not refer to minors in describing both the pruri-
ent appeal and social value elements. Thus, WASH. REV. CODE § 968.050 (Supp. 1974)
refers to appeal to "the prurient interest of minors," but does not refer specifically
to minors when it describes the social value element as "utterly without redeeming
social value" (following Memoirs). CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West Supp. 1976),
on the other hand, describes the social value element as "utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors" and the prurient appeal element as a "predominant
appeal ... which to the average person ... is to prurient interest." See also IOWA
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lows this approach. The prurient appeal element is stated as requiring
appeal to the prurient interest "of minors," and the social value standard
is stated as requiring a lack of serious literary, artistic, political, and sci-
entific value "for minors."
The states vary in their treatment of the adaptation of the patent of-
fensiveness element to minors. Many jurisdictions follow the New York
provision upheld in Ginsberg, which judged patent offensiveness accord-
ing to the "prevailing standard in the adult community . .. [as] to what
is suitable material for minors. ' 154 Other jurisdictions make no reference
to the adaptation of the patent offensiveness element. 155 In these jurisdic-
tions, patent offensiveness conceivably could be judged in terms of the
standards of the juvenile community itself, although such an interpretation
is unlikely.156 Proposed paragraph (h) (ii) follows the New York ap-
proach. Several factors favor looking to the views of the adult commu-
nity, rather than the juvenile community, in determining whether material
is patently offensive for youth. First, it is not clear that a separable
standard is likely to exist among minors as to suitable depictions of sex
for persons of their age. It might well be that, insofar as minors have
reflected on this matter, they have largely absorbed the standards of the
adult community.
Second, assuming that a separate standard among youth might exist,
CODE ANN. § 725.1(1) (Cum. Pamphlet 1975) (refers to minors in describing patent
offensiveness and prurient appeal, but not social value). The lack of reference to
minors in the description of the prurient appeal element, as in the California pro-
vision, probably is a product of drafting style, rather than a decision not to adapt that
element to the interests of minors. Cf. note 152 supra. On the other hand, the Iowa
provision, for one, appears to reflect a policy decision against adapting the social
value standard to minors. The practical significance of adapting to minors the elements
of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness, but not the social value element, is
uncertain. Conceivably, this approach could affect the outcome where the material
in question contains an oblique message that only an adult could appreciate. Cf. text
accompanying note 132 supra. The Iowa approach also may give the court greater lee-
way in rejecting a jury finding of obscenity as to minors. See note 50 supra.
154 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h(1)(f)(ii), [1965] N.Y. Laws 481, as
amended N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(6)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 847.012 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (E) (Page 1975);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(F) (Supp. 1975).
155 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.68.050 (Supp. 1974); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(11) (1974).
See also the provisions cited in note 152 supra. The failure to refer to the adaptation
of the patent offensiveness element seems to be a product of drafting style rather
than a policy decision that the patent offensiveness element should not be adapted
to minors. There is no apparent reason why the element of patent offensiveness
should not be modified for minors along with the prurient appeal element, especially
since the two elements are closely connected. Including a separate reference to
minors probably was considered unnecessary on the ground that the standard for
judging patent offensiveness-community standards relating to "suitable descrip-
tions"-adjusts automatically to the nature of the audience.
156 Assuming an adjustment for the age of the audience automatically is made by
the jury in applying community standards, see note 155 supra, a jury of adults is
more likely to judge patent offensiveness in terms of an adult standard as to appro-
priate matter for youth rather than in terms of any separate standard of the juvenile
community itself. See text accompanying notes 157-60 infra.
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establishing that standard may introduce unnecessary complexity in the
trial of obscenity cases. While prurient appeal and lack of social value often
would be apparent from the material itself,157 patent offensiveness might
not be so readily established if that element is judged in terms of the
separate standards of the juvenile community. Arguably, the standards
held by minors themselves cannot be determined solely from the scope
of the sexually oriented material that jurors know to be available to
minors; the access of minors to sexually oriented materials is largely
controlled by adults, and the defense can contend that current juvenile
viewing habits do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the juvenile
community as to what they should be allowed to see. Although the prose-
cution might not be constitutionally compelled to introduce expert testi-
mony on the youth-standard issue, 158 the defense certainly could use the
issue as a justification for introducing expert testimony on that point. 5 9
Jurors also might have more difficulty in distinguishing the separate roles
of the juvenile community's experience in determining prurient appeal and
patent offensiveness.1 60
Finally, even if requiring proof of a separate youth-standard would not
add to the complexity of the proceeding, the standard of adults as to
what is suitable for youth is still preferable because it more adequately
serves the function of the patent offensiveness test. As already noted,
affronts to community standards in the depiction of sexual conduct con-
tribute to pornographic quality by exploiting the allure of the forbidden.
The "very fact of social disapproval [is made] a source of added excite-
ment and attraction."1 61 The contribution of patent offensiveness to por-
nographic quality thus is likely to be far greater because the material of-
fends the concepts of suitability held in the adult community, which gen-
erally sets the standard for youth, than because it violates any separate
standards set by youth themselves. Looking to the adult community
standard is also consistent with a basic purpose of the proposed statute-
to support parental interest in restricting dissemination of potentially
harmful matter to their children.
157 See note 158 infra.
158The Court has held that, with respect to proof of obscenity for adults, the
"prosecution need not as a matter of constitutional law produce 'expert witnesses' to
testify as to ... obscenity." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). Hav-
ing examined the materials disseminated, the jurors may draw on their own knowledge
of what appeals to the prurient interest of the average adult in their community, or
is patently offensive to the standards of their community. The material itself also
may amply illustrate to the jurors the total lack of literary, artistic, political, or social
value. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973). Similarly,
in a juvenile obscenity prosecution, the jury's general familiarity with youth should
permit it to apply the tripartite standard without expert testimony, see note 46 supra,
although application of a youth-community standard might strain the familiarity.
159 The Court has noted that "[tihe defense should be free to introduce appropriate
expert testimony." Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121 (1973).
160 In determining prurient appeal, jurors would consider the experience of minors
in the community with sexually oriented material as that experience is known to the
jurors. See note 168 and accompanying text infra.
161 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
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I. Community Standards
1. Application-Under Miller, two elements of the tripartite test-
patent offensiveness and appeal to the prurient interest-are to be judged
in terms of "contemporary community standards.' 1 62 The usefulness of
community standards in determining patent offensiveness clearly follows
from the function of the patent offensiveness element. The impact of patent
offensiveness in contributing to the pornographic quality of material stems
from the community judgment that the material goes beyond acceptable
social standards governing the depiction of sexual activity. It is because
the community has judged the material as "indecent" that it has the special
quality of "forbidden fruit.'' 1 3
The usefulness of community standards in determining prurient appeal
is not nearly so self-evident. Indeed, prior to Miller, it often was assumed
that community standards were to be employed only in judging patent
offensiveness. Roth referred to contemporary community standards in de-
scribing the prurient interest test, but that reference appeared to be aimed
at incorporating the element of patent offensiveness within the prurient in-
terest standard. 64 When patent offensiveness was subsequently recognized
as a distinct element of the constitutional definition of obscenity, the
reference to community standards was dropped from the statement of the
prurient interest element. Thus, Justice Brennan's statement of the tri-
partite test in Memoirs referred to community standards only in describing
the element of patent offensiveness. 165 Several state juvenile statutes, fol-
lowing Memoirs, did not refer to community standards in describing the
element of prurient appeal.1 66
Miller returned to the language of Roth, including the Roth reference
to community standards, in describing the prurient interest element. The
issue to be decided by the jury, the Court noted, is "whether the 'average
person, applying contemporary community standards,' would find that
162 413 U.S. at 24, 30. In its initial description of the tripartite test, the Court did
not refer to community standards in describing the patent offensiveness element.
See text accompanying note 26 supra. However, in its later discussion of community
standards, the Court clearly indicated that patent offensiveness is to be judged ac-
cording to such standards. See 413 U.S. at 30. See also text accompanying notes 95-96
supra.
The Miller opinion also clearly indicates that the lack of serious literary, artistic,
political, and scientific value is not to be determined by local community standards.
See Lockhart, supra note 117, at 553-54. The social value standard is the ultimate
test for the presence of a significant expository function, see part II A supra, and
accordingly must be judged by universally accepted standards as to what constitutes
the communication of ideas, without regard to the community's evaluation of those
ideas. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra; Lockhart, supra note 117, at
554-55; Clor, supra note 131, at 217-18.
163 See part II A supra and text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
164 354 U.S. at 489. See note 91 supra and text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
165 383 U.S. at 418.
166 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(5) (Special Supp. 1972);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-.02(2) (Special Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. STAT. §
9.68.050 (Supp. 1974). The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg also referred to
community standards only in its statement of the patent offensiveness element. See
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968).
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the work . . . appeals to the prurient interest.' 67 This statement appears
to direct the jury to look to some community judgment as to the type
of material likely to have strong erotic appeal for the average person. It is
not clear, however, how this community judgment contributes to the de-
termination of prurient appeal. Unlike the patent offensiveness element,
the ultimate issue here is not how the community views the matter in ques-
tion, but whether the matter would, in fact, have a certain impact upon
the average person. Of course, the reaction of the average person is molded
to some extent by community judgments, particularly as they control prob-
able prior experience with sexually oriented material. 1 68 The Court's
specific reference to community standards might suggest some further
community role, however, since the basic directive that the material be
judged by its impact upon the average person should itself automatically
incorporate any community contribution to that person's experiences.
Nevertheless, the Court's discussion of community standards, in both
Miller and the later decision in Hamling, indicates that the reference to
community standards was not intended to give the community judgment
a unique role beyond that which it ordinarily would play in any determina-
tion of the average person's reactions. Thus, the Court noted that the
primary function of its reference to community standards was to assure
that the juror looks to the impact of the material upon the average person,
not to the juror's personal reaction. 169 The juror must, in other words,
look to the community experience with sexually oriented materials, not
to the juror's personal experience. This concept, we believe, can be stated
more clearly by substituting for the reference to community standards a
directive that prurient appeal be determined in the light of the experience of
average minors in the community, and paragraph (h)(i) uses that formula-
tion.
2. Geographic Scope-Prior to Miller, considerable uncertainty existed
as to the appropriate geographic scope of the community which was to
serve as the source of "contemporary community standards." Those Jus-
tices who had spoken on the issue were divided as to whether the states
had leeway to apply "local" community standards or were required to
look to a single national standard. 170 In Miller and two later rulings,
167 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting in part from Roth). See text accompanying note 26
supra.
168 Thus, to some extent, general community acceptance of a certain type of
sexually explicit material suggests that the average person might be more familiar
with such material and the material therefore might be less likely to arouse intens!
sexual excitement. Cf. OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 177-82.
169 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974), quoted in text accompanying note 176 in/ra. See also
note 174 infra. Cf. United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975)
("prurient interest of the average adult must be measured by the synthesis of the
entire community," and it is reversible error where the jury directions leave the im-
pression that it is sufficient that the material need appeal to only "some of the
average people" in the community).
170 See 413 U.S. at 32-34 (collecting opinions).
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Jenkins v. Georgia,171 and Hamling v. United States,172 the Court settled
the question. Those opinions hold that the state is not constitutionally re-
quired to apply a national standard. The three opinions do not clearly spe-
cify all of the different geographic areas that might appropriately serve as
the source of community standards, but at least three geographic areas
appear to be constitutionally acceptable: (1) the state as a whole; (2) the
vicinage from which the jury is selected; 17 3 and (3) a "local" community
defined in terms of socio-economic factors. 174 Miller upheld jury instruc-
tions specifying the relevant community standard as that of the state as a
whole. 175 Hamling and Jenkins both indicate that a jury charge utilizing
the judicial district from which the jurors were selected would also be con-
stitutionally acceptable. In Hamling, the Court indicated that a vicinage
standard should be utilized under the federal obscenity statute:
The result of the Miller cases, therefore, as a matter of con-
stitutional law and federal statutory construction, is to permit a
juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge of the com-
munity or vicinage from which he comes in deciding what con-
clusion "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would reach in a given case. Since this case was tried
in the Southern District of California, and presumably jurors
from throughout that judicial district were available to serve on
the panel which tried petitioners, it would be the standards of that
"community" upon which the jurors would draw. 17 6
171 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
172 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
173 It is assumed that prosecution is brought in the district of dissemination See
United States v. Elkins, 396 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (where indictment was
filed in Iowa charging conspiracy in Iowa to use the mails in disseminating obscene
material, moving the trial to California, on a change of venue, was improper; con-
temporary community standards of the Northern District of Iowa were applicable
and expert testimony on such standards "could not be a substitute for or eliminate
the need for the knowledge of each juror which he or she could have drawn from
the community of his residence"). See also United States v. Miscellaneous Porno-
graphic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. I11. 1975).
174 Another alternative, use of a single national standard, is of questionable validity.
Ham ling upheld a conviction, under a federal obscenity statute, that was based upon
a pre-Miller jury instruction including occasional references to a nationwide com-
munity standard. The Court noted that the federal obscenity statute, interpreted in
light of Miller, did not authorize a nationwide standard, but the trial court's error in
referring to a national standard did not require reversal since the "principal concern"
in requiring reliance upon a community standard-assuring that the jurors look
to a community viewpoint rather than their personal opinions-had been satisfied
by the instruction below. In rejecting future use of a nationwide standard under the
federal statute, the Court did not state that it would be unconstitutional for a state
to use such a standard. However, certain comments in the majority opinion did sug-
gest that a national standard might be subject to a successful challenge as unduly
vague, at least where the jury charge emphasized the need to utilize a national
viewpoint that might differ significantly from a local viewpoint. See 418 U.S. at
102-10. Cf. United States v. Henson, 513 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding prejudicial
error in instruction to apply a "national standard" where expert testimony indicated
that a national standard allowed less sexual candor than a Southern California
standard).
175 413 U.S. at 30-34.
176 418 U.S. at 105-06.
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Jenkins relied upon a similar analysis in holding that a state court had
not committed constitutional error in leaving the relevant community un-
specified in jury instructions. The Court apparently assumed that the jurors,
with the community left unspecified, would rely "on the understanding of
the community from which they came."' 7 7
In Jenkins, unlike Hamling, the Court did not identify the district from
which the jury was selected. Thus, it did not seem concerned that the
vicinage in a state proceeding might be considerably smaller than the
federal judicial districts. The Court noted in Jenkins that Miller granted
the states "considerable latitude" in determining the appropriate com-
munity.'78 In Hamling, it also noted that
a principal concern in requiring that a judgment be made on the
basis of "contemporary community standards" is to assure that
the material is judged neither on the basis of each juror's personal
opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive
person or group. 179
These statements, combined with the rulings in Hamling and Jenkins, sug-
gest that reference to the standard of the vicinage would be acceptable
even where the jury was drawn from a small community.
The Court's analysis of the role of the community standard in Miller,
Jenkins, and Hamling also supports the constitutionality of using a "local
community" standard, with the particular local community defined in each
case according to socio-economic factors. 80 In some instances, such a
community would be larger than the vicinage and in others smaller. Thus,
where a metropolitan area included several cities, or even several counties,
the entire area would be considered. On the other hand, where the judicial
district included an entire county, a particular city therein, such as a col-
lege town in an otherwise rural community, might be sufficiently different
from the rest of the county to constitute a separate local community.
While the Court did not speak directly to such a "local" community con-
cept, its acceptance of the Jenkins charge indicates that a socio-economic
definition of the relevant community would be upheld. The jurors in
17 7 See 418 U.S. at 157:
Miller held that it was constitutionally permissible to permit juries to
rely on the understanding of the community from which they came as
to contemporary community standards, and the States have consider-
able latitude in framing statutes under this element of the Miller de-
cision. A State may choose to define an obscenity offense in terms of
"contemporary community standards" as defined in Miller without
further specification, as was done here, or it may choose to define
the standards in more precise geographic terms, as was done by Cali-
fornia in Miller.
See also People v. Watson, 26 I11. App. 3d 1081, 325 N.E.2d 629 (1975), discussed
in note 210 infra.
178 418 U.S. at 157.
'79 418 U.S. at 107.
180 This concept is sometimes described as utilizing a "metropolitan area" stand-
ard. See Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 577, 217 N.W.2d 676, 679 (1974) (also
referring to "integrated local communities"); Davison v. State, 288 So. 2d 483, 487
(Fla. 1973).
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Jenkins, with the precise community left unspecified, were more likely to
have looked to their local socio-economic community than to the par-
ticular governmental unit from which the jury was drawn.181 It also may
be significant that the Miller opinion referred to particular cities as illus-
trations of separate communities, 182 rather than to counties, which serve
as the vicinage for jury selection in most parts of this country.' 83
Most of the state juvenile provisions examined do not specify what com-
munity should be utilized in applying contemporary community stand-
ards. 84 These provisions generally were adopted before Miller, when
there was doubt as to the leeway allowed to the state in designating
the relevant community. Judicial decisions interpreting such statutes have
utilized either a statewide standard, a "local" standard that is not further
defined, or a local standard defined by reference to the vicinage.'8 5 Several
states have statutory provisions defining the relevant community as either
the vicinage or the entire state. 186
Proposed paragraph (h) contains two alternative references--one to
the "local" community and the other to the "statewide" community. The
use of the phrase "local community," in turn, presents three alternatives:
(1) leave the term "local" undefined, thereby permitting reference in the
individual case to the appropriate socio-economic community; (2) define
"local" as the vicinage from which the jurors of the particular court are
selected; or (3) define "local" with reference to the county or other dis-
trict from which jurors are selected in courts of general jurisdiction in the
181 Arguably, the socio-economic definition of the relevant community* is the
most appropriate definition in light of the role of community standards in determin-
ing patent offensiveness. Insofar as patent offensiveness is significant because of the
"forbidden" quality of material not accepted in the community, see text accom-
panying notes 104-05 supra, the reference of the audience will be to the community
with which the audience is most familiar. That community presumably would be the
metropolitan area from which the audience comes.
182 In referring to variations in standards among separate communities, Miller
mentioned New York City and Las Vegas. 413 U.S. at 32.
183 See, e.g., UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT §§ 4-6, 13 UNIF. LAW
ANNOT. 328 (1975).
184 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(f)(2) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
235.20(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.25 (Supp. 1975). The
state provisions examined referring to a specific geographic community are cited in
note 186 infra. See also DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-10-18(ll)(A) (1974) ("contem-
porary community standards of the city of Detroit").
185 See, e.g., Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 217 N.W.2d 676 (1974) (statewide
standard); People v. Heller, 33 N.Y.2d 314, 307 N.E.2d 805, 352 N.Y.S.2d 601
(1973) (statewide standard); Davison v. State, 288 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1973) (county,
which was vicinage, was permissible); Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 201
S.E.2d 798 (1974) (local without further definition). See also Hunsaker, supra
note 122, at 931-32; Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 482, 296 So. 2d 218, 226 (1974).
Except for Davison, the decisions cited above interpret general obscenity statutes,
but the courts presumably would adopt the same interpretation for juvenile pro-
visions. In light of Davison v. State, supra, see Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351
(Fla. 1973).
186N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-02 (Special Supp. 1975) (statewide); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1202(12) (Supp. 1975) (vicinage); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-1
(Supp. 1974) (statewide). See also S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-28 (Supp.
1974) (statewide); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2801 (1974) (statewide).
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state. Thus, including the possible use of a statewide standard, four options
are presented. Each has its own advantages and disadvantages.
In Miller the Court criticized use of a national community standard as
"hypothetical" and "unascertainable." "[O]ur Nation is simply too big and
too diverse," the Court noted, "to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming
the prerequisite consensus exists."'81 T A statewide standard would, in many
states, not seem to be significantly less hypothetical. 188 Of course, any
community standard will be a hypothetical construction to some degree.
Yet a local community ordinarily should come much closer to a general
consensus than the state as a whole.
The use of a statewide standard arguably also places greater emphasis on
the use of expert testimony. As noted previously, the Supreme Court has
held that obscenity need not be established by expert testimony. 189 Having
examined the publication in issue, a juror "is entitled to draw on his own
knowledge of the views of the average person in the community or vicinage
from which he comes for making the required determination." 90 Although
the Court's opinions suggest that application of a statewide standard
does not necessarily carry with it a constitutional requirement that expert
witnesses be used, 191 it is highly questionable that a local jury has the
capacity to act as "cross-section of [a statewide community] with knowl-
edge of its standards."'19 2
187 413 U.S. at 30.
188 Variation between standards of urban and rural areas has been cited as a
primary objection to adopting a statewide standard. See Davison v. State, 288 So.
2d 483, 487 (Fla. 1973); Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 491, 201 S.E.2d
798, 799 (1974). But see Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 482, 296 So. 2d 218, 226
(1974), concluding that "there is no real reason to believe that there is any great
difference in the morals of the average citizen of the state depending upon where he
happens to live." The court noted particularly "the mobility of modern society,
coupled with the impact of mass media on contemporary thought."
189 See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
190 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
191 Expert testimony was used in Miller (involving a statewide standard) and
Hamling (involving a national standard). However, the Hamling discussion of a
juror's capacity to determine obscenity without expert testimony was not tied to
the use of a specific local standard. Although noting that the juror could rely on
the views of the average person in his home community, the Court analogized the
juror's capacity to that of the juror required to apply a "reasonable person" standard
in tort law, which ordinarily is not tied to a particular geographic community. In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), which reaffirmed that use of
expert testimony is not a constitutional requirement, the Court did not suggest that
its ruling was tied to the particular community standard that might be adopted by
the Georgia Supreme Court. On remand, the Georgia court held a statewide standard
applicable. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 231 Ga. 312, 317-18, 201 S.E.2d 456, 460
(1973). Paris cited with approval the majority opinion in United States v. Groner,
479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973), which tied its rejection of an expert witness require-
ment to the application of a local standard. But Paris also cited Judge Clark's con-
curring opinion in Groner, which noted that the ruling below was acceptable with-
out expert testimony though based on application of a national standard. 479 F.2d
at 588.
192 Leventhal, supra note 115, at 1263. See also Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
490, 201 S.E.2d 798 (1974); Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 582-84, 217 N.W.2d
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One advantage of a statewide standard is that it should reduce the bur-
den upon the publisher and wholesale and mail-order distributors. A
local standard, it is argued, places an almost intolerable burden upon such
disseminators by requiring them to be aware of potentially different
community standards throughout the state. The defendants advanced a
similar complaint in Miller and Hamling, arguing that only a national
standard was acceptable, but the Court rejected that position. The majority
noted that application of diverse community standards throughout the
country did not impose an unconstitutional burden on disseminators of
sexually oriented material.' 93 In the area of distribution to minors, there
is, perhaps, less need to be concerned as to the burden imposed on pub-
lishers and wholesale and mail-order distributors. Sexually oriented ma-
terial ordinarily is not developed for an audience of minors alone and
publishers of most material accordingly look primarily to community
standards for adults. Similarly, wholesale distributors are not concerned
about standards for minors since they do not sell directly to minors and
ordinarily would have no responsibility for such sales. While mail-order
distributors may deal with some minors, they ordinarily do not sell to
persons known to be minors.19 4 The persons who sell directly to minors
and who therefore are likely to be subject to criminal prosecution are the
local distributors, who should be more familiar with local standards.
A statewide standard also may minimize, to some extent, the possibility
that two persons distributing the same or similar material in different parts
of the state would be treated differently as to criminal liability. Such dis-
parity appears particularly unseemly in applying a state criminal statute.195
676, 682-83 (1974) (Hanson, J., concurring). But see Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473,
482, 296 So. 2d 218, 226 (1974) (suggesting that the "homogeneity in the average
citizens" of the state readily permits jurors selected from any particular locality to
apply a statewide standard).
Pierce also suggests that utilization of a standard requiring greater reliance on
expert testimony is preferable since an appellate court cannot effectively review a
jury determination that is not based on extrinsic evidence. Pierce noted that, if a
local standard were applied, with the jury "deemed to be the embodiment of the
community, then proof of standards for the jury's sake would be superfluous" and
an appellate court "could make no independent determination on the issue of ob-
scenity vel non." Id. at 480, 296 So. 2d at 224. See also note 197 and accompanying
text infra.
193 413 U.S. at 30-34; 418 U.S. at 104-09. See also the statement of Chief Justice
Warren quoted with approval in Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106-07:
It is said that such a "community" approach may well result in ma-
terial being proscribed as obscene in one community but not in an-
other, and, in all probability, that is true. But communities throughout
the Nation are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in
cases such as this one, the Court is confronted with the task of recon-
ciling conflicting rights of the diverse communities within our society
and of individuals.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
194 See notes 476-77 and accompanying text infra.
'95 See Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 480-81, 296 So. 2d 218, 224-25 (1974);
Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 217 N.W.2d 676 (1974); People v. Nitke, 45 App.
Div. 2d 543, 359 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1974). But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
26 n.9 (1973):
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Arguably, it may be justified on the ground that the two cases are different
because of the differences in the communities involved, but this conten-
tion, in turn, raises the issue as to whether such local variations should
be incorporated in any criminal offense. Reliance upon local standards
may be inconsistent with state policy governing local variation in criminal
provisions.196 Of course, even if a statewide standard is adopted, juries
may tend to rely heavily on local experience (particularly if expert testi-
mony is not presented). The appellate courts, however, could much more
readily make their own independent determination of obscenity vel non
where a statewide, as opposed to a local, standard governs. 197
As opposed to a statewide standard, the use of a local standard that
looks to the vicinage has two major advantages. First, assuming that there
is considerable variation in the standards of communities throughout the
state, 198 the vicinage standard looks to a "community" that would play a
more significant role than the state as a whole in contributing to the impact
of material upon the average person in the audience. 199 Second, the vicin-
age standard permits the jury to operate most effectively by applying the
standards of a community with which the jurors should be quite familiar.
On the other hand, like any local standard, a vicinage standard pre-
sents disadvantages inherent in diversity, such as an added element of
uncertainty that must be borne by distributors. Moreover, use of the
vicinage presents special difficulties that are peculiar to that standard as
opposed to a more flexible local community standard. The districts from
which jurors are selected often do not reflect distinct economic or social
entities. In some instances, they do not even constitute very significant
political entities. From the distributor's viewpoint, the community in
which he sells is not the particular judicial district in which his establish-
ment is located, but the surrounding geographical area from which his
The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the same
material does not mean that constitutional rights are abridged. As this
Court observed in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 492 n.30, "it is
common experience that different juries may reach different results
under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences we accept
under our jury system."
196 In Court v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 570, 577, 217 N.W.2d 676, 679 (1974), the
majority noted:
We find merit in the contention that any criminal statute of less than
statewide effect may not be promulgated by the legislature. Such would
be the case if less than state standards were applied. Since obscenity
and First Amendment rights are matters of statewide concern [see Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 31, one community may not deem noncriminal that
which is criminal in another community.
See also Study Report, supra note 1, at 279 n.155. But cf. Note, Concurrent State and
Local Regulation of Marijuana, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 400 (1972).
197 See authorities cited in note 50 supra; Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So.
2d 218 (1974); Lockhart, supra note 117, at 551-52 (suggesting that a state appellate
court is "in no position to disagree with a local jury's assessment of the 'contemporary
community standards ... except where a statewide standard has been prescribed'").
198 See note 188 supra. But see Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473, 296 So. 2d 218
(1974), quoted in note 188 supra.
199 See notes 181, 168 supra and text accompanying notes 104-05, 163 supra.
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customers come. Often, as in a major metropolis, that surrounding area
extends beyond the line of the judicial district. On the other hand, in
counties containing quite distinct cities, the marketing area may not
extend throughout the entire judicial district. Admittedly, the prevailing
viewpoint of the district in which the dealer is located often will be quite
similar to that of the total marketing area, 20 0 and the difference in com-
munity standards then would not have a significant impact upon the jury's
determination. Also, even though the community is defined as the vicinage,
the trial court may let the distributor introduce evidence relating to prac-
tices in the surrounding metropolitan area, if such evidence would "assist
the jurors. '20 1 Nevertheless, one can easily imagine situations in which
such evidence would not be admitted, and the distinction between the
staadards of the vicinage and those of the marketing area conceivably could
have some impact upon the jury's conclusion.
In some states, such as Michigan, the complex structure of the local
judicial system presents special difficulty in using the vicinage as the rele-
vant community. Thus, in Michigan, the issue of obscenity could be tried
in various courts operating under different jury selection acts. Criminal
prosecutions could be tried in Recorder's Court of Detroit, district courts,
municipal courts, or circuit courts (via trial de novo on appeal from mu-
nicipal courts). Civil actions would be brought in the circuit court. Each
of these courts draws its jurors from a different judicial district. Thus,
for example, material disseminated in the city of Ann Arbor would be
judged by the standards of that city in a criminal prosecution in the district
court, but by the standards of the county in a civil proceeding in the circuit
court.20 2 To eliminate such inconsistency, a single standard using the
vicinage of the trial court of general jurisdiction could be adopted. In
Michigan, this would be the county.20 3
We have already noted the advantages of leaving the local community
standard undefined to permit reference to the appropriate socio-economic
community in the particular case. This approach also presents various
disadvantages, however. In each case, a new factual issue is added: a de-
termination must be made as to the appropriate socio-economic community
under the circumstances of the dissemination in that case. While under
Hamling an error in defining the appropriate community is likely to be
viewed as harmless error on appeal, the issue still may be hotly contested.
Also, since the very concept of a socio-economic community is somewhat
nebulous, a careful analysis of various factors would be needed in devel-
200 Cf. United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 918 (6th Cir. 1975) (where the
theatre was located in Newport, Kentucky, the Eastern District of Kentucky was an
acceptable community although it did not include Cincinnati, a part of the socio-
economic community from which the audience came; the trial court did permit,
however, testimony relating to community standards in the Cincinnati area).
201 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). See also United States v.
Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975) (discussed in note 200 supra); Kaplan v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
-02 While the civil action would be tried without a jury, the same concept of the
community of the vicinage would apply. See, e.g., cases cited in note 48 supra.
203 MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.1306 (Supp. 1975).
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oping an appropriate standard to be applied in individual cases. 20 4 Judge
Leventhal has raised the question whether there may be distinct socio-
economic communities within a larger socio-economic community-wheth-
er, for example, "a college bookstore [is] governed by the standards of
the college community or of the town or county in which the college is
located. '20 5 Certainly, the concept of a community within a community
could not be carried to the point where a few city blocks, largely devoted
to porno-shops, would be viewed as a separate community. 20 6 Special
problems in defining a community also may be presented with respect to
minors, who may be more limited in the geographic range of establish-
ments to which they have access. 207
If the local community standard is to be left undefined to permit a
case-by-case determinaton, another issue that must be considered is
whether that community is to be defined by the judge or the jury. Arguably,
the determination of the relevant socio-economic community is as much
a jury function as the determination of whether the publication was patent-
ly offensive under the standards of that community. Similar issues involv-
ing determination of relevant geographical communities are left to juries
in analogous fields. 20 8 If the relevant community is to be determined by
the jury, it might be tempting for a trial court to simply send the issue to
the jury without attempting to define the socio-economic community. Jen-
kins lends support to the constitutionality of such an approach. 20 9 However,
where the jury is given a standard that is not self-defining, it should also
be given instructions as to the application of that standard. The jury
should not be left "at sea" so that each juror could adopt his or her own
view as to what the statute means. 210 We anticipate that, if a local com-
munity standard is utilized, appropriate jury instructions will be devel-
oped, perhaps as part of the state's standard jury instructions.
204 Consider, by analogy, the treatment of the "locality rule" in the malpractice
area and the "relevant market" requirement in the antitrust area. See, e.g., Pederson
v. Domouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne
Bell, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. § 60, at 582 (10th Cir.
1975). The malpractice analogy was relied upon in adopting a local standard in
Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 491-92, 201 S.E.2d 798, 799-800 (1974).
235 Leventhal, supra note 115, at 1263.
206 See, e.g., United States v. 392 Copies of Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253
F. Supp. 485, 496 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1967) ("The
Block," a Baltimore area containing various adult bookstores, did not furnish a
separate community standard).
207 See proposed paragraph (h)(i) (determining prurient interest in light of the
experience of minors in the community). See also text accompanying notes 167-68
supra.
208 See note 204 supra.
209 See text accompanying note 177 supra.
2 1 0 See People v. Watson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1083-84, 325 N.E.2d 629, 632
(1975) (where state had prescribed statewide standard, failure of trial judge to
designate geographical area constituted "plain error" since jury should not be given
"unbridled discretion to impose any type of standard they desire").
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J. "Considered as a Whole"
Judgments as to appeal to prurient interest and lack of serious literary,
artistic, political, and scientific value must be made as to the material
"considered as a whole. '211 The "whole publication" standard, incor-
porated in proposed paragraphs (h) (i) and (h) (ii), follows Miller.212
The primary issues presented in the application of this standard relate
to the integration of pornographic material in a work that largely consists
of nonpornographic material. While an integrated publication must be
considered as a whole, separate pornographic segments, unrelated to the
whole, are not protected by their insertion into an otherwise innocuous
publication. 213 Determining whether particular matter is or is not part of
the whole may be quite difficult, but further statutory explanation of the
whole publication standard is unlikely to provide substantial assistance
in making that determination. Accordingly, the proposed statute, like
those of other jurisdictions, does not go beyond a general statement that
the matter be "considered as a whole."
K. The Role of Pandering 0
Proposed paragraph (h) provides that circumstances showing com-
mercial exploitation of prurient appeal can be relied upon as probative
evidence in determining whether challenged material falls within the tri-
partite test. This provision follows the Supreme Court's holding in Ginz-
burg v. United States.214 The defendant in Ginzburg was charged with
mailing obscene material. The prosecution alleged that the publications
in question were obscene "in the context of the circumstances [of their]
production, sale, and publicity. ' 215 Evidence accordingly was introduced
to show that "each of the accused publications was originated or sold as
stock in trade of the sordid business of pandering-'the business of pur-
veying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic
interest of their customers.' "216 The Court held that the trial judge prop-
erly considered such evidence in concluding that the mailed publications
were obscene. The Court noted:
[W]here an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography
[i.e., pandering] is shown with respect to material lending itself to
such exploitation ... such evidence may support the determina-
211 The "considered as a whole" standard does not apply to the "patent offensive-
ness" element since that element is directed only at characterizing the depiction of
specified sexual conduct that gives the publication, as a whole, its prurient appeal.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
212 See id. at 24, quoted in text accompanying note 26 supra.
213 See Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1972); Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1966); City of Tacoma v. Mushkin, 12 Wash. App. 56, 527
P.2d 1393, 1395 (1974).
214 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
215 Id. at 465.
216 Id. at 467 (quoting in part from Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957)).
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tion that the material is obscene even though in other contexts the
material would escape such condemnation. 217
The Court emphasized that this conclusion was consistent with the con-
stitutional definition of obscenity.
This evidence [of pandering] .. .was relevant in determining the
ultimate question of obscenity and, in the context of this record,
serves to resolve all ambiguity and doubt. The deliberate repre-
sentation of petitioners' publications as erotically arousing, for
example, stimulated the reader to accept them as prurient; he
looks for titillation, not for saving intellectual content .... Sim-
ilarly, such representation would tend to force public confronta-
tion with the potentially offensive aspects of the work; the
brazenness of such an appeal heightens the offensiveness ...
And the circumstances of presentation and dissemination . . . are
equally relevant to determining whether social importance
claimed ...was, in the circumstances, pretense or reality ...
[T]he fact that each of these publications was created or ex-
ploited entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient interests
strengthens the conclusion that the transactions here were sales
of illicit merchandise, not sales of constitutionally protected mat-
ter.218
Although the Court's opinion at points suggested the relevancy of pan-
dering in judging all sexually oriented material, the Ginzburg "holding"
was described in a more limited fashion: "[]n close cases evidence of
pandering may be probative of the nature of the material in question and
thus satisfy the Roth test. ' 219 The limited scope of the Court's ruling and
the varying arguments it offered in support of that ruling leave uncertain
the precise role that may be played by evidence of pandering in establish-
ing obscenity. 220 This uncertainty, in turn, may lead one to question wheth-
er a provision incorporating a Ginzburg standard should be included in a
juvenile obscenity provision.
The Ginzburg ruling suggests that pandering is relevant primarily where
the material involved has not only a potential prurient appeal, but also
a potential serious social value. The Ginzburg case involved this type
of material, and the Court's discussion frequently was tied to the factual
context of that case. 22 1 In such a situation, the Court indicates, the pres-
ence of pandering permits the trier of fact to ignore the potential expository
217 Id. at 475-76.
218 Id. at 470, 474-75.
219 Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
220 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
221 See, e.g., 383 U.S. at 247-73:
The decision in United States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512, is persuasive
authority for our conclusion. That was a prosecution under the pre-
decessor to § 1461, brought in the context of pandering of publications
assumed useful to scholars and members of learned professions. The
books involved were written by authors proved in many instances to
have been men of scientific standing, as anthropologists or psychiatrists.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit therefore assumed that
many of the books were entitled to the protection of the First Amend-
ment, and "could lawfully have passed through the mails, if directed to
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content of the material and concentrate on its potential prurient appeal.
This focus apparently is permissible because (1) the seller, through his
pandering, has presented the material solely as pornography and (2) the
audience, responding to the pandering, is likely to view the material solely
as pornography.
Insofar as the Ginzburg rationale rests on the premise that those who
purchase in response to pandering are more likely to view the material
solely for its erotic value, it may reflect the same kind of "special audience"
analysis as the Mishkin case.222 This aspect of the Ginzburg rationale
apparently requires, as a factual prerequisite, that the audience is likely to
have been aware of the pandering, either because the pandering was part of
the material disseminated or because it was directed at those persons who
purchased the material.223 Both circumstances apparently were present in
Ginzburg, where the pandering was directed at mail order subscribers. 224 In
Mishkin, the Court also noted that the material in issue was both "designed
for and primarily disseminated to" the special audience. 225 Dissemination to
minors might present certain difficulties in this regard since pandering fre-
quently would be aimed at an adult audience and would be contained in
advertisements not generally disseminated to minors. 226 While it might be
assumed that a minor's decision to purchase was influenced at least in-
directly by the pandering, that assumption is not so readily made as in the
mail order distribution scheme of Ginzburg.
The Ginzburg opinion at points also justifies consideration of pandering
in close cases on what may be described as an "admissions analysis." Thus,
the Court noted that petitioners "proclaimed" the obscenity of their
material and the court below accordingly could "tak[e] their own evalu-
ation at its face value .... ",227 Of course, the defendant's admission is not
conclusive, but in a close case it may tip the balance.228 This admis-
those who would be likely to use them for the purposes for which
they were written..." 109 F.2d at 514. But the evidence, as here,
was that the defendants had not disseminated them for their "proper
use, but... woefully misused them, and it was that misuse which con-
stituted the gravamen of the crime."
222 See part II E 2 supra.
223 See Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 7,
61-62.
224 See 383 U.S. at 464-70.
225 Id. at 508.
226 It assumed that an advertisement would not be characterized as "pandering"
unless, as in Ginzburg, it contained material that clearly emphasized the "leer of
the sensualist." Id. at 468. The circulars distributed there "openly boasted that the
publishers would take full advantage of what they regarded as an unrestricted license
allowed by law in the expression of sex and sexual matters." Id. The concept of
pandering cannot be extended substantially beyond the type of advertisements pre-
sented in Ginzburg without encompassing a broad range of traditional advertising
(found in general circulation magazines and even daily newspapers) that empha-
sizes "sex appeal." See McGrath, supra note 223, at 60-61. Cf. People v. Superior
Court, 14 Cal. 3d 82, 87-88, 534 P.2d 393, 397, 120 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1975).
227 383 U.S. at 472. See also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966).
228 Arguably, the person who utilizes pandering should be subject to criminal
liability for that act alone, without regard to the nature of the material sold. While
the Constitution protects the dissemination of sexually oriented material having
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sions analysis would present less difficulty in its application to minors
than would the special audience analysis. Although the pandering is
directed at adults rather than minors, the acknowledgment that the ma-
terial appeals to the prurient interest of the adults ordinarily would en-
compass the prurient interest of minors as well. However, an admissions
analysis restricts consideration of pandering to prosecutions brought against
the person engaged in the pandering and that person very often is the
publisher or wholesale distributor rather than the retailer who sells to the
minor.
The proposed provision on pandering in paragraph (h) proceeds on an
admissions analysis. It does not require that the pandering have been
directed especially at minors or that the pandering knowingly was pre-
sented in a form that would reach minors as well as adults. Either require-
ment would sharply limit the use of pandering evidence, perhaps to such
a degree that inclusion of a pandering provision would be of little practical
importance. Indeed, even without such restrictions, the pandering provision
may have very limited significance. Where material is promoted as porno-
graphic as to adults and presents a close factual case as to its obscene
quality for adults, its obscenity for minors ordinarily will be fairly ob-
vious, even without consideration of the pandering. 229 Thus, inclusion of a
pandering provision based on either or both analyses of Ginzburg may
not be advisable, at least until the Supreme Court more fully explains the
scope of the Ginzburg ruling.
Only three of the juvenile statutes examined provide for consideration
of pandering evidence. 230 The wording is similar in all three provisions:
[W]here circumstances of production, presentation, sale, dis-
semination, distribution or publicity indicate that matter is being
exploited by the defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal,
such evidence is probative with respect to the nature of the mat-
serious social value, it should not protect advertising designed to exploit that material
as pornography. The Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 6, proposed adoption
of a provision, replacing the basic dissemination section, that would make pandering
a crime in itself, without regard to whether the material sold was actually obscene.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10[l] (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); Schwartz, Morals
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 680 (1973). See also
HILL-LINK MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 9. Since a separate offense of pandering
would not be limited to pandering aimed at juveniles, extended consideration of such
an offense is outside the scope of this article.
229 Arguably, pandering evidence might be significant in cases involving substantial
"puffing" of the erotic quality of material that is not obscene as to adults but might
present a close question as to juveniles. Cf. People v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d
82, 87-88, 534 P.2d 393, 397, 120 Cal. Rptr. 699, 701 (1975).
230 CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a)(2) (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-104
(1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). See also IOWA
CODE ANN. § 725.7(4) (Cum. Pamphlet 1975) (simply noting that the court may
receive into evidence the testimony of experts as to inter alia, "[tihe advertising pro-
motion and other circumstances relating to the sale of the materials").
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ter and can justify the conclusion that the matter is utterly with-
out redeeming social importance for minors.231
The pandering provision included in proposed paragraph (h) largely
tracks these three state provisions. Like the California provision, para-
graph (h) is limited to pandering "by the defendant. '232 Like the Califor-
nia and Illinois provisions, it permits evidence of pandering to be considered
in the application of all elements of the tripartite test.2 33 Ginzburg was
decided under Roth, which recognized the significance of serious social
value and patent offensiveness, but did not treat these factors as separate
elements of the constitutional definition of obscenity. However, in dis-
cussing the relevancy of pandering evidence under Roth, Ginzburg spe-
cifically refers to its bearing on all three elements of the tripartite test.234
Paragraph (h) would allow the trier of fact considerable leeway in
determining the relevancy of pandering to particular aspects of the tri-
partite test. Unlike all three state provisions,235 parapraph (h) states only
that the pandering "may be probative" in applying the tripartite test.
Thus, evidence of pandering need not be given any weight in a particular
case.2 36 The "may be probative" phrasing is consistent with Ginzburg,
where the Court described its ruling as "holding that in close cases evidence
of pandering may be probative with respect to the nature of the material
in question and thus satisfy the Roth test. 02 37 Even aside from the desira-
bility of following the limited language of Ginzburg, the trial court always
should have some discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence to
the various issues presented in the individual case.
231 CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a)(2) (West Supp. 1976). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-7-104 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). The
Colorado and Illinois provisions both omit the phrase "by the defendant." In addi-
tion, Illinois includes a reference to its "balancing" formulation of the social value
standard, see note 128 supra, and Colorado describes evidence of pandering as
probative only with respect to the "nature of the material or performance."
232 See note 231 supra. Illinois and Colorado do not include this requirement.
233 See note 231 supra. Colorado makes the evidence probative only as to the
"nature of the material," but the scope of that phrase is unclear. Cf. part VII A inira.
234 See quotation in text accompanying note 218 supra. This position arguably
may be inconsistent with an "admissions analysis" of the appropriate use of evidence
of pandering. While the panderer clearly acknowledges that the material appeals to
the prurient interest, not all panderers will necessarily acknowledge also that the
material lacks social value. However, the proposed paragraph (h) gives the trial
court sufficient leeway to evaluate the scope of the pandering in determining
whether to hold it "probative" as to just the prurient interest element or all three
elements of the tripartite test.
235The California provision, quoted in text accompanying note 231 supra, and
the Illinois provision both state that the evidence of pandering "is probative." The
Colorado provision states that evidence of pandering "shall be admitted in evidence
as bearing upon the nature of the material." COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-104 (1973).
236 See note 234 supra.
237 383 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).
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III. DEFINING OBSCENITY: SPECIFIC
SEXUAL CONTENT
A. Introduction
As noted previously,238 the proposed statute, like all but four of the
juvenile statutes examined,2 39 extends only to material that depicts partic-
ular sexual conduct specified in the statute. Under proposed paragraph (h)
of section 1, material is not subjected to the tripartite test unless it falls
within the category of "sexually explicit matter," and under proposed
paragraph (m) of section 1, that category is limited to material depicting
listed types of sexual conduct, such as sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic
abuse, and erotic fondling. 240
The paragraph (h) requirement that material initially fall within the
"sexually explicit" category is based in part on Miller v. California.241
The Court there held that "state statutes designed to regulate obscene
238See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
239 The Michigan obscenity provisions currently refer only to the qualities of the
materials encompassed under the statute. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
750.343e (1973) ("obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent"). In our general
review of state juvenile statutes, we noted a few similar provisions, see note 54 supra,
but did not include them in the group of twenty state provisions used as the basis for
our study. See note 2 supra. Aside from the Michigan provision, that group was
limited to more detailed juvenile provisions. Only three of these provisions (Cali-
fornia, Illinois, and Washington) failed to describe the required content of the
regulated material. The California and Illinois provisions describe the requisite
prurient appeal as related to "nudity, sex, or excretion," CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a)
(West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975),
and the Washington provision describes the requisite patent offensiveness as related
to "sexual matters or sado-masochistic abuse," WASH. REV. CODE § 968.050(2) (Supp.
1974), but neither reference adequately specifies the particular sexual conduct that
must be depicted to bring the material within the statutory coverage. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 17, 23-25 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 54 (1973). But note People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1973) (specification added by judicial interpretation). The Colorado provision,
although referring to specific sexual conduct, presents some difficulty because it
appears also to include a broader category of materials. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-7-101(5) (1973) (obscene matter must go substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in "describing, portraying, or dealing" with "nudity, sex, sexual conduct,
sexual excitement, excretion, sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse")
(emphasis added). In People v. Tabron, - Colo. -, 544 P.2d 372, 379 (1976), the
court held that an identical definition utilized in the Colorado general obscenity
statute was unconstitutional because, inter alia, "the words 'nudity, sex, sexual con-
duct, sexual excitement.... sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse' are not
representative of the specificity contemplated by the Supreme Court in Miller."
Of the four commission proposals examined, see note 3 supra, only the Hill-Link
proposal failed to describe the encompassed material by reference to the depiction
of specified sexual conduct. See OBSCENITY CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 3, at
462-68.
240 Paragraph (m) incorporates the listing of specific categories of sexual conduct
found in the separate provisions on "sexually explicit visual material" (paragraph
(p)), "sexually explicit verbal material" (paragraph (o)), and "sexually explicit
performance" (paragraph (n)). Visual material (e.g., drawings or photographs),
verbal material, and performances are treated separately because, inter alia, dif-
ferent categories of sexual content may be applied to different media. See part IV A
infra.
241 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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materials" may reach only "works which depict or describe sexual con-
duct" and "that conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable
state law, as written or authoritatively construed. '242 In the course of
establishing this requirement of "sexual specificity," Miller offered "a few
plain examples of . . .[sexual conduct that] a state statute could define for
regulation:"
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; [and] (b)
Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturba-
tion, excretory functions and lewd exhibitions of the genitals. 24 3
Although Miller dealt with a general obscenity statute, the Miller re-
quirement of sexual specificity appears equally applicable to a juvenile
obscenity provision. Miller offered two justifications for requiring that the
state statute apply only to material depicting specified sexual conduct.
First, restricting the statutory coverage to the depiction of sexual conduct
provides additional assurance that the statute is "carefully limited" in
application to material that is not protected under the first amendment. 244
Second, precise specification of the materials encompassed by the statute
provides "fair notice to a dealer in [such] materials that his . .. com-
mercial activities may bring prosecution. 2 45 Although a juvenile provision
may encompass depictions of a broader range of sexual conduct than an
adult statute,246 the two justifications noted in Miller equally support the
imposition of a requirement of sexual specificity for juvenile statutes.
Moreover, while Ginsberg did not discuss such a requirement, it is note-
worthy that the New York statute upheld there contained the type of
sexual specificity required by Miller.247 Indeed, most of the juvenile statutes
we examined, even when enacted before Miller, include a specific listing
of encompassed material described in terms of the depiction of particular
sexual conduct. 248 In light of Miller and Ginsberg,'2 49 it appears that any
juvenile obscenity provision lacking such specificity could only be "saved"
242 1d. at 23-24.
243 Id. at 25.
244 Id. at 24, 25.
245 Id. at 27.
246 See text accompanying notes 301-09 infra. Cf. parts II H, II I supra.
247 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 645-47 (1968). See also text accompany-
ing note 17 supra.
248 See note 239 supra for a listing of the four state provisions examined that do
not describe the encompassed material in terms of the depiction of specified sexual
conduct. The total group of statutes examined are listed at note 2 supra. Several of
these statutes (e.g., Iowa, North Dakota, and West Virginia) were enacted after
Miller, but the majority were enacted before Miller.
249 See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1968) (noting
the need for specificity in a juvenile provision). The Court there stated:
Nor is it an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of
expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary purpose
of protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness is not
directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the power to
regulate or control expression with respect to children.
See also Erznozik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (discussed in note 309 infra).
SPRING 1976]
Journal of Law Reform
constitutionally by the incorporation of similar standards through judicial
interpretation. 250
Leaving aside the constitutional mandate, we believe that a listing of
included sexual content should be part of any obscenity provision simply
because such a listing is helpful in minimizing the administrative difficulties
noted at the outset of this article. 251 If the listing is carefully limited to the
depiction of advanced sexual acts, such as intercourse and masturba-
tion,2 52 reliance upon the listing alone, without reference to the tripartite
test, should relieve disseminators of any doubts as to the legality of distrib-
uting the great bulk of sexually oriented materials that is protected under the
first amendment, though having some prurient appeal for minors. Indeed,
the listing should provide far more protection overall for constitutionally
protected speech than the Miller tripartite standard. Carefully limiting the
content encompassed should be especially effective in preventing the in-
itiation of inappropriate prosecutions and in gaining prompt dismissal of
those prosecutions that are brought erroneously. The tripartite standard is
sufficiently vague that a prosecutor cannot readily cite it as a clear barrier
to a requested prosecution where the material in question is somewhat
erotic, even though that material does not portray advanced sexual conduct
and is very likely to be protected constitutionally. The nebulous character of
the tripartite standard also makes it a somewhat unreliable basis for gain-
250 State courts examining general obscenity statutes have divided on the appro-
priateness of incorporating by judicial intepretation the Miller illustrations of
sexual specificity. Some courts have argued that the listing of encompassed material is
a task for the legislature, while others have contended that the courts should con-
strue the statute to preserve its constitutionality. See Note, Community Standards,
Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1847 n.51 (1975) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. McDonald, - Pa. -, 347
A.2d 290 (1975). See also People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1973) (finding that the California general obscenity statute, as construed prior to
Miller, satisfied the sexual specificity requirement of Miller).
251 See points (1), (2), and (3), discussed in part I supra.
252 As noted in Justice Brennan's dissent in Miller, some of the illustrations of
sexual specificity in the Miller majority opinion incorporate terms that are them-
selves somewhat vague. Thus, the Court refers to "ultimate sex acts" and the "lewd
exhibition of genitals." As will be discussed in part III C infra, the use of such
phrases can be avoided if the listing of specified conduct is limited to advanced sex
acts. See also Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the
First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 546-48 (1975). Of course, this does not elimi-
nate all ambiguity. Even though the definition of a particular act may be clear (e.g.,
coitus), it may not always be clear what constitutes a "depiction" of that act. See
note 259 infra. However, if the listing is limited to advanced sexual acts, the
vagueness inherent in the listing certainly is no greater than that found in standards
governing the regulation of other types of speech, such as libel or advocacy of
illegal acts.
Clearly, within the framework of current statutes, the use of a carefully limited
listing of specified content, along with restriction of the statute to visual material,
see part IV A infra, and the imposition of an appropriate scienter requirement, see
part VII infra, offers the greatest hope for eliminating the uncertainty inherent in
the tripartite test. For a thorough discussion of the need to eliminate that uncer-
tainty, and suggestions as to other statutory modifications that might be used for
that purpose, see Lockhart, supra.
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ing prompt dismissal of an inappropriate prosecution.2 13 On the other
hand, the factual issue as to whether material does or does not depict
advanced sexual conduct should be capable of resolution with far more
dispatch. Of course, where the material does depict such conduct, the
disseminator must look to the elements of the tripartite test. But the seg-
ment of constitutionally protected material that depicts such conduct should
be far narrower than the segment which has been viewed as potentially
subject to prosecution under those juvenile obscenity provisions that
fail to describe the encompassed material by reference to the conduct
depicted.
The discussion that follows considers each category of sex-related con-
tent, from sexual intercourse to nudity, that might possibly be subjected
to statutory restriction. Those categories are defined in various para-
graphs in proposed section 1254 and are brought together in the definitions
of different types of sexually explicit material in paragraphs (n), (o) and
(p) of section 1.
B. Sexual Intercourse
The least controversial category of sexual content included within the
proposed statute is that presented in paragraph (1), the depiction of vari-
ous acts of "sexual intercourse." This category encompasses the depiction
of several activities, such as fellatio and coitus, which Miller described
as "ultimate sex acts" and specifically cited as an example of constitution-
ally permissible coverage.2 55 All of the state statutes describing sexual
content include'such a category.2 56
Inclusion of a sexual intercourse category presents few administrative
problems of the type discussed at the outset of this article.2 57 Portrayals of
sexual intercourse are rather easily identified by the disseminator. More-
over, combined with the exemption provisions, the sexual intercourse
category presents little potential for overly broad coverage which would
253See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (where exhibition of the
movie "Carnal Knowledge" was successfully prosecuted at the trial level under an
adult obscenity provision); OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 40
(noting the uncertainty produced by the "subjectivity and vagueness" of the tri-
partite standard); Lockhart, supra note 252, at 552. Cf. Huffman v. United States,
470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(discussing various cases reversed by the Supreme Court).
254 See paragraphs (b) ("erotic fondling"), (e) ("masturbation"), (g) ("nudity"),
(j) ("sado-masochistic abuse"), (k) ("sexual excitement"), (1) ("sexual intercourse").
255 See text accompanying note 243 supra.
256See, e.g., the provisions cited in notes 260, 261, 263 infra. The reference is to
those statutes that describe the encompassed content in terms of the depiction of
specified sexual conduct. Subsequent statements in the text concerning the inclusion
of specified categories in "all" or "most" of the statutes examined exclude considera-
tion of the four statutes that do not list specific sexual conduct. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 313(a) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.343e (1973); WASH. REV. CODE §
968.050(2) (Supp. 1974). See note 239 supra.
257See points (1), (2), and (3), discussed in part I supra. See also notes 251-53
and accompanying text supra.
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require reliance upon the tripartite test as a primary safeguard for constitu-
tionally protected speech. Generally, depictions of sexual intercourse are
unlikely to contribute significantly to the exposition of ideas as presented
to minors. Of course, true expository uses for depictions of sexual inter-
course do exist, as in sex education, but such uses ordinarily would be
protected under the proposed statute by the exemption for parents and
other educators.2 58 Some other expository uses might require the protection
afforded by the tripartite test, but only a comparatively small group of
depictions would fall within this category.2 59
Although all of the state statutes examined include a sexual intercourse
category, descriptions of that category vary. A number of statutes utilize
a general category of "sexual conduct," which is defined as including
"sexual intercourse," "homosexuality," and in some provisions, "lesbian-
ism" and "beastiality. '260 Although constitutionally acceptable, this ap-
proach may be unnecessarily vague. It is not clear, for example, whether
''sexual intercourse" as used in this type of provision includes only
coitus or also fellatio. Terms like "lesbianism" and "homosexuality" are
even less precise. A preferable approach is to refer to each of the specific
sexual acts. The Ohio provision takes this approach, defining "sexual
conduct" as "vaginal intercourse, between a male and female, and anal
intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of
sex."'261 This definition has the virtues of clarity and comprehensiveness.
Proposed paragraph (1) utilizes a similar definition but avoids the use of
Latin terminology.262
258See section 2(2).
259 To a large extent, the quantity of material falling within this category will be
dependent upon whether the statute encompasses verbal depictions. See part IV A
infra. Yet even some visual depictions of sexual conduct, though not presented in an
educational setting, nevertheless are likely to be protected by the tripartite test. There
are, of course, various levels of "depiction." Consider, for example, the nondetailed
cartoon or "line drawing" that shows two persons in the position of sexual inter-
course with no showing of genitals, as compared to a film showing the actual act. The
term "depiction" may be construed narrowly, in light of the context of the statute
as a whole, to exclude less explicit representations of sexual intercourse, yet it still
is likely to encompass some abstract representations that are not patently offensive.
Moreover, even assuming a very narrow construction of the term "depiction," some
materials might clearly constitute depiction of sexual intercourse and yet still be
presented in a manner that would prevent them from falling within the tripartite
test as adapted to minors (e.g., in artistic works).
26OSee, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(7) (Special Supp. 1972); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 531.010(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(3) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1975) ("sexual conduct" includes "homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or
physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks,
or, if such person be a female, breast").
261 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01 (A) (Page 1975). Bestiality is included in a
separate category of encompassed sexual conduct under the Ohio provision. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E)(3) (Page 1975).
262 A similar approach is taken in two of the state statutes examined. See IOWA
CODE ANN. § 725.1(7) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(8) (Special
Supp. 1975). See also OBSCENITY COMMISSION MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, §
2(d)(ii); PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3500(m) (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975);
DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(14)(B) (1974) (described in text accompanying
note 263 infra).
[VOL.9:413
Juvenile Obscenity Statutes
The proposed paragraph (1) definition is based upon the Detroit ob-
scenity ordinance. 263 Sexual intercourse is defined as "genital-genital, oral-
genital, oral-anal, and anal-genital" intercourse, "whether between persons
of the same or opposite sex or between a human and an animal." By refer-
ring directly to act, anatomy, and participant, rather than using the Latin
terms, paragraph (1) hopefully suggests a straightforwardness that is par-
ticularly valuable in this type of statute. 26 4
The definition of sexual intercourse includes both actual and simulated
intercourse. Regulation of the depictions of simulated ultimate sex acts
was explicitly authorized by Miller.2 6 5 Several of the statutes examined did
not refer specifically to simulation, but all included a general category
that would encompass simulation, such as the definition of erotic fon-
dling contained in proposed paragraph (b).266 The inclusion of simula-
tion presents certain difficulties. On the one hand, the impact and
offensiveness of realistic simulation does not differ significantly from de-
pictions of the actual sexual conduct. On the other hand, more abstract
simulation of sexual acts is fairly common in certain forms of art which
clearly would not fall within the tripartite test. The need for a narrower
definition to protect the latter type of simulation is unclear. 267 One refine-
ment that would afford such protection would be to limit the simulation
provision to depiction of actors whose genitals are unclothed. 268
C. Sado-Masochistic Abuse
Almost all of the statutes examined specifically encompass the depiction
of "sado-masochistic abuse," as defined in paragraph (j).269 Depictions
263 DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(14) (1974).
264 Compare, however, the recently adopted Michigan Sexual Conduct Act, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(a) (Supp. 1975), using Latin terminology similar to
the Ohio statute.
265 See quotation from Miller in text accompanying note 243 supra.
266 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 115-1.7(c) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
235.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (quoted in note 260 supra); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
944.25(1)(c) (Supp. 1975).
267 Ordinarily, in productions using such simulation (e.g., modern dance), the
simulation is a small portion of the total product and that factor alone might be
taken to provide ample protection against inappropriate prosecution. But see South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), where an advisory jury
found the musical Hair obscene under a general obscenity statute. The district
court agreed, relying in part upon instances of simulated sex that were included in
the particular production. See 420 U.S. at 566-68 (White, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court reversed on procedural grounds and did not reach the issue of obscenity.
268 Consider, in this regard, the simulations described in Morris v. United States,
259 A.2d 337 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1969); People v. Better, - Ill. App. -, 337
N.E.2d 272 (1975); Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 228 Ga. 343, 185 S.E.2d 768
(1971), vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 49, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881,
judgment reinstated on remand, 231 Ga. 312, 201 S.E.2d 456 (1973), cert. denied, 418
U.S. 939, rehearing denied, 419 U.S. 887 (1974). Compare the definition
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (" 'Simulated' means the ex-
plicit depiction.., of any of the types of conduct set forth in clause (b) ... which
creates the appearance of such conduct"). See also the discussion of the definition of
"erotic fondling" in part IH E infra.
269 Among the statutes examined that listed specific sexual content, see note 256
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of sado-masochistic abuse are easily identified, and the constitutionally
protected use of materials emphasizing such depictions is minimal, espe-
cially for minors.
2 1
0
The definition proposed in paragraph (j) is based upon the standard
terminology used by most state statutes defining sado-masochistic abuse.
211
A somewhat briefer description is used in a few states.272 The longer form
used in paragraph (j) provides greater assurance that the activity depicted
is in fact designed for sexual gratification as evidenced by the apparel (or
lack thereof) of the participants. It also includes the depiction of a person
fettered or bound in a specified fashion that usually appeals to a particular
type of deviant audience.27 3
D. Depiction of Masturbation
All of the statutes examined specifically include the depiction of "mas-
turbation," although none sought to define that act. 27 4 A proposed definition
is included in paragraph (e) but may be unnecessary. Paragraph (e) en-
sures coverage of the manipulation of the genitals of another. The term
"masturbation" is often taken to refer only to self-stimulation, although
supra, only two did not refer explicitly to depictions of sado-masochistic abuse. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.7 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974).
Both of these provisions would reach many depictions of sado-masochistic abuse
since each contains a broad nudity provision (extending to the exposure of the geni-
tals, pubic area, buttocks, and female breast).
270 Cf. notes 257-59 and accompanying text supra.
271See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.262 (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(9) (Supp. 1975).
272 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(9) (Special Supp. 1972) ("flagel-
lation or torture by or upon a person as an act of sexual stimulation or gratifica-
tion"); Ky. REV. STAT. § 531.010(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) ("flagellation... for the
purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification"); cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.1(5)
(Cum. Pamphlet 1975) ("the infliction of physical or mental pain upon a person
or the condition of a person being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained").
273 In its listing of examples of constitutionally permissible coverage, Miller did
not refer to depictions of sado-masochistic abuse. See text accompanying note 243
supra. In light of Mishkin, discussed in text accompanying note 78 supra, and the
Court's repeated statement that the Miller listing is not "exhaustive," see text ac-
companying note 305 infra, inclusion of depictions of sado-masochistic abuse should
present no constitutional difficulties, at least where the material depicts specific
activities, such as flagellation. The depiction of a single person posed in a condition
suggesting anticipated abuse (e.g., by costume or bindings) poses some difficulty,
but arguably falls within the Miller reference to the depiction of "sexual conduct."
See notes 301-09 and accompanying text infra, discussing similar concerns relating
to the "nudity" category. See also note 88 supra; B & A Co. v. State, 24 Md. App.
367, 330 A.2d 701 (1975).
274 In some provisions, "masturbation" is placed in a separate category. See, e.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 121-27.1-01(8)(d) (Special Supp. 1975). In others, "masturba-
tion" is one of the acts listed in the general category of "sexual conduct," see, e.g.,
the provisions cited in note 260 supra. The Colorado provision, described in note
239 supra, does not refer explicitly to masturbation, but apparently would include
that act within the category of "sexual conduct."
275 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1968 ed.) defining
masturbation as
erotic stimulation involving the genital organs commonly resulting
in orgasm and achieved by manual or other bodily contact exclusive
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the dictionary definition is not so limited. 275 Paragraph (e) also ensures
coverage of manipulation through the use of instruments other than the
human hand. Again, the dictionary definition of "masturbation" includes
such activity.
A strong case can be made for limiting the coverage of a juvenile ob-
scenity statute to material depicting sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic
abuse, and masturbation. A statute limited to those categories of sexual
content would clearly exempt from coverage the vast bulk of sexually
oriented pictorial material that is constitutionally protected under the tri-
partite standard. At the same time, such a statute, combined with industry
controls relating to minors, would bar dissemination of much of the obscene
material generally viewed as most harmful to minors..2 7 6 The categories
of sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic abuse, and masturbation would
encompass the traditional "hard-core pornography" of the type sold in
adult bookstores. It would also reach so-called "girlie" publications (such
as Playboy) that are sold in many stores catering to the general public. 277
The three categories would also encompass most X-rated films, while the
movie industry's own code would exclude minors from attending, without
parental consent, the much broader group of films subject to an R rating.2 78
With respect to live performances, an even greater range of sexually ex-
plicit performances (such as topless shows) would be off-limits to minors
in any event, since such performances commonly are presented in estab-
lishments serving liquor.
The states have not been willing, however, to accept legislation that direct-
ly regulates such a limited segment of all potentially obscene material and
relies so heavily on industry regulation as a supplementary screening device.
None of the state statutes examined were limited to material depicting
sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic abuse, and masturbation.279 All seek
to provide complete or almost complete coverage of sexually oriented
material that might be obscene for minors. All extend to sexual touching
that falls short of sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic abuse, and mastur-
bation, and all except one reach certain material depicting nudity alone.280
of sexual intercourse, by instrumental manipulation, occas. by sexual
fantasies, or by various combinations of these agencies.
The proposed definition would not include the .depiction of sexual fantasizing that
produced orgasm, although the depiction of the fantasy itself might fall within one
of the other categories of included content.
276 The depiction of sexual intercourse and masturbation are among those having
the greatest potential for causing sexual arousal, but that grouping also includes
certain portrayals of nudity. See studies cited in the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 166-67 as to sexual arousal in adults produced by the depiction of
different sexual conduct.
277 See text accompanying note 313 infra.
278 See notes 314-15 and accompanying text infra, discussing also nonrated films.
279 LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 106(F)(1) (1974), a general obscenity statute, draws
a similar line in a somewhat different context. It permits criminal prosecutions with-
out prior civil adjudication of obscenity, see note 5 supra, only if the material in
question depicts "ultimate sex acts" or contains certain simulated or animated
depictions of such acts.
280 See notes 283-86, 322 and accompanying text infra. Several states also have
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E. Sexual Touching
State obscenity provisions commonly encompass the depiction of any
"sexual touching" of the primary erogenous areas of the body-the gen-
itals, pubic area, buttocks, and female breasts. 21 Significant arguments
can be advanced against including such a category even in a juvenile ob-
scenity provision. A major difficulty presented in defining sexual touching
is that the physical acts involved may or may not be sexually related.
Pictorial representations and verbal descriptions of the touching of eroge-
nous areas frequently are presented in contexts that are non-erotic. Thus,
sexual touching cannot be defined solely in terms of the physical contact
involved, as can be done with sexual intercourse. The description of the
touching must be supplemented by a requirement that the touching be
portrayed as undertaken for "the purpose of sexual stimulation." This
additional element may add considerable subjectivity, however, to the
definition of sexual touching. It is not always clear from the context whether
the depicted touching is for the purpose of sexual stimulation, particularly
where the medium does not portray movement and the erogenous area
is clothed.2 82 The ultimate judgment as to purpose may depend in large
part upon the attitude of the viewer.
Even where the acts portrayed clearly are intended for sexual stimula-
tion, the offensiveness of their portrayal may vary greatly. The hand laid on
the clothed buttocks during a kiss may be viewed as innocuous, while a hand
sexual content categories referring to "excretory functions." See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-27.1-01(8)(f) (Special Supp. 1975); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(E)(4)
(Page 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-1(7)(b) (Supp. 1974). Insofar as the de-
piction of excretion relates to nudity or sexual intercourse (e.g., ejaculation), it would
be encompassed by the other categories of sexual content commonly included in
state obscenity provisions. Depictions of excretion not encompassed by such cate-
gories may have prurient appeal for persons with deviant sexual interests, but most
states have not viewed such depictions as being of sufficient significance to include a
separate category, although Miller specifically cited "excretory functions" as a
permissible category of coverage. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
281 The reference is to touching aside from "masturbation," which is defined as
manipulation of the genitals. In still representations, it ordinarily would be most
difficult to distinguish between depictions of manipulation constituting masturbation
and the simple touching of the genitals for the purpose of sexual stimulation. If a
sexual touching category is not included in the statute, see acc-mpanying text, the
paragraph (e) definition of "masturbation" might be expanded to include all touch-
ing of the uncovered genitals for the apparent purpose of sexual stimulation. Cf.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.263 (1973). On the other hand, if a broad definition of sexual
touching is adopted, that definition probably would include all forms of masturbation
and the separate category of masturbation might be omitted from the statute. In our
proposed statute, a reference to "masturbation" is included in the paragraphs (o) and
(p) on the assumption that the sexual touching category of paragraph (b) may not
be encompassed in those provisions. On the other hand, no reference to "masturba-
tion" is included in paragraph (n), defining sexually explicit performances, since a
sexual touching category is likely to apply to performances even if not to other
visual material. See note 291 infra.
282While the definitions of "masturbation" and "sado-masochistic abuse" also
refer to a purpose of sexual stimulation, that purpose ordinarily is reflected by the
very nature of the physical activity involved in masturbation and sado-masochistic
abuse. But consider note 281 supra, discussing still representations of masturbation.
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laid on the unclothed buttocks in the context of foreplay clearly leading to
sexual intercourse may be very offensive. In light of this variation in the im-
pact of the portrayal of similar physical acts, the inclusion of a broad sexual
touching category necessarily carries with it the danger of encompassing sub-
stantial material which society sees as valuable or, at least, as not harmful.
Aside from the touching of the unclothed genitals and the unclothed pubic
area, the sexually oriented touching of erogenous areas often may be depict-
ed in a manner that does not clearly affront community standards, at least
in still representations. Thus, a broad sexual touching category arguably
loses one of the major advantages of a specific listing of encompassed
content by requiring reliance on the nebulous tripartite test to protect a
substantial body of material that is not "obscene for minors."
Notwithstanding this deficiency, most of the statutes examined in-
clude a broad sexual touching category. 28 3 The New York provision, for
example, encompasses "physical contact with a person's clothed or un-
clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female,
breast. '28 4 Some states add "for the purpose of sexual stimulation, grati-
fication, or perversion, '28 5 or other similar phrases. 2 6
Proposed paragraph (b) is drafted for possible inclusion of a broad
sexual touching category. 28 T The encompassed sexual conduct is charac-
terized as "erotic fondling," a term culled from the Detroit ordinance. 28 8
283 Five states do not have broad sexual touching categories, but do have cate-
gories that would include some forms of sexual touching. See IOWA CODE ANN. §
725.1(7) (Supp. 1975) (including depictions of the genitals, with or without the de-
piction of touching); KY. REV. STAT. § 531.010(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (including only
"physical contact with the genitals"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.263 (1973) (including
only "physical contact with a person's unclothed genitals or pubic area"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(8) (Special Supp. 1975) (including "lewd exhibition" of
the genitals, with or without the depiction of touching); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-8A-l(7)(b) (Supp. 1974) (same). See also PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3500
(Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975) ("direct or indirect touching" of genitals, pubic
area, or anus); OBSCENITY COMMISSION MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 2(d) ("di-
rect physical stimulation of unclothed genitals").
284 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Accord, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 847.013(l)(c) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.7(c)(3) (Supp.
1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(l)(c) (Supp. 1975). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.01(B) (Page 1975) ("any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including
without limitation, the thigh .... for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying
either person").
285 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(7) (Special Supp. 1972).
286 See, e.g., PROPOSED ARIz. CRIM. CODE § 3500(m) (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n
1975) ("in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification"); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.01(B) (Page 1975) (quoted in note 284 supra); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 167.060(10) (1974) ("in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(7)"(Supp. 1975) (same). The New Jersey and Rhode
Island provisions characterize the required touch as "fondling or other erotic touch-
ing." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.7(c)(3) (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-10
(Supp. 1974).
287 While Miller did not list sexual touching among its illustrations of permissible
coverage for a general obscenity statute, see text accompanying note 243 supra,
that omission does not indicate that a state could not include a broad sexual touching
category in a juvenile statute. See note 294 infra, and text accompanying notes
301-09 infra. Cf. note 273 supra.
288 DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(14)(C) (1974).
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Paragraph (b) initially follows the wording of the New York provision in
describing the touching of the four major erogenous areas. It then adds,
as in the Hawaiian statute, a requirement that the touching be "for the
purpose of sexual stimulation. ' 28 9 Paragraph (b) is also drafted so as
to permit adoption of a much narrower erotic fondling category. Initially,
the definition may be limited by deleting the reference to the touching
of clothed erogenous zones and, perhaps, excluding entirely the touching
of the buttocks. 290 Restricting erotic fondling to the touching of unclothed
genitals, pubic area, or breast of a female would eliminate much of the
potential overly broad coverage of the definition. Second, the reach of
the category may be further limited by making the category applicable
only to performances, either live or on film.291 A substantial differ-
ence in impact may exist, due to the added element of movement, be-
tween a movie or live performance depicting the touching of unclothed
erogenous areas and a photograph capturing a given moment in such
action.2 92 Moreover, the context in performances tends to be much clearer
and the purpose of sexual gratification can be more readily determined.
It should be noted, however, that much of the material that would be
brought under the statute by including the touching of unclothed erogenous
areas in performances is already "off-limits" to minors through other
regulations. "Topless" and "bottomless" shows involving such touching are
usually presented in establishments serving alcoholic beverages. Movies
containing such touching are classified as X or R and are effectively barred
to minors on that basis. 29
3
F. Sexual Excitement
The category of "sexual excitement," as defined in paragraph (k), lies
on the boundary between sexual activity and nudity. Two years before
289 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(7) (Special Supp. 1972). Statutes includ-
ing a similar requirement usually refer to "sexual stimulation or gratification," see
note 286 supra, and the Hawaiian statute also refers to "perversion," see text ac-
companying note 285 supra. An element of stimulation is present in the achievement
of sexual "gratification" or "perversion" so those terms do not add to the substance
of the statute. On the other hand, only "stimulation" is noted in the definition of "pru-
rient interest," see paragraph (i), and including additional terms in paragraph (b)
could lead to an inappropriately narrow interpretation of the "prurient interest" defi-
nition. See text accompanying notes 70-76 supra.2 90 See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.263 (1973); OBSCENITY COMMISSION MODEL
STATUTE, supra note 3, § 2(d). These provisions apply to the touching only of the
unclothed genitals and pubic area (Nevada) or genitals alone (Commission). Adop-
tion of this limitation could more readily be fitted within the framework of our
proposal by eliminating the category of "erotic fondling" and broadening the defi-
nition of "masturbation." See note 281 supra.
291 This could be achieved by including the category of "erotic fondling" only in
the definition of "sexually explicit performance." See proposed paragraph (n). If
"erotic fondling" is included in that paragraph, a reference to "masturbation" would
be unnecessary. See note 281 supra.
292 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 169. See also Richards v.
State, 497 S.W.2d 770, 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); General Corp. v. State ex rel.
Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 663, 320 So. 2d 668, 672 (1975).
293 See notes 314-15 and accompanying text infra, also discussing nonrated films.
See also text accompanying note 278 supra.
[VOL.9:413
Juvenile Obscenity Statutes
Miller, Judge Leventhal suggested in HuJffman v. United States,29 4 that,
while nudity alone could not constitute obscenity for adults, a picture
showing an erect penis could be obscene, since it shows "the kind of
sexual response that typically denotes imminent sexual activity." The con-
stitutionally protected use of materials portraying sexual excitement is
quite limited, and it is relatively easy to determine whether visual material
depicts sexual excitement, at least with respect to a male.
Most of the statutes examined include a specific category labelled "sex-
ual excitement," and the others, with one exception, would reach depic-
tions of sexual excitement under other categories of included content. 295
States with a sexual excitement category commonly employ a definition
similar to that in proposed paragraph (k), which refers essentially to de-
piction of aroused genitals.2 96
The Detroit ordinance is one of three provisions that uses a broader
definition. It defines "sexual excitement" as the
facial expressions, movements, utterances, or other responses of
a human . . . whether clothed or not, who is in an apparent
state of sexual stimulation or arousal or experiencing the physical
or sensual reactions of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual
conduct.29 7
The genital arousal described in proposed paragraph (k) is only one of
294470 F.2d 386, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 419, 423
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
In its listing of examples of constitutionally permissible coverage for a general
obscenity statute, Miller did not refer specifically to depiction of sexual excitement,
but did refer to patently offensive representations of the "lewd exhibition of the
genitals." See text accompanying note 243 supra. That category arguably could
encompass the depiction of clothed, as well as unclothed, genitals in a state of sexual
excitement. See note 295 infra and text accompanying note 304 inIra. See also text
accompanying notes 301-09 infra (discussing the significance of the Miller examples
as applied to a juvenile obscenity statute).
295 Of the statutes defining specific sexual content, see note 256 supra, all but three
(Iowa, Kentucky, and West Virginia) include a "sexual excitement" category. More-
over, IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.1(1) (Cum. Pamphlet 1975) (which applies to the de-
piction of "genitals") and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-l(7)(b) (Supp. 1974) (which
applies to the "lewd exhibition of the genitals") may both encompass the depiction of
clothed, as well as unclothed, genitals in the state of sexual excitement. See also note
325 infra. The Kentucky provision, KY. REV. STAT. § 521.010 (Cum. Supp. 1974), (de-
scribed in note 321 infra) would include depictions of sexual excitement only when
such depictions also portrayed excretion or touching of the genitals. See also PRO-
POSED ARiz. CRIM. CODE § 3504 (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975) (described in
note 322 infra).
296See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(d) (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:115-1.7(c)(1) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(1)(d) (Supp. 1975).
Paragraph (k) refers to genitals in a state of sexual arousal or "stimulation." The
reference to a state of "stimulation" may be deleted if verbal material is not included
in the statute. See part IV A infra. The term "arousal" sufficiently covers possible
visual representations.
297 DETROIT, MIcH., CODE § 39-1-18(15) (1974). See also ORE. REV. STAT. §
167.060(11) (1974) (defining "sexual excitement" as the condition of the genitals
or the breasts of a female "when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(8) (Supp. 1975) (same).
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various types of "responses" that would be included under the Detroit
definition. Most of those other responses would, however, normally be
accompanied by the depiction of sexual activities that would fall within
other categories in the proposed statute. Thus, a certain variety of nude
"go-go dancing" commonly features the types of expressions, movements,
and utterances which the Detroit draftsmen apparently had in mind. But
such "dancing" also includes "erotic fondling" or even simulated sexual
intercourse. Indeed, if the specific content of the juvenile statute includes
depictions of "nudity," 298 then the only additional coverage provided by
the Detroit definition of sexual excitement would be of material that almost
always would be protected under the tripartite test. Taken literally, the
Detroit definition could reach almost every portrayal of an embrace or
kiss between persons romantically inclined, even though those persons
are fully clothed and there is no accompanying depiction of erotic fondling.
As noted previously, 299 the inclusion of such potentially broad-ranging
provisions has given rise to much of the criticism of obscenity provisions.
The narrower and more common definition of paragraph (k) provides
adequate coverage in the context of the total statute while giving the dis-
seminator far more precise guidelines. 300
G. Nudity
1. Inclusion of a Nudity Category-The final category of sex-related
content is "nudity"-the depiction of unclothed genitals, pubic area, but-
tocks, or female breasts.30 ' In offering "a few plain examples of what a
state statute could define for regulation," Miller cited the "patently of-
fensive representations or descriptions of . . . lewd exhibitions of the
genitals. ' '3°2 The scope of the Court's reference to the "lewd exhibi-
tion" of the genitals is unclear. Miller also noted that the specific sexual
content of a general obscenity provision must be limited to the depiction
of "sexual conduct." Judge Leventhal contends that the Miller reference
to "lewd exhibition" of the genitals must be read in light of this "sexual
conduct" limitation, and, accordingly, the term "exhibition" should be
298 See part III G I infra.
299 See point 2 in part I supra.
300 On the possible use of a definition similar to that of the Detroit ordinance in
connection with a nudity provision, see note 323 infra.
301 The nudity category discussed in this section is not directed at depictions of
nudity that portray sexual intercourse, sado-masochistic abuse, masturbation, erotic
fondling, or sexual excitement, but is designed to encompass portrayals of nudity
that would not fall within the other content categories discussed above.
Some state statutes include in the definition of "nudity" the depiction of "covered
male genitals in a discernably turgid state." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(l)(b)
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.020(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.01(H) (Page 1975). These states also have "sexual excitement
categories" that would include such depictions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012
(l)(d) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.020(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(g) (Page 1975). Since such depictions are more appro-
priately treated as illustrations of sexual excitement, the definition of nudity under
discussion here does not refer to the depiction of clothed genitals.
302 413 U.S. at 25. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
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viewed as referring only to "the conduct of exhibiting and not to a pas-
sive pose. '30 3 This interpretation of Miller, he notes, would exclude still
photographs of a single nude person, unless that person's genitals are
depicted in a state of arousal or masturbatory or excretory conduct is
shown. 304
Even if Judge Leventhal's interpretation reads too much into the Court's
use of the term "exhibition," Miller's reference to the lewd showing of
"genitals" suggests that at least the depiction of nude female breasts or
male or female buttocks could not be proscribed under a general ob-
scenity statute. While the Court has noted that the Miller examples "were
not intended to be exhaustive, ' 30 5 the fact that Miller referred to depiction
only of the genitals takes on potential constitutional significance when
viewed in light of the Court's further comment that obscenity encompasses
only the depiction of " 'hard-core' sexual conduct. ' 30 6 A nudity category
in a general obscenity statute certainly would be of doubtful validity if it
encompassed, for example, a nude pin-up that reveals no more than the
bare buttocks or breast.
In the case of a juvenile obscenity provision, a nudity category encom-
passing the showing of buttocks or breasts arguably would be less suspect
constitutionally. The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg included just
such a definition of proscribable nudity: "the showing of the [unclothed]
human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks . . . or the show-
ing of the female breast ... below the top of the nipple .... ,,301 The Gins-
berg opinion, however, was primarily concerned with the state's authority
to adopt a special standard of obscenity for minors; it did not discuss the
range of depictions included within the New York provision, aside from
stressing that the statute by its own terms applied only to material that
met a modified tripartite test. Moreover, the Court specifically refused to
rule on the obscenity of the publications in issue in that case, two so-called
"girlie" magazines that portrayed the nude buttocks and breasts of fe-
males. 308 Thus, Ginsberg does not hold that such nude pin-ups are ob-
303 See Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-Pornography Decisions, 59
A.B.A.J. 1261, 1263 (1973).
304 Another possible exception would be the portrayal of a nude person in a setting
indicating sado-masochistic abuse. See note 273 supra.
305 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974).
306 413 U.S. at 27. See also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974), holding
that "'Carnal Knowledge' could not be found under the Miller standards to depict
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way." The Court noted
[w]hile ... there are scenes in which sexual conduct including "ultimate
sex acts" is to be understood to be taking place, the camera does not
focus on the bodies of the actors at such times. There is no exhibi-
tion whatever of the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these
scenes. There are occasional scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not
enough to make material legally obscene under the Miller standards.
Id.
307 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h, [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as amended
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975). See 390 U.S. at 645.
308 390 U.S. at 632, 635. The Court did not rule on the obscenity of this material
since the defendant failed to argue that the material was not "harmful to minors"
under the statutory definition, or that the statute was unconstitutionally applied. Id. at
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scene for minors. On the other hand, it also clearly does not foreclose that
possibility, and the Court's opinion certainly seems to have assumed that at
least some such portrayals of nudity can be obscene for minors.30 9
Assuming that a juvenile obscenity statute constitutionally can include
a broad nudity provision (such as the New York provision in Ginsberg),
the question remains as to whether adoption of such a provision or even
a narrower provision (such as one limited to the depiction of nude gen-
itals) reflects sound legislative policy. The basic argument favoring inclusion
of a nudity category is that depictions of nudity alone can be presented in
a manner that is at least as erotic as a depiction of masturbation, 310 and
therefore may have an equally adverse impact upon juveniles. Also, while
erotic nudity may not be as offensive to community standards as erotic
portrayals of sexual intercourse, such nudity still may clearly affront
those standards.
On the other side, substantial arguments can be advanced against in-
cluding either a broad or narrow nudity category. Those arguments,
moreover, need not challenge the assumption noted above as to the porno-
graphic quality of certain portrayals of nudity. Instead, they stress that a
nudity category (1) undermines a primary function of the sexual specificity
requirement by encompassing a substantial body of material that would
not be obscene under the tripartite standard, 311 (2) places a substantial
administrative burden on disseminators because of its over-coverage, and
(3) is largely unnecessary in light of the coverage provided by other cate-
gories of sex-related content.
631 n.1, 635. Justice Fortas' dissent was based, in part, on the Court's failure to rule
on the obscenity of the individual items, but the dissent also did not determine
whether the items were obscene for minors.
Of course, even if Ginsberg had held that the portrayal of the nude buttocks or
breast could be obscene, that ruling might be subject to review in light of the in-
creased exposure of minors to nudity during the past eight years. Cf. Jenkins v.
United States, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); People v. Berger, - Colo. -, 521 P.2d 1244
(1974).
309See also Erznozik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Court there held
unconstitutional a local ordinance prohibiting a drive-in movie, with a screen
visible from a "public place," from exhibiting any material "in which the human
male or female bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic
areas are shown." Id. at 207, 217-18. In the course of describing the ordinance's
overbreadth, the Court noted that "[c]learly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene
even as to minors." Id. at 213. The Court also commented, that "under any test of
obscenity even as to minors," nudity could not be proscribed unless the portrayal
was "in some significant way, erotic." Id. at 213 n.10 (quoting from Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)). Of course, in a juvenile obscenity statute, the appli-
cation of the tripartite test would ensure that the material is erotic. Also, some
statutory definitions of encompassed nudity assist in excluding non-erotic portrayals
by limiting encompassed depictions to those of persons above the age of puberty.
See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(6)(b) (Special Supp. 1972); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 167.060(5) (1974).
310 See studies cited in the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
172-78 (on the types of depictions most likely to cause sexual arousal).
311 See text accompanying notes 251-53 supra. Cf. Siegel v. Salisbury, 379 F. Supp.
317, 321, 325 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (holding unconstitutional a public display ordinance
that utilized the Ginsberg definition of "nudity," and required a finding of prurient
appeal, but rejected the other elements of the tripartite tests).
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The problems of over-coverage and administrative burden flow from
the pervasiveness of depictions of nudity. The contents of even the
weekly news magazines illustrate that rapidly changing sex attitudes
have eliminated the nude buttocks and female breasts, as they previously
eliminated the well-turned ankle of Victorian days, from the category
of items that are viewed as automatically sexually provocative even for
minors. Depictions of the nude genitals have not yet reached the weekly
news magazines, but they are found occasionally in publications such as
photography and art magazines that are not primarily sexually oriented.
Almost all such nude portrayals in publications lacking a sexual orienta-
tion would fall short of the patently offensive requirement of the tripartite
test, even though some might have prurient appeal for minors.312
Those depictions of nudity which may be categorized as offensive and
of potential harm to minors are found primarily in "girlie" magazines,
sexually oriented films, "peep-show" slides, and certain live performances.
But inclusion of a nudity category generally is not necessary to ensure
coverage of such publications and productions because they ordinarily also
contain depictions of sexual intercourse, masturbation, sado-masochistic
abuse, erotic fondling, or sexual excitement. "Girlie" magazines, as can be
seen from recent issues of Playboy and Oui, contain photographs which por-
tray masturbation and sexual excitement, and drawings which depict sexual
intercourse.313 "Peep-show" slides contain similar portrayals. Those live
performances of primary concern-the typical topless and bottomless show,
as opposed to the Las Vegas or "Follies" nude show-girl performance
-often contain at least erotic fondling. Movies that contain objectionable
nudity often also contain erotic fondling. However, even if portraying
nudity alone, the movies would be rated R or X under the industry's own
regulations so minors either would not be admitted (X-rated) or would
be admitted only if accompanied by a parent (R-rated). 314 Sexually ori-
ented films not submitted for an industry rating usually are aimed at an
312 Moreover, as minors are exposed more frequently to nudity in constitutionally
protected material, the potential prurient appeal of nudity in sexually oriented publi-
cations may decrease significantly. Cf. note 168 supra.
313 See, e.g., OuI, July 1975, at 24, 31, 62, 95-96. See also Skin Trouble, TIME,
Sept. 22, 1975, at 50. Such magazines also portray various acts of "erotic fondling."
For reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 291-93 supra, it may be de-
sirable to limit inclusion of the "erotic fondling" category to performances.
314 Occasional glimpses of the nude breast or buttocks may also be found in PG
movies. Extensive nude scenes and all displays of nude genitals and the pubic area
should result, however, in an R or X rating. OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 78-80. Of course, the movie rating system is always subject to change. In-
deed, the industry agencies involved have never published formal rating criteria.
See Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional Analysis
of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 195 (1973)
(noting that "whatever standards do exist are almost totally dependent on the weltan-
schauung of whoever happens to be the current CARA director"). However, sexually
oriented material that would be patently offensive to even the more conservative
communities in the country ordinarily has received at least an R rating, and the pres-
sure of public opinion makes it unlikely that the industry will depart from that
pattern. See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 78-79; Friedman,
supra, at 205, 210-13.
SPING 19761
Journal of Law Reform
adult market and shown by theatres that do not admit minors.315 More-
over, even if minors were not excluded, most of these films depict sexual
activity that would put the films within the reach of a juvenile obscenity
statute without regard to the nudity itself. Thus, with respect to magazines,
movies, and live performances, a nudity category is not needed to restrict
the access of minors to that nudity most likely to be viewed as objection-
able.316
A nudity category would be needed, however, to reach other less ob-
jectionable material that might fall within the tripartite test, such as maga-
zines combining an alleged artistic and sexual emphasis in presenting
highly erotic nude portraits.317 Such publications are not as likely to go
beyond portrayal of the nude genitals, and therefore most would not fall
within a statute applicable only to depictions of sexual acts or sexual
excitement. Yet, even with a nudity category, a juvenile obscenity statute
may not be very successful in restricting the dissemination of these publi-
cations to minors. There are a large variety of publications that may con-
tain visual representations of nudes as part of artistic or scientific
presentations. Most of these publications clearly would be protected un-
der the tripartite standard, and the disseminator would find it extremely
time consuming to separate such publications from others containing nudity
that is likely to be obscene for minors.318 Many disseminators probably
would make little effort to draw distinctions, and simply would continue to
sell to minors or adults almost any publication that was assumed to con-
tain no more than nudity.
If, on the other hand, the possibility of prosecution served as a sufficient
threat to deter the sale of a wide variety of publications likely to contain
nudity, there would be significant offsetting costs for minors. In light
315 Friedman, supra note 314, at 192, estimates that rated films account for 92
percent of all commerical exhibitions. Nonrated films are given an automatic X
rating by any theatre subscribing to the rating program, which includes more than 90
percent of the nation's theatres. Id. at 192 n.52. So-called "sexploitation" films may
be shown by theatres that do not participate in the rating program, but these
theatres impose a minimum age for entry similar to that required for X-rated
movies. See Sampson, Commercial Traflic in Sexually Oriented Materials in the
United States (1969-1970), in III COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
TECHNICAL REPORT 3, 36-37 (1971). See also id. at 53-57 (discussing 16-millimeter
films). Unrated foreign "art films" may pose greater difficulties. Such films, while
not of the X variety, do contain material that would warrant an R rating and are not
necessarily shown in "adult-only" theatres or theatres that subscribe to the rating
program. See id. at 24.
316 It is unlikely that these materials could be profitably altered to ensure legality
of distribution to the minors in a state with a statute that did not encompass nudity
alone. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra. Live performances arguably might
be more readily tailored to avoid the other statutory categories and yet include
nudity. If nudity in live performances is considered an important problem, a nudity
category could readily be included for such performances alone, as live performances
are treated in the separate section on performances. See proposed section 2(1) (b).
31T Cf. People v. Berger, - Colo. -, 521 P.2d 1244 (1974).
318 The problems presented in identifying objectionable nudity would be even
more significant if the "nudity" category included verbal descriptions of nudity as
well as visual representations. See notes 334-35 and accompanying text infra.
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of the burden of inspection and the difficulty of determining precisely
what nudity is proscribed, the concerned bookseller might simply adopt
a policy of refusing to sell any potentially questionable material to mi-
nors. 319 Thus, dealers might refuse to sell to minors sexually oriented
publications that only occasionally include some nudity. 320 Cautious deal-
ers also may refuse to sell various significant works (particularly in the
artistic area) that are not primarily sexually oriented but are likely to con-
tain substantial nudity.
Notwithstanding the various difficulties presented by a nudity category,
all except one of the state provisions examined reach at least some de-
pictions of nudity that would not be encompassed by the categories of sex-
ual excitement, erotic fondling, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
sexual intercourse. 321 Of four proposed statutes examined, three apply to
nudity, but one, the Arizona proposal, is limited to the depiction of sexual
acts.3
22
2. Definition of Nudity-If a nudity category is included in a juvenile
statute, the arguments noted above suggest that it should at least be nar-
rowly defined. Proposed paragraph (g) limits nudity to the "lewd show-
ing of the genitals or pubic area of a person of the age of puberty or
older. ' ' 323 This definition largely follows the Miller description of nudity
319 Cf. Lockhart & McClure, quoted note 389 infra.
320 This would be particularly likely where the publication, like Cosmopolitan,
has achieved some notoriety due to a past issue containing a photograph revealing
male genitals.
321 Various state provisions are cited in notes 325-27 infra. The one exception
noted above is KY. REV. STAT. §§ 531.010, .030 (Cum. Supp. 1974). The Kentucky
obscenity statute uses a single definition of "obscene" material for both its general
and juvenile provisions, and that definition applies only to depictions of "sexual
conduct" (i.e., "acts of masturbation, homosexuality, lesbianism, bestiality, sexual
intercourse, or deviant sexual intercourse; a physical contact with the genitals,
flagellation, or excretion for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification").
KY. REV. STAT. § 521.010(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
322 The statute proposed by Commissioners Hill and Link, see note 3 supra, does
not contain a listing of specific sexual content, but clearly was intended to apply to
depictions of nudity that appeal to the prurient interest of minors. See OBSCENITY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 463, 418-19, 470-73. The statute proposed by
the majority of the Commissioners would apply to matter "which emphasizes the
depiction of uncovered adult human genitals." See proposed statute § 2(d)(ii), OB-
SCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 66. The PROPOSED MICH. GRIM. CODE
§H 6301(e), 6310 (Mich. State Bar 1967) would apply to the display of the genitals
and pubic area. The PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3504 (Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n
1975) would apply only to the depiction of sexual conduct (masturbation, intercourse,
or the "touching of the genitals, pubic area, or other areas" in an "act of apparent
sexual stimulation or gratification") and sado-masochistic abuse (defined as in pro-
posed paragraph (j) of section 1). Of course, since the definition of sado-masochis-
tic abuse encompasses the nude person displayed in a "condition of being fettered,"
the Arizona proposal would reach, in this limited context, a depiction of nudity
without accompanying conduct by the person depicted.
323 Another possible definition would combine the Detroit definition of sexual
excitement, see text accompanying note 297 supra, with the depiction of nude geni-
tals and pubic area. The facial expressions and movements accompanying the
showing of genitals are often the key factor contributing to the "lewdness" of the
depiction of nudity. This approach might assist in limiting the vagueness inherent in
the term "lewd."
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which might be found obscene for adults,3 24 five state juvenile obscenity
provisions, 32 5 and the juvenile provisions recommended by the Michigan
Bar Committee326 and the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography. 327
Unlike the Miller description, paragraph (g) encompasses the lewd dis-
play of the pubic area as well as the genitals. Portrayals of the fully nude
female in performances and publications that are clearly designed to
appeal to the prurient interest typically reveal the pubic area without
showing the genitals. 328 Such portrayals are no less revealing than por-
trayals of nude males, and are just as obviously presented with a primary
emphasis on eroticism. Moreover, including depiction of the pubic area
as well as the genitals should not add significantly to the difficulties pre-
sented in applying the nudity definition.
Most of the state juvenile obscenity statutes examined have broader
definitions of nudity than proposed paragraph (g). These provisions gen-
erally are identical to the definition of nudity in the New York statute
considered in Ginsberg.329 That definition extends to the depiction of the
nude genitals, pubic area, buttocks, and female breast below the top of
the nipple.330 Including depictions of the breast and buttocks raises the
most serious problems of unnecessary breadth. Those are the portions of
the body most frequently revealed in national magazines, art collections,
and other material readily available to minors. Indeed, the nude pin-ups of
324 See text accompanying note 302 supra.
325 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(6) (Special Supp. 1972) (visual repre-
sentation of "person of the age of puberty or older... with less than a fully opaque
covering of his or her genitals and pubic area"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.1(1) (Supp.
1975) ("depicting... the genitals"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.261 (1973) (the "showing
of the human male or female genitals or pubic area"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01
(8) (Special Supp. 1975) ("lewd exhibition of the male or female genitals"); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-8A1(7)(b) (Supp. 1974) ("lewd exhibition of the genitals"). Not
all of these provisions are clearly limited to depictions of the unclothed genitals, but
they are likely to encompass depictions of the clothed genitals only when the genitals
are portrayed in a state of sexual excitement. See note 295 supra.
326 PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6301(b) (ii) (Mich. State Bar 1967) (depiction
of "any person of the age of puberty or over revealing such person with a less than
fully opaque covering over his or her genitals and pubic area").
327 Proposed section 2(d)(ii), OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 66
(applying to material "which emphasizes the depiction of uncovered adult human
genitals").
328 See BBS Productions, Inc. v. Purcell, 360 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D. Ariz. 1973)
(holding that typical total front female nudity does not depict female "genitalia:"
"No standard or medical dictionary tells or shows us that the Mount of Venus, re-
vealed by the triangular area of pubic hair, is any component of exterior female
genitalia.").
329 See note 307 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
847.012(1)(b) (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(H) (Page 1975).3 30 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975):
"Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals,
pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the
showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of
any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Oregon modified this provision to exclude depictions of the nude buttocks. ORE.
REV. STAT. § 167.060(5) (1974).
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the fifties are today published in the national news magazines as memora-
bilia of that period. 33
1
IV. DEFINING OBSCENITY: MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
A. Inclusion of Verbal Material
Proposed paragraphs (o) and (p) of section 1 distinguish between
visual and verbal matter. This distinction was drawn to raise two issues:
(1) whether the statute should encompass any verbal material; and (2)
if verbal material is included, whether the sexual content of the encom-
passed verbal material should be more narrowly confined than the con-
tent of visual material.
Separate treatment of verbal material might be justified on two related
grounds. First, although Kaplan v. California332 held that verbal material
could be obscene for adults, the Court noted that regulating the dissemina-
tion of such material was a subject of special concern:
Because of a profound commitment to protecting communication
of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the printed word
or in speech stimulates a traditional and emotional response, un-
like the response to obscene pictures of flagrant human conduct.
A book seems to have a different and preferred place in our
hierarchy of values, and so it should be. 333
Of course, as Kaplan held, the "preferred place" of verbal material does not
give such material constitutional immunity from state regulation. Neither
is that "preferred place" conclusive in determining, as a matter of state
policy, whether a juvenile obscenity statute should apply to verbal ma-
terial. An obscene book may have the same impact upon a minor as an
obscene picture. 334 However, the special status of verbal material does
331 See, e.g., TIME, July 21, 1975, at 39.
332413 U.S. 115 (1973).
333 Id. at 119. At an earlier point in the opinion, the Court noted that it has
"always rigorously scrutinized judgments involving books for possible violation of
first amendment rights." Id. at 118 n.3.
334 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 167-72 and the authorities
cited therein. In Kaplan, the Court noted:
A state could reasonably regard "hard-core" conduct described by...
[a book] as capable of encouraging or causing antisocial behavior,
especially in its impact upon young people.
413 U.S. at 120. It should be noted, however, that public expressions of concern
relating to the dissemination of obscenity to juveniles appear to center on visual
representations, particularly illustrated magazines and movies. Cf. Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 62 n.4 (1963) (describing the Rhode Island Youth
Morality Commission's listing of "objectionable" publications). It is unclear whether
this emphasis reflects a belief that the impact of books is less than that of pictures
or that minors are less likely to be exposed to obscene verbal material because it
takes more effort to read a book than to look at pictures. But cf. Wilson, Friedman
& Horowitz, Gravity of the Pornography Situation and Problems of Control: A Sur-
vey of Prosecuting Attorneys, in V COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
TECHNICAL REPORT 3, 10 (1971) (suggesting that "erotic paperback books," which
often are not illustrated, ranked ahead of such magazines as Playboy as a cause of
community concern relating to the general distribution of obscenity). See also note
340 infra.
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suggest that a juvenile statute should encompass such material only to the
extent that state regulation is justified by an especially strong showing of
need.
The second factor supporting separate treatment of verbal material is
the added administrative burden imposed by the regulation of such ma-
terial. Regulating the dissemination of verbal material presents greater
difficulties than regulating the dissemination of visual materials. Those
additional difficulties are presented primarily in defining the content of
potential harmful materials and limiting the burden placed upon the dis-
seminator.
When the verbal form is involved, application of the traditional defini-
tions of proscribed sex-related content is not appropriate. A definition
for visual material may simply refer to any "depiction" of sexual inter-
course, but a similar definition applied to textual material could encompass
a single statement referring to people "making love." For textual material,
the definition must consider more carefully the degree of specificity in the
description of the sexual activity. A requirement that the description be "ex-
plicit and detailed," as proposed in paragraph (o), is helpful in this regard,
but still leaves room for considerable variation in application. It fails to
ensure that the class of materials described primarily includes only un-
protected speech. The definitional problem is analogous to that presented
in dealing with visual representations of nudity and, perhaps, erotic
fondling, but is even more severe.
Since a workable dividing line cannot as readily be drawn for verbal
as for visual material, it is almost impossible to provide the disseminator of
verbal material with the same degree of certainty in assessing his potential
liability as can be provided the disseminator of visual representations.
Moreover, the burden of inspection placed upon the disseminator naturally
is greater for verbal material because it is more difficult to check for pos-
sible obscenity by reading text than by flipping through pictures or watch-
ing a movie.33
5
Weighing these administrative difficulties against the need for regulation,
the decision whether to include verbal material may rest on the legislative
determination of the type of verbal materials that should be kept from
minors without parental consent. If the legislative concern relates primarily
to the traditional "sex-pulp" novels of the type considered in Kaplan,
then current marketing practices may render regulation of verbal ma-
terial unnecessary. Books of this type-described in Kaplan as "made
up entirely of repetitive descriptions of physical, sexual conduct, 'clin-
ically' explicit and offensive . . . [with] only the most tenuous 'plot' "336
-are sold primarily in adult bookstores. 337 If verbal materials were not
335 Also, in the case of a movie, if only a portion of the work is patently offen-
sive, it is relatively easy for the distributor to remove the offensive part by editing
the film. Similar editing by the distributor of books is not feasible.
336413 U.S. at 116-17.
337 The reference is to stores that have a restricted access section devoted to
"adult" materials as well as to bookstores that sell only to adults. Available studies
indicate that adult bookstores do make significant efforts to exclude minors. See
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included within the statute, it seems unlikely that those bookstores would
initiate a policy of selling to minors since the remainder of their wares
would be proscribed for minors.3 3 s On the other hand, if the legislative
concern extends to books that probably are not obscene for adults but con-
tain considerable, quite explicit sexual content (such as The Happy Hook-
er), 9 then the current marketing practices could not as readily be relied
upon to keep the books from minors. Such books are available in most
bookstores and many drugstores as well. 340
While legal sanctions are most clearly needed to restrict the access of
minors to books sold outside of adult bookstores, any attempt to reach
such material also increases the pernicious potential of self-censorship
by booksellers. Many modern novels are concerned, in part, with sex
and include at least a few pages containing an "explicit and detailed
description" of ultimate sex acts. Consider, for example, the various works
of John Updike, which are available to a minor from almost any public
library. Books of this type clearly would be protected under the tripartite
standard. They reflect serious literary efforts, although often dealing in
significant part with sexual relations. While the plot or character develop-
ment might not be totally within the grasp of most minors, the Updike
works can hardly be described as lacking serious literary value for minors.
Yet, the characteristics that distinguish The Happy Hooker from Rabbit
Redux are far more difficult to clearly identify than those which distinguish
the "sex-pulp" novels discussed in Kaplan from either The Happy Hooker
or Rabbit Redux. While the drawing of a reasonable dividing line is diffi-
cult for verbal works generally, it becomes almost impossible once the
ban extends beyond the "sex-pulp" novel. Moreover, even if a line could
be drawn that would separate The Happy Hooker from Rabbit Redux, its
application would surely require a fairly thorough examination of the
OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 128-30 and authorities cited therein;
Winick, Some Observations on Characteristics of Patrons of Adult Theatres and
Bookstores, in IV COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL RE-
PORT 225, 231, 242 (1971).
Sex-pulp novels can also be found in various conventional bookstores that have
substantial sections devoted to sexually oriented materials. Such bookstores are often
found in train stations, airports, and certain downtown areas which are not likely
to be frequented by a substantial number of unaccompanied youth under the age of
sixteen. Moreover, sex-pulp novels carried in such stores frequently are marked
"for adult readers," although the sales clerks may not abide by this direction.
338 Cf. Winick, supra note 337 (noting that adult bookstores commonly set mini-
mum ages above those required by state juvenile obscenity statutes as a precaution
against possible misjudgment of a customer's age).
339 But see McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975) (majority concluded
that The Happy Hooker could be found obscene under Miller, while the dissent
concluded that the book "does have some 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value' "). The survey cited in Wilson, Friedman & Horowitz, supra note 334,
revealed comparatively little public concern as to the general distribution of "erotic
literary novels" as opposed to "erotic paperback books" (presumably "sex-pulp"
novels). See also note 340 infra.
340 Such stores also may carry the "classic" erotic literature (e.g., Fanny Hill)
which frequently has been challenged as obscene even for adults. The "pseudo-
medical" books, containing alleged case studies of sexual activity, also may be found
in stores that are not in the "adult bookstore" category.
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works involved. Conventional bookstores handling nonpornographic stock
obviously lack the resources or the commercial incentive to undertake
such an extensive examination. Many are likely to cut off sales to minors341
of any book thought to have significant sexual content and thereby restrict
the access of minors to a wide range of potentially beneficial writings.
Concerns such as those noted above led the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography to suggest that juvenile obscenity statutes should apply
only to visual representations. 342 None of the state statutes examined,
however, were so limited.
Assuming the decision is made to include verbal material, consideration
should be given to reaching a narrower range of sex-related content for
verbal material than for visual material. For example, even if a nudity
category is included for visual materials, it might not be included for
verbal materials. Depiction of nudity arguably is less offensive in texts
and certainly is even more pervasive in contemporary literature than in
the visual arts. The risk of harm to minors is speculative, and the possible
costs of restricting books with value for minors is great.
Although several of the statutes examined do not separate verbal ma-
terial from visual material in terms of encompassed content,343 a number
do draw that distinction.344 Those states making the distinction do not
include a nudity category for verbal material and their definitional sec-
tions impose special requirements of "explicitness" in describing the
sexual content of covered verbal material. 345 The definition of encompassed
verbal material in proposed paragraph (o) follows the pattern of these
states. It does not include nudity and limits prohibited content to "explicit
and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts" of sexual intercourse,
sado-masochistic abuse, and masturbation. Alternative formulations could
also include sexual excitement and erotic fondling.
B. Age
Juvenile obscenity statutes restrict dissemination of "obscene" ma-
terial only as to youth under a certain age. The state statutes examined
341 This policy might be extended to all persons who could conceivably be minors.
See part VII C infra; note 388 supra. Cf. text accompanying notes 318-20 supra.
342 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 58. Several commissioners
disagreed with this recommendation, favoring inclusion of verbal materials along
with a broad exception for "such textual materials when they bear literary, historical,
scientific, educational, or other similar social value for young persons." Id.
343See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-103(1), -101(3) (1973); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 725.1(2), .2 (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8A-1(5), -2 (Supp.
1974).
344See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(2)(b) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-391(a)(2) (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(j)(2) (Supp. 1975). See also
statutes cited in note 345 infra.
345 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(6)(a) (Special Supp. 1972)
("primarily devoted to explicit and detailed narrative accounts"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 235.21(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975) ("explicit and detailed verbal descriptions
or narrative acounts"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 67.065(1)(b) (1974) ("explicit verbal
descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-
masochistic abuse").
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vary somewhat in setting that maximum age limit. Most of the provisions
examined apply to distributions to youths under the age of eighteen. 346
Two states, however, utilize an age limitation of "under seventeen" 347
and one utilizes "under sixteen. '348 In determining the appropriate age
limit, a legislature should give primary consideration to two factors re-
lating to the typical maturity of youth at a particular age. The first is the
special susceptibility of youth to the deleterious influence of erotic pub-
lications, and the second is the effectiveness of parental control as re-
inforced by the juvenile provision.
In holding that a juvenile obscenity provision could reach a broader range
of material than a statute aimed at adults, the Ginsberg decision noted that
the legislature could reasonably assume that juveniles have a special
susceptibility to the harmful impact of erotic publications.349 There is no
clear-cut point, however, at which the special susceptibility of juveniles
suddenly ceases. The maturing of attitudes toward sex is a gradual process.
Thus, any chronological line that is drawn must be in part arbitrary. But
similar lines are drawn in other legislation designed to protect juveniles,
and they can furnish support for the line that is drawn in this area.
The most helpful analogy for juvenile protective legislation is the age
limit drawn in statutes dealing with consensual sexual conduct. While
age limitations in statutes dealing with other aspects of social or physical
maturity (such as alcohol consumption or betting at tracks) are not
irrelevant, they are far less helpful, since activities relating to sex tradition-
346 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(g) (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-7-101(4) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.8 (Supp. 1975). Some statutes
do not refer to any specific age limit, but apparently incorporate the under-
eighteen limit as the general dividing line between "minors" and "adults." See, e.g.,
KY. REV. STAT. § 531.080 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.-27.1-02,
14-10-01 (Special Supp. 1974). A few of the provisions utilizing an under-eighteen
standard are specifically limited to "unmarried persons" under eighteen. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(I) (Page 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.060(4) (1974).
The model statute recommended by the Commission on Obscenity and Porno-
graphy left the age limit unspecified so that each state could make its own determina-
tion. See OBSCENITY COMMISSION MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 2(d) (i). The model
statute proposed by dissenting Commissioners Hill and Link uses an age limit of
"under 18." See HILL-LINK MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 7.3 4 7FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(l)(a) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1975). See also PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE §§ 6301(d), 6310
(Mich. State Bar 1967). The New York statute upheld in Ginsberg used an age
limitation of "under seventeen," and many states adopted quite similar statutes im-
mediately after Ginsberg. See Friedman, State Obscenity Statutes, in II COMMISSION
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL REPORT 37, 46 (1971). Because these
statutes are almost identical, we included only a few of these jurisdictions in the
twenty state statutes examined in detail. See note 2 supra. Thus, it is probable that
the "under seventeen" limit has substantially more support than our sample indicates,
although "under eighteen" clearly constitutes the majority position. Several states
adopting the New York-type statute after Ginsberg did make the one change of mov-
ing the age limit up to "under eighteen." See Friedman, supra, at 47.
348 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(3) (Special Supp. 1972).
349 390 U.S. at 640-41. As to the scientific evidence supporting this assumption,
see OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 182-94, 379-80 (and the studies
cited therein).
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ally have been given separate treatment by state legislatures. 35 0
Based in large part on the age limitations utilized in Michigan legisla-
tion relating to sexual conduct, our Study Report suggested that the Mich-
igan juvenile obscenity statute probably should utilize an age limitation
of "under sixteen." 351 The new Michigan Criminal Sexual Conduct Act35 2
brings together various provisions 353 seeking to protect juveniles against
older persons who seek to take sexual advantage of the juvenile's im-
maturity. Under the Sexual Conduct Act, an older person commits a
felony if he or she engages in various acts of "sexual penetration" with a
person under sixteen, even though both parties consent. If both participants
have reached the age of sixteen, then consensual sexual activity is treated
as the activity of "adults," and criminal liability is imposed only where
special conditions are present (such as adultery). Criminal statutes in
many other jurisdictions also use the age limitation of sixteen in protect-
ing youth against consensual sexual intercourse. 35 4 These statutes appear
to reflect a legislative judgment that, at sixteen, juveniles have sufficient
capacity to make decisions concerning sexual conduct that they no longer
need be distinguished from "adults." Based upon this legislative judgment,
one might also assume that at sixteen juveniles have sufficient maturity in
handling matters depicting sexual conduct that their capacity to purchase
such material need not be distinguished from adults generally.355
350 The Michigan statutory pattern appears to be fairly typical in this regard. Con-
sider, in addition to the consensual sexual conduct provisions cited in note 353 infra,
such criminal provisions as: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.13 (1968) (enticing
away a female under sixteen); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.462 (1968) (employing
a female under seventeen in a house of prostitution); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.337 (1968) (obscene language in presence of children).
351 See Study Report, supra note 1, at 241. The current Michigan provisions set
the age limit at "under eighteen," MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.142, .343e (Supp.
1975). The PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6310 (Mich. State Bar 1967) recommended
"under seventeen," although the commentary noted some division on this point be-
cause, inter alia, "proposed [CRIMINAL CODE] § 2312, in treating consensual inter-
course as rape in the third degree, adopts a maximum age limit of under sixteen."
352 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(a) (Supp. 1975).
353 This statute replaced offenses commonly characterized as "statutory rape"
(formerly MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (1968), applying to consensual inter-
course with females under sixteen); "debauchery of youth," (formerly MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.339 (1968), applying to consensual intercourse with a male under
fifteen); "indecent liberties" (formerly MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.336 (1968),
applying to sexual contact with a child under sixteen); "enticement" (formerly MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145(a) (1968), applying to the solicitation of a child under
sixteen to engage in immoral acts); and "carnal knowledge of a female ward" (for-
merly MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.342 (1968), applying to sexual intercourse
with a female ward under eighteen).
354 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-66
(1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE 250-51 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (discussing age limitations commonly
used in "statutory rape" provisions).
355 While the age limitation utilized in statutory rape statutes reflects, in part, a
judgment as to a youth's maturity in dealing with sexual matters, it may also reflect,
in part, concern as to imposing criminal liability upon the "older" participant who
fails to resist temptation. (Some statutory rape provisions arguably reflect such con-
cern in requiring a significant age differential between the older participant and the
participant who is under sixteen. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401-1(d) (1973)).
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If the age limit is examined in light of the statute's potential effective-
ness in reinforcing parental control, a maximum age of "under sixteen,"
or perhaps, "under seventeen," is suggested. In those areas where parents
have specific legal authority co control the decisions of their children,
that authority ordinarily exists until the child reaches eighteen.35, But
there are various areas where a different age limit is applied, 357 and the
nature of the activity regulated by a juvenile obscenity statute suggests
that it should be among those exceptions. The obscenity statute is not
dealing with an activity requiring a government license, such as marriage,
where the state can assure that the activity will not be undertaken by
minors without parental approval. Once minors have a significant degree
of mobility, and greater contacts with adults in a setting where they are
treated as adults, a juvenile obscenity statute is likely to be of limited
value in reinforcing parental control. With greater mobility and more
significant contacts with adults, minors are more likely to obtain obscene
material from noncommercial sources. Moreover, even as to commercial
distribution, when minors have mobility, limited financial independence,
and the cooperation of adult friends, their capacity to make direct pur-
chases in violation of the law is significantly increased. Of course, the
acquisition of mobility and adult contacts, as with the loss of any special
vulnerability to obscenity, is a gradual process. Here again, however, an
age limit of under sixteen or seventeen reflects a more realistic ceiling than
under eighteen. It is at sixteen, for example, that a youngster ordinarily
may obtain a driver's license and may begin to work in an adult setting.
With respect to the commercial seller of material "obscene" for minors, the concern
over imposing liability for failure to resist "temptation" understandably may be lack-
ing, and it therefore may be urged that a higher age limit is appropriate.
356 General "custody and control" provisions commonly extend to the age of
eighteen where the minor is unemancipated. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§
703.6, 722.3 (Supp. 1975). In addition, various statutes require parental approval
for a youth to engage in a specified activity. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
551.103 (1967) (marriage of females between sixteen and eighteen). In other areas,
parental approval is brought into play because the law generally prohibits dis-
semination of a certain item to minors, but does not prohibit parents from giving
such items to the minors. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.641, .643 (1968)
(cigarettes). But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.651 (1968). The common use
of an "under eighteen" age limitation in the various parental control provisions
probably explains the use of that age limit in juvenile obscenity statutes. While
eighteen now is a commonly accepted age of majority, the "under eighteen" limit
was found in many jurisdictions when a person was not legally an "adult" until he
reached twenty-one. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.343(e) (1968) (ob-
scenity provision adopted in 1958); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.52 (Supp. 1975)
(Age of Majority Act of 1971). See also the "New York-type" statutes passed after
Ginsberg, listed in Friedman, supra note 347, at 47.
357 Thus, in Michigan, minors under seventeen may visit a place where liquor is
sold only while accompanied by their parents, but after reaching seventeen, parental
approval is no longer needed. See MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 750.141 (1968). See
also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 722.751-.752 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1975)
(curfew applied to minors not accompanied by parent or appropriate adult limited
to minors under sixteen). In some areas, such as attendance at school, parents may
have no legal authority since the children will be required to participate up to a
certain age and after that have a personal option not legally subject to parental con-
trol. See MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 340.731-.732 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
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V. DISTRIBUTION
A. Inclusion of Noncommercial Dissemination
The activity prohibited under section 2 of the proposed statute is the
"dissemination" of obscene material. Paragraph (a) of section 1, in turn,
offers two alternative definitions of "dissemination." Under the first alter-
native, the statute would apply to both commercial and noncommercial
distribution of obscene matter to a minor, while the second would limit
its application to commercial distribution alone. Whether the statute en-
compasses noncommercial dissemination probably is not of great practical
significance, but it is an issue viewed as symbolic of the statute's basic
range and, accordingly, often is a subject of considerable controversy.
The state apparently has the constitutional authority to regulate non-
commercial as well as commercial distribution of obscene materials to
minors. Miller and two companion cases 358 placed considerable stress on
the commercial aspect of the dissemination involved in those cases, 359
but in United States v. Orito,360 decided at the same time, the Court upheld
Congress' power to bar interstate transportation of obscene materials with-
out regard to whether the material transported was to be sold commercially
or used personally by the transporter. Congress could constitutionally
adopt a comprehensive prohibition, encompassing private transportation
for private use, as reasonably necessary to keep interstate commerce from
being used to extend the harm caused by the ultimate exposure of obscene
material to the public. 36' Similarly, to prevent that same harm, the state
may seek to restrict noncommercial dissemination as a necessary supple-
ment to the regulation of commercial distribution. 362
Of course, although constitutional authority exists, the issue remains
whether regulation of noncommercial dissemination constitutes sound
legislative policy. In deciding this issue, the legislature should determine
the extent to which criminal regulation of noncommercial dissemination
is needed to implement the statute's basic function of supplementing
358 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 491 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115 (1973).
359 See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 35 (noting the state authority over the "public
portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake and for the ensuing com-
mercial gain"); Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 57 (noting the state interest in
stemming the tide of "commercialized obscenity"). Ginsberg also involved commercial
distribution and the New York juvenile obscenity law applied there was specifically
limited to such dissemination. See note 7 supra.
360413 U.S. 139 (1973).
361 See id. at 143. See also United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S.
123, 128 (1972) (emphasis added):
We have already indicated that the protected right to possess obscene
material in the privacy of one's home [see note 362 infra] does not give
rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give ;t to others.
362 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), recognized a zone of privacy within
the home that protects against prosecution for private possession of obscenity. Stanley
does not apply, however, where material is taken outside of the home. See, e.g.,
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-43 (1973).
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parents' control of their children's access to potentially obscene matter.36 3
Unfortunately, available information fails to provide a clear-cut assess-
ment of that need.
On the one hand, the argument is advanced that the typical parental
response to noncommercial distribution suggests the lack of any significant
need for criminal regulation of such distribution. The great mass of non-
commercial dissemination is between peers. 364 The reaction of parents to
peer distribution often differs considerably from their reaction to com-
mercial distribution. In either instance, parental control of the child's
access to sex-related materials is violated, but the peer engaged in non-
commercial distribution is not viewed as equally responsible. Moreover,
peer distribution arguably may be controlled by means other than criminal
prosecution, such as school or parental discipline. Of course, not all non-
commercial distribution is among peers. A somewhat older person may,
for one reason or another, show obscene material to a minor. But the
Obscenity Commission Report suggests that minors receive material in
this manner in only a minute fraction of the total instances of distribu-
tion.
3 6 5
On the other hand, the argument is advanced that noncommercial dis-
tribution constitutes such a major portion of the total distribution pattern
that it must be regulated to assure parental control. Available evidence in-
dicates that peer distribution far exceeds direct commercial sales to mi-
nors.366 While alternative controls are often available, there are instances
when peers cannot readily be controlled without the threat of criminal
prosecution. Moreover, it is argued, use of the criminal law is not unduly
harsh. Since the peers will be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
363 The Model Penal Code commentary, in support of a prohibition directed pri-
marily at suppressing commercial dissemination, noted: "If production and circula-
tion of obscene material for gain could be eliminated, the supply would be
cut off at the source." MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment, at 13 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1957). Our model provision is drafted on the premise that the production
and circulation of material obscene for minors cannot effectivCly be cut off "at the
source" whether or not the state also adopts a general obscenity provision prohibit-
ing dissemination to consenting adults. See note 4 supra. In the absence of a general
provision, obscene material certainly will be introduced into commerce in the state,
and at least the printed material purchased by adults may eventually find its way
to minors (often without the consent of the adults). Moreover, even if a general
obscenity provision were adopted, and it effectively deterred distribution to adults
of material obscene for adults, youth still might receive materials obscene for
minors but not for adults. Such material lawfully could be distributed to adults
even under the most rigorous general obscenity provision. See Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957). Thus, we assume throughout this discussion that noncommercial
dissemination cannot be eliminated by preventing commercial dissemination to minors.
See also text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
364 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 126-29 and studies cited
therein.
365 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 126-29 and the studies
cited therein. Our reference is to dissemination by adults other than relatives. In one
study noted in the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, members of the family were
cited as the most common source of pictures of sexual intercourse by 5 percent of
the respondents.
366 OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 126-29.
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the consequences imposed upon them are less than catastrophic.3 67 The
point is also made that, while noncommercial dissemination by persons
who are neither peers nor relatives may not be common, it can cause
considerable community concern. Such activity also can best be reached
by direct prosecution under a juvenile obscenity provision rather than,
for example, use of a "contributing-to-the-delinquency" provision.3 68 The
Michigan State Bar Committee, in supporting total coverage, described
such noncommercial distribution to minors as "often present[ing] a very
serious problem. '369
Assuming that noncommercial dissemination is a matter of serious con-
cern, there are administrative problems which nevertheless might justify
limiting coverage of the juvenile statute to commercial transactions. A
statute including noncommercial dissemination would present a broad
area of coverage in which most transactions would not be appropriate for
prosecution. Such overbreadth is likely to subject any enforcement of the
statute against noncommercial dissemination to claims of discriminatory
prosecution. It also may increase the burden placed upon the prosecutor,
who will have to deal with irate parents demanding prosecution in cases
that fall within the literal reach of the statute but which are best dis-
posed of outside the criminal process. Finally, the overbreadth will cer-
tainly lead to opposition to the statute on the ground that it grants the
prosecution and police far too much discretion and it may thereby under-
mine public support for the statute generally.370
Exclusion of noncommercial dissemination also may be supported on
the ground that it bolsters the protection afforded persons who distribute
sexually explicit material to minors in connection with legitimate scientific
or educational endeavors. Such persons would be protected both by
367 The maximum age for juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction commonly is
seventeen or eighteen. See H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 387 (1972). As noted in the text accompanying note 355 supra, the recom-
mended age level under the proposed statute is under sixteen or seventeen.
368 Some of the difficulties presented in utilizing a "contributing-to-the-delin-
quency" provision against the disseminator of obscene materials to minors are sug-
gested by the authorities cited in note 487 infra.
369 PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE, Comment, at 485 (Mich. State Bar 1967). The
proposed Michigan code encompasses noncommercial distribution, but the com-
mentary notes that "the Committee was sharply divided on this point." Id. Although
the commentary does not clearly indicate what constituted the committee's primary
concern about noncommercial distribution, the notes of the reporter who wrote the
commentary (and who is one of the co-authors of this article) indicate that members
were concerned almost exclusively with noncommercial distribution by adults rather
than peers. One method of reaching noncommercial distributions by adults, yet still
exempting peers, would be to limit liability for noncommercial dissemination to
disseminators over the age of eighteen. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.7 (Supp.
1975). Cf. the "statutory rape" provisions discussed in note 355 supra.
370 The difficulties presented by over-coverage are accentuated in this area, where
the activity involved often occurs within the home and therefore poses added con-
cern relating to invasion of privacy. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569
(1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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statutory exemptions371 and by the tripartite standard. However, for those
who believe that scientific and educational activities should be given abso-
lute protection, these safeguards may be inadequate. As noted previous-
ly,372 the tripartite standard is too uncertain to be relied upon by itself to
preclude inappropriate prosecutions. The exemptions provide more cer-
tainty, but they necessarily are built on standards that leave room for
disagreement at points. For example, a scientist who is not acting within
a doctor-patient relationship is only exempt if his use of obscenity with
children is for a "legitimate scientific . . . purpose. ' '37 3 Very frequently,
educators and scientists who use sexually explicit material with minors do
so as part of a noncommercial venture. Limiting the statute to commercial
dissemination would provide such educators and scientists with an addi-
tional layer of protection that should relieve them of any concern as to
the protection afforded by the exemption provisions.374
States are divided as to the inclusion of noncommercial dissemination,
although a majority of the statutes examined did include such dissemina-
tion.375 Some of these jurisdictions define "distribute" as "transferring
possession whether with or without consideration. '376 Other statutes sim-
ply apply to persons who "sell, give, rent, loan or otherwise provide," 37 7 or
similarly, "lend, distribute, transmit, exhibit, or present. '37 A substantial
minority of the provisions examined apply only to commercial distribu-
tion. 379 The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography also took the
371 See proposed section 2(2) and part VI inIra.
372 See text accompanying note 253 supra.
373 See proposed section 2(2) (e).
374 Limiting the statutory coverage to commercial transactions would not afford
protection where the individual sells a scientific or educational service that includes
the showing of sexually explicit material. Here the individual would have to rely
upon the exemptions and the tripartite test. In referring to the "showing" of sexually
explicit material for monetary consideration, proposed paragraph (a) seeks to pre-
vent evasion of the statutory purpose by persons attempting to disguise the com-
mercial distribution of obscene material as an aspect of the delivery of a service. Cf.
Locke v. State, 516 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1974).
375 See, e.g., the provisions cited in notes 376-78 infra. Two of the statutes ex-
amined are ambiguous as to the extent of their coverage of noncommercial dis-
semination. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.060 (Supp. 1974) is applicable to any
person who "sells, distributes, or exhibits" erotic material to a minor. Since the
Washington criminal provision is applicable only upon a prior civil adjudication,
see note 5 supra, it seems likely that the provision was designed to reach primarily,
if not solely, commercial transactions. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (1975) uses the
phrase "sell or loan," which presumably excludes coverage of noncommercial dis-
semination when the obscene matter is given to the minor and a "loan" clearly is
not involved. See Note, Proposed Changes in Statutory Regulation of Obscenity in
Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 1636, 1649 (1971).
376 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). See also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 313(d) (West Supp. 1976); IowA CODE ANN. § 725.1(3) (Supp. 1975);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1201(3) (Supp. 1975).
377 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.075(3) (1974).
378 HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(1) (Special Supp. 1972). See also PRO-
POSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6301(a) (Mich. State Bar 1967).
379 Seven of the provisions cited in note 2 supra (Colorado, Florida, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) apply only to commercial
dissemination. This proportion appears to be fairly representative of the nation as a
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position that juvenile statutes should apply only to commercial dissemina-
tion.38 0
Assuming that the statute is limited to commercial dissemination, de-
scribing that limitation presents some problems. State statutes commonly
use the phrase "sell or lend for monetary consideration."'38 ' This phrasing
may not be adequate to reach commercial establishments that charge cus-
tomers for the privilege of examining pornographic pictures or books
but do not give up possession of such materials. The term "exhibit"
would encompass such activity but that term is commonly used only with
regard to performances.3 82 Accordingly, proposed paragraph (a) adds
the term "show," so that the alternative draft limited to commercial dis-
tribution defines "disseminate" as to "sell, lend, exhibit, or show for
monetary consideration."
A more significant difficulty might be presented by advertisements
which are themselves obscene. Since the advertisements are not sold,
they could not be reached under the "monetary consideration" language
of paragraph (a). One possible answer might be the use of a broader defini-
tion of commercial dissemination. Thus, the Colorado juvenile provision
extends to any dissemination "for pecuniary gain. '383 This provision, how-
ever, is not quite as precise as the standard phrasing quoted above. An-
other possibility is simply to ignore the problem of advertisements on
whole. While the New York statute upheld in Ginsberg was limited to commercial
distributions, and the twenty state statutes listed in note 2 include only a few ex-
amples of approximately seventeen state provisions that largely copied the "Ginsberg
statute," see note 347 supra, most of those provisions departed from the Ginsberg
provision and included noncommercial dissemination. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§
374(16b), (16c) (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 18-1515 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE §
39-1013 (Supp. 1974). Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.293, .294 (Supp. 1976);
MISS. CODE §§ 97-5-15, -17 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-B:2 (1973) (all
limited to commercial dissemination).
380 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 56-57; OBSCENITY COM-
MISSION MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 2(a). The other commission proposals
examined, see note 3 supra, all extend to noncommerical dissemination. See HILL-
LINK MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 7; PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3500(d)
(Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975); PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6301(a) (Mich.
State Bar 1967).
381 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(2) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1975). See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(10) (Supp. 1975) (in-
cluding the term "exhibit," which other jurisdictions, such as Florida and New York,
use only in the statutory provision on performances).
382 See, e.g., provisions cited in notes 381 supra and 391 infra. Several jurisdictions
include the term "distribute" and "publish" in the definition of disseminate. HAWAII
REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1210(1) (Special Supp. 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-27.1-02(1) (Special Supp. 1975); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18(3) (1974).
A publisher or wholesale distributor could be liable as an accomplice or co-conspirator
if he knows that the particular retailer with whom he is dealing will sell the material
to minors. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 507-09, 466-68 (1972). On
the other hand, if the publisher or distributor is not aware of the retailer's practices,
he would lack the mens rea required for liability under proposed section 2. See notes
463-73 and accompanying text infra. Accordingly, the proposed statute does not in-
clude any special provisions on the liability of publishers and wholesale distributors.
See also notes 477, 480 infra.
383 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(9) (1973). See also PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE
§ 6305 (Mich. State Bar 1967).
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the ground that federal legislation currently provides parents with ade-
quate protection against the mailing of unwanted sexually oriented adver-
tisements to their homes.a8 4
B. Display
Another issue relating to the definition of dissemination is whether the
statute should reach the commercial establishment that fails to prevent
minors from perusing prohibited material placed upon open shelves. Such
conduct is not covered by the usual definition of dissemination, whether
or not that definition is limited to dissemination "for monetary considera-
tion." Placement of material in a location where it may be examined by
a minor obviously is not "selling," "giving," or "lending." Neither is it
likely to be viewed as "showing" the material unless the particular ma-
terial is clearly presented as available for perusal by minors.385 The term
"show" suggests that the particular depiction is purposely presented to
the minor for him to view. The owner often can claim that, although the
possibility existed that the minor might peruse the material on display,
the owner intentionally "showed" (that is presented for examination) no
more than the cover of the book or magazine. 386
384 Under 39 U.S.C. § 3010 (1970), parents may file a form with the post office
noting that they do not desire to receive any sexually oriented advertisements. The
post office list of persons filing such forms is available to mail order distributors, and
they are barred from mailing sexually oriented advertisements to any persons whose
name and address has been on the list for more than thirty days. See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1735 (1970) (providing for criminal penalties). An advertisement is "sexually
oriented" under 39 U.S.C. § 3010(d) (1970) if it
depicts in actual or simulated form, or explicitly describes, in a pre-
dominantly sexual context, human genitalia, any act of natural or
unnatural sexual intercourse, any act of sadism or masochism, or any
other erotic subject directly relating to the foregoing.
See also OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 126-27 (studies indicating
that mails are a comparatively insignificant source of obscenity obtained by minors).
385 If the minor is invited to peruse the material, but no charge is made for per-
usal, see text accompanying notes 381-82 supra, the "showing" would not be en-
compassed if the statute were limited to commercial transactions. This potential gap
in coverage does not, in itself, furnish a substantial basis for extending the statute
to noncommercial transactions. Ordinarily, a storeowner who invited a minor to
peruse prohibited material would also be willing to sell that material to the minor
and could be prosecuted for the eventual sale. See also note 386 inIra.
386 The mens rea required for the act of "showing" must be distinguished from the
required mens rea as to the nature of the item shown. See note 412 infra. While reck-
less disregard is sufficient mens rea as to the character of the matter, see text ac-
companying note 441 infra, it would not be sufficient for the act of "showing." The
term "show" suggests an intent to present the particular depiction for viewing by
another. See note 412 infra. A person does not "show" a picture within a closed
book if he placed the book in a location where another may or may not examine its
contents. Thus, the operator of a store that displays a large variety of publications,
including some obscene for minors, does not "show" the contents of the publication
if he recklessly disregards the possibility that a minor will open the publication and
examine its contents. Only reckless disregard would be involved, for example, if the
store had a policy against perusal of obscene material by minors, but failed to assign
personnel to ensure that minors did not violate that policy. Jurisdictions seeking to
extend their juvenile obscenity statutes to such recklessness have adopted special pro-
visions applicable to the display of the publication itself. See note 387 infra. Oregon
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Only a few of the provisions examined clearly apply to the proprietor
who fails to keep minors from perusing obscene material offered for sale
to adults.387 The Oregon statute is typical of these provisions. Oregon
reaches the "perusal situation" through a separate offense of "displaying
obscene materials to minors." That offense makes it a misdemeanor if an
owner, operator, or manager of a business . . . knowingly or
recklessly permits a minor who is not accompanied by his parent
or lawful guardian to enter or remain on the premises, if in that
part of the premises where the minor is so permitted to be, there
is visibly displayed . . . [a]ny book, magazine, paperback, pam-
phlet or other written or printed matter. . . [which] depicts nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse.A88
The Oregon provision obviously places a great administrative burden
upon storeowners. It would require, for example, that magazines
such as Playboy and Penthouse be placed in separate portions of a store.
Some retailers might refuse to sell such items, thereby making them less
readily available to adults. Other retailers might find it necessary to place
all but the most innocuous magazines in a special section not open to
minors. 38 9
does so, for example, although its basic provision prohibits the "selling], giv[ing],
rent[ing], loan[ing] or otherwise provid[ing]" obscene matter to a minor. ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 167.060(3), .065 (1974). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974)
(prohibiting the "showing" of obscene matter, but also adding the "display" pro-
vision quoted in note 387 infra).
387See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 201.265(1)-(2) (1973) ("[e]xhibits for sale ... in such
a manner or location as to allow a minor to view, read, hear or examine any...
printed matter.., or sound recording.., which contains any matter" that depicts
"nudity, sexual conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse and is harmful to minors"); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 167.080 (1974) (quoted in the text accompanying note 388 inlra);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974) ("display at newsstands or any other
business establishment frequented by minors.., or where said minors are or may
be invited as a part of the general public any pornographic motion picture, or...
[other material] the cover or content of which exploits, is devoted to, or is princi-
pally made up of descriptions or depictions" of sexual excitement, masturbation, inter-
course, erotic fondling, and nudity). See also PROPOSED ARiz. CRIM. CODE § 3507
(Ariz. Crim. Code Comm'n 1975) (similar to the Oregon provision); OBSCENITY
COMMISSION MODEL STATUTE, supra note 3, § 2(d)(iv) ("display for sale so that
young persons may see portions of the material constituting explicit sexual pictorial
material"). An older Michigan provision is considerably broader than the statutes
cited above. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.143 (Supp. 1973) (misdemeanor to
"exhibit upon any public street... or in any other place within the view of children
passing on any public street. . . any book, pamphlet or other.., thing containing...
obscene prints, figures, or descriptions, tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth").
388 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.080 (1974).
3 8 9 See also Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 86 (1960) (footnotes omitted):
To prohibit dealers from exhibiting within the view of adolescents
books and magazines that can be sold only to adults would raise the
additional problem of undue interference with the material's primary
audience. Beyond these obstacles is the disrupting effect of "adult only"
counters or shelves in bookstores and at newsstands, for the "adult only"
label would serve only to attract adolescents eager for a look at the
forbidden fruit and would make it difficult for the dealer to prevent
adolescent shoplifting of the books and magazines. To avoid these diffi-
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C. Performances
The proposed statute deals separately with performances in paragraph
(b) of section 2(1) and paragraph (n) of section 1. The special definition
of "exhibit" in section 1(c), which includes persons who sell tickets to a
performance, is needed to indicate clearly the range of persons involved
in the dissemination of a performance who may be held liable. The pro-
posed language follows provisions adopted in several states.a90 Still other
states apparently assume that terms like "exhibit" will be broadly con-
strued to reach such persons as ticket sellers. 391 This approach, however,
is particularly risky in a criminal statute, even if there is a criminal code
provision rejecting the so-called "strict construction rule. '39 2
Two of the state statutes examined specifically exempt film projection-
ists. 393 Projectionists are not likely to be held liable under a statute ap-
plicable to minors since they ordinarily would lack the requisite scienter
as to age of the audience. 394 Aside from that factor, there is no reason to
treat the projectionist differently from the clerk in the bookstore or the
ticket seller.395
VI. EXEMPTIONS
A. Parental Exemption
As discussed previously, 39 6 the major objective of the juvenile obscenity
statute is to aid parents in controlling their children's access to sexually ori-
ented materials. While the state also has an independent interest in the well-
being of its youth, the generally accepted legislative position has been
culties, cautious dealers might well decide to abandon all books and
magazines claimed by any one to be unsuitable for adolescents.
Two members of the Obscenity Commission, who joined the general recommenda-
tion as to adoption of a juvenile provision, dissented as to the juvenile display pro-
vision, see note 387 supra, on the ground that "segregating that material prohibited
for sale to juveniles from that which is available to all would only enhance its
appeal." OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 57 n.14.
390 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.013 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, §
712-1215(l)(b); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 167.075 (1974).
391 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(a) (West Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §
531.030(l)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.8 (Supp. 1975)
(using only the term "sells").
392 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney Supp. 1975); People v.
Hall, 391 Mich. 175, 189, 215 N.W.2d 166, 174 (1974).
39 3 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1208(2) (Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-8A-3 (Supp. 1974) (exempting the "projectionist, ticket taker, usher" or other
employee "when [he] distributes, prepares or exhibits obscene matter while acting
within the scope of his regular employment").
394 See part VII C supra.
395 Consider in this connection the West Virginia provision quoted in note 393
supra. But cf. State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973)
(finding sufficient rational basis to support the constitutionality of a statutory dis-
tinction between a projectionist and a clerk in a bookstore).
396 See part I supra.
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that, with respect to obscenity, the state's interest is best served by paren-
tal discretion. That position is based on the view that material classified
as "obscene for minors" is not equally, or even necessarily, harmful in
all circumstances. Different children react differently to the same ma-
terials. Some children mature more quickly than others. Their parents
may decide that they would not be harmed by exposure to material which
might adversely affect another child of the same age. A picture seen in
the context of a discussion between parent and child may have a different
impact than the same picture purchased in response to whispered hints
of forbidden fruit. A movie with explicit sex scenes viewed after a parental
explanation and discussion is far less likely to harm than when seen with-
out parental knowledge. The possible usefulness of otherwise harmful ma-
terials under such circumstances, and the importance of the parental right
to raise their children as they see fit,397 justifies a parental exemption. It
is possible, of course, that a parent might abuse such a right. The danger
is no greater here, however, than in other areas involving the raising of
children.
If the juvenile obscenity statute extends only to commercial transactions,
a special parental exemption provision need not be included in the
statute. Those states that bar only commercial dissemination have not
adopted such exemption provisions since distributions by parents to their
children presumably would not constitute dissemination for "monetary
consideration. '398 However, even if the statute is so limited, there might
be value in adding an exemption provision to emphasize the basic thrust
of the provision and to provide a safeguard against a broad construction
of dissemination for "monetary consideration" that might extend to parents
under unusual circumstances. 99
Statutes applicable to noncommercial transactions generally contain
some form of exception that relieves parents of liability.400 The exception
397 For a review of legal precedent recognizing this right, see Friedman, The
Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional Analysis of Self-Regulation
by the Film Industry, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 185, 213-16 (1973).
398 See note 379 supra and text accompanying note 381 supra. The reference is to
a provision exempting parents themselves, as opposed to a provision exempting the
person who "exhibits" an obscene performance to a minor when that minor is ac-
companied by a parent. The "monetary consideration" limitation would not, in
itself, relieve the commercial exhibitor of liability in that situation. See notes 404-06
and accompanying text infra. Several of the statutes limited to commercial dissemina-
tion contain provisions specifically noting that an exhibitor is not liable when the
minor is accompanied by a parent. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.013(2)(b) (Supp.
1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.265(3) (1973) (accompanied by "parent, guardian, or
spouse"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(11)(b) (Supp. 1975) ("parent or guardian").
But see COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-103(l)(b) (1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1975) (applicable to any person who "exhibits" a performance,
sells a ticket to the performance, or "admits" the minor to the performance, with
no reference made to the presence of a parent).
399 Thus, where a parent or guardian purchases material for a child but insists
upon reimbursement, the transaction should not be viewed as a "sale" by the
parent, cf. Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1964), but a parental
exemption would avoid any necessity of even examining that issue.
400 Of those statutes examined that clearly apply to noncommercial transactions,
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is sometimes stated as an exemption. 40 1 Other jurisdictions make it a de-
fense. 40 - The parental exception of the proposed statute, found in section
2(2) (a), is stated as an exemption rather than a defense.40 3 This formula-
tion would not prevent the court from requiring that the defendant in-
itially raise the exemption issue, but the burden of proof would remain
with the prosecutor, which is consistent with the general pattern of sub-
stantive criminal law. 40 4
Where the material involved is a magazine or book, the parent simply
may purchase the item and give it to the child. A similar procedure cannot
be utilized with respect to performances. The performance is still dis-
seminated directly to the minor by admitting him to the theatre, but the
approval signified by the parent accompanying the child should give the
disseminator the same protection as one who sells to a parent a book
which is then given to the child. Accordingly, a special provision is needed
to extend the policy of the parental exemption to those who exhibit a per-
formance to a minor accompanied by his or her parent. 40 5 That provision
see notes 375-78 supra, four make no reference to exempting parents. See KY. REV.
STAT. § 531.030 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (described in note 321 supra); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.343e (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03 (Special Supp.
1975) (but requiring prior civil adjudication, see note 5 supra); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
61-8A-2 (Supp. 1974). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31(B) (Page 1975)
(parental status is an affirmative defense to giving a child material "harmful" (i.e.,
obscene) for minors, but not to giving a child material that is obscene for adults).
See also VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391(d) (1975) (no specific exemption, but exemption
suggested by reference to misrepresentation of parental status). See Note, Proposed
Changes in Statutory Regulation of Obscenity in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 1636, 1650
n.58 (1971).
401 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.2(a) (West Supp. 1976) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall prohibit any parent or guardian from distributing any harmful matter
to his child or ward or permitting his child or ward to attend an exhibition of any
harmful matter if the child or ward is accompanied by him."); HAWAII REV. STAT.
tit. 37, § 712-1215(2) (Special Supp. 1972) ("does not apply to a parent, guardian,
or other person in loco parentis to the minor"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.2 (Supp.
1975) (statute applicable to "[alny person, other than the parent or guardian of the
minor").
402 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.31 (B)(1) (Page 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. §
167.085(1) (1974).
403 Whether the protective provision is in the form of an exemption or an affirma-
tive defense is not a matter of major importance. Only rarely is a person's status as
a parent or guardian likely to be the subject of litigation. Our proposal utilizes an
exemption provision largely because the proposal is geared to Michigan substantive
law and Michigan traditionally does not use affirmative defenses. See note 404 infra.
Other jurisdictions commonly treat various "justifications" or "excuses" as affirma-
tive defenses, see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8 (1972), although that
policy may be subject to reconsideration in light of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975).
404 Under Michigan law, for example, once the existence of a possible excuse is
presented in the case, the prosecution bears the burden of showing that excuse is not
applicable. See G. GILLESPIE, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 389
(1953). Cf. PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 2005(3) (Mich. State Bar 1967).
405 Arguably, this exception is too narrow, since the parent should not be required
to accompany the child, but only to grant permission (such as by purchasing the
ticket). Where a parent gives an obscene book to a minor, the parent need not be
present when the minor examines the book. On the other hand, as noted in the text
accompanying note 292 supra, the element of movement may give performances a
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is placed in paragraph (b) of subsection 2(1 ) since the matter relates only
to performances. 406
B. Other Exemptions
Many of the factors justifying a parental exemption also support an
exemption of professionals who disseminate obscene material to minors
in the course of educational or scientific projects. Such persons use ob-
scene material in a controlled setting designed to benefit rather than harm
the child. Moreover, institutional checks, including parental control,
should ensure that an exemption for educational and scientific use will
not be abused within that controlled setting. Of course, these same con-
siderations suggest that the dissemination would be protected under the
tripartite test,40 7 but, as noted previously, the general thrust of the statute
should be clearly to exclude protected dissemination without relying upon
the protection of the nebulous tripartite standard. 40 8
Most of the statutes encompassing nonmonetary transactions have some
form of scientific and educational exception. The scope and specificity
of these provisions vary widely. There are three major approaches. One
is to list legitimate disseminators. 40 9 The second approach is to describe
special impact not present in other visual materials. Performances, unlike books,
also are viewed in the presence of others, but it is questionable whether the statute
should take into account the possible concern of others in the audience that un-
escorted minors are watching the same performance. See note 145 supra.
406 Similar provisions in other states are sometimes stated as exemptions, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 313.2(10) (West Supp. 1976), or as a defense, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.31(B)(2) (Page 1975). Other statutes contain a special provision similar
to proposed paragraph (b) in the basic description of the offense. See, e.g., the pro-
visions cited in note 398 supra.
407 While the context of the dissemination may have a significant bearing on the
application of all three elements of the tripartite test, a true educational or scientific
setting would strongly suggest that, at the least, the material was presented for its
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Cf. Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966), discussed in part II K supra; note 140 supra. But cf. Schwartz,
infra note 408, at 679-80.
408 See notes 251-53 and accompanying text supra. On the desirability of specific
exemptions, consider Schwartz, Morals Oflenses and the Model Penal Code, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679-80 (1963); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
72 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (commenting upon the need for specific exemption
of librarians).
409 See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.085(2) (1974) ("a bona fide school, museum
or public library, or [person] acting in the course of his employment as an employee
of such organization or of a retail outlet affiliated with and serving the educational
purpose of such organization"); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.100 (Supp. 1974) ("by any
recognized historical society or museum, the state law library, any county law library,
the state library, the public library, any library of any college or university, or to
any archive or library under the supervision and control of the state, county, munici-
pality, or other political subdivision"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(1l)(c) (Supp.
1975) (same wording as the Oregon statute); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 39-1-18.3
(1974) ("(1) A teacher of an accredited course of study related to pornography at
a State approved educational institution; or (2) [a] licensed medical practitioner or
psychologist in the treatment of a patient; or (3) [a] participant in the criminal
justice system, such as legislator, judge, prosecutor, law enforcement official or other
similar or related position; or (4) [a] supplier to any person described in (1) through
(3) above").
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generally the appropriate purposes that require exemption.410 The third
approach is to both specify the primary legitimate disseminators and in-
clude a general description of the exempt purposes.41' The proposed stat-
ute, in section 2(2), uses this third approach, listing specific exempted
professionals and then adding a "catch-all" provision encompassing any
person acting for a "legitimate medical, scientific, educational, govern-
mental, or judicial purpose."
VII. SCIENTER
Under proposed section 2(1) a person who disseminates obscene ma-
terial to a minor is criminally liable only if he acts "knowingly." The term
"knowingly" is defined in paragraph (d) of section 1. That paragraph
provides that a person acts "knowingly" with respect to a particular
circumstance if he is aware of the circumstance or recklessly disregards a
substantial risk of the existence of that circumstance. Paragraph (d) also
provides that this level of mens rea must be established with respect to
both the "nature" of the material disseminated and the status of the re-
cipient as a minor.412 Paragraph (d) thus sets standards for two different
elements of the required mens rea-the necessary level of the mens rea and
the scope of circumstances to which that mens rea level applies. In both
areas, any legislative standard is subject to constitutional limitations, as
set forth primarily in Smith v. California.413
Smith held unconstitutional a state statute rendering a bookseller liable
for selling an obscene book without regard to whether the seller had been
aware or reasonably should have been aware of the contents of the book. 414
The Court reasoned that the imposition of such strict liability would lead
a bookseller to "tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has in-
spected." Since the bookseller obviously could not inspect all the ma-
410 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-11 (Special Supp. 1975) ("in the course
of law enforcement, judicial, or legislative activities"); PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE
§ 6301(b) (Mich. State Bar 1967) ("for educational or scientific purposes").
411 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.3 1(C) (Page 1975) ("for a bona fide
medical, scientific, educational, governmental, judicial or other proper purpose, by
a physician, psychologist, sociologist, scientist, teacher, librarian, clergyman, prose-
cutor, judge, or other proper person"). Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(e)(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) ("any public library or any library operated by an ac-
credited institution of higher education.., in aid of a legitimate scientific or edu-
cational purpose").
412 The discussion above refers to the requisite mens rea as to surrounding cir-
cumstances rather than to the actus reus of dissemination. To disseminate, the
individual must "sell, lend, give, exhibit, or show." These terms carry with them
a requirement of intent as to the conduct of distributing and therefore no explicit
mens rea requirement as to the actus reus is set forth in section 1(d) or 1(a). See also
note 386 supra. But see PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3504 (Ariz. Crim. Code Com-
m'n 1975) (describing the conduct of "furnishing" material as "intentionally or
knowingly furnish[ing]").
413 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
414 While Smith involved a general obscenity statute, the principle announced
there was later viewed in Ginsberg as equally applicable to a juvenile statute. See
note 420 infra; Commonwealth v. Corey, 351 Mass. 331, 334, 221 N.E.2d 222, 224
(1966).
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terials that he might otherwise desire to sell, the quantity of material made
available for sale would be limited, and the public inevitably would be
denied access to some uninspected material that might very well be con-
stitutionally protected. Thus, by forcing booksellers to adopt a scheme of
self-censorship, the statute had violated the first amendment; it had in-
directly imposed a restriction upon the distribution of protected material
that it could not directly impose. The first amendment demands, to min-
imize the impact of self-censorship, that the state not impose liability with-
out requiring some element of scienter.
415
While Smith held that the state may not impose strict liability, it did
not specify what level of mental element is constitutionally required or
what aspects of the contents of the material must be encompassed by that
mens rea. 416 Later cases 417 held that reckless disregard was a constitu-
tionally sufficient level of mens rea, but none clearly went beyond Smith
in identifying those aspects of the content of the material to which reckless
disregard applied. We will consider initially the appropriate definition of
this element of the mens rea requirement. 418
A. Nature of the Material
The Smith opinion spoke in terms of a constitutional mens rea re-
quirement as to the "contents" and the "character" of the book being
sold.419 Later cases have used the same terminology. 420 In its latest state-
415 In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966), the Court noted that an
element of scienter also was required to "compensate for the ambiguities inherent
in the definition of obscenity." See also note 431 infra. But see Note, The Scienter
Requirement in Criminal Obscenity Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 791, 798 (1966).
416 The Court noted:
We need not and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of
mental element is requisite ... whether honest mistake as to whether
its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse; whether
there might be circumstances under which the State constitutionally
might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on
him the burden of explaining why he did not, and what such circum-
stances might be. Doubtless any form of criminal obscenity statute
applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency to self-censor-
ship and have some inhibiting effect.., but we consider today only
one which goes to the extent of eliminating all mental elements for the
crime.
361 U.S. at 154-55.
417 See notes 447-48 and accompanying text infra.
418 The subsequent discussion of the requisite mens rea is based on the assumption
that the state does not require a prior civil adjudication of obscenity as a prerequisite
to criminal prosecution. See note 5 supra. In jurisdictions requiring a prior civil
adjudication, the disseminator must have been a party to the proceeding or have
received notice of the finding of obscenity before he can be prosecuted for sub-
sequent dissemination. Thus, the prosecution readily can establish reckless disregard
as to the content and legal status of the material. See also McKinney v. Alabama,
44 U.S.L.W. 4330 (U.S. March 23, 1976), as to the disseminator's right to challenge
a finding of obscenity made in a proceeding to which he was not a party.
419 361 U.S. at 152-53.
420 In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the Court held that a con-
stitutional challenge based upon Smith was "foreclosed" where the state statute had
been construed as imposing the following scienter requirement:
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ment on this aspect of the constitutionally required mens rea, in Hamling
v. United States,421 the Court noted that the state need not require proof
that the disseminator knew that the materials were legally classified as "ob-
scene," but beyond that, added little to what was said in Smith. Hamling
stated:
It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that a
defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he
distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of the
materials. 422
Neither Smith nor subsequent cases clearly indicate whether. the con-
stitutionally required mens rea encompasses the particular content of the
disseminated material. Is it sufficient that the seller was aware (or should
have been aware) that the material placed a heavy emphasis on sex or is
it essential that the mens rea also extend to the portrayal of particular
types of sexual conduct?423 Similarly, the cases are not very helpful in
determining the extent to which the mens rea must encompass the porno-
graphic quality of the material. Assuming the seller was aware (or should
have been aware) that the material depicted sexual intercourse, must the
prosecution show he also was aware (or should have been aware) that the
portrayal was presented in a manner emphasizing prurient appeal? Does
the constitutional principle of Smith also require proof that the seller was
aware (or should have been aware) that the material made no significant
effort to convey artistic, literary, political, or scientific ideas? Proposed
paragraph (d) is presented in three alternative drafts, each varying in its
answer to these questions.
Alternative A follows the wording of Smith and simply describes the
mens rea requirement as extending to the "character and content" of
the matter distributed. The use of this phrase largely leaves to judicial
interpretation the determination of the precise scope of the required mens
rea. The state statutes examined generally follow a similar approach. Some
[O]nly those who are in some manner aware of the character of the
material they attempt to distribute should be punished. It is not innocent
but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcised ....
Id. at 510 (emphasis by the Court). In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968),
the Court upheld the scienter provision of a juvenile obscenity statute. The provision
required, inter alia, "reason to know" the "character and content" of the material
in question. The Court rejected petitioner's contention that the statutory reference
to the "character" of the material was inadequate, noting that the legislative history
indicated the term "character" would be given the same gloss in this statute as the
statute upheld in Mishkin. Id. at 643-44.
421 418 U.S. 87, 121 (1974).
422 Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
423 Lower federal courts, interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1966), have described the
scienter requirement of that statute as relating to "general knowledge that the material
is sexually oriented," not to "[s]cienter as to the exact content of the material trans-
ported." United States v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 490 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.
1974). See also United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 1974). When
Smith referred to the "contents" of the material, the Court had not yet held that
obscenity included only material depicting "sexual conduct specifically defined by
state law." See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 241-50 supra.
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make no reference to the scope of the mens rea requirement, 42 4 and others
simply note that it must extend to the "character" or the "character and
content" of the material sold.42 5
If the legislative policy is to limit the mens rea requirement to the
minimum required by the Constitution, then Alternative A presents a
distinct advantage over Alternatives B and C. Either or both of these
alternatives may go beyond the constitutional minimum. Under Alter-
native A, the scope of the required mens rea can readily be adjusted in
accordance with future Supreme Court decisions. 426 While the alternative
does not state in so many words that its objective is to extend the mens
rea requirement only so far as the Constitution requires, the terms "char-
acter" and "content," having been taken from Smith, should be inter-
preted in light of subsequent constitutional interpretations of Smith.42
While permitting adjustment to future decisions, the broad language
of Alternative A also provides the disseminator with far less precise guide-
lines as to his duty to inspect than do Alternatives B and C. Assume, for
example, that the disseminator is aware that a magazine portrays nudes,
but knows from previous issues that the portrayals are not of the type en-
compassed by the statute since they do not depict the genitals or persons
engaged in sexual activities. If the disseminator fails to inspect the current
issue, and the magazine has shifted its editorial policy and now depicts full
nudes and sexual acts, is the disseminator subject to criminal liability for
selling that publication to a known minor? Is he liable because he knew
that the magazine had a substantial sexual orientation, or does reckless
disregard as to "character and content" also require a reasonable basis for
assuming the magazine contained the particular type of depictions specified
in the statute? Alternative A, unlike Alternatives B and C, offers little
direction on such an issue. While judicial decisions interpreting Alternative
A could eventually provide the answer, it may be months or years before
such an issue would be resolved by the appellate courts.
424 See LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 106(3) (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03
(Special Supp. 1975). But compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01 (Special Supp.
1975) (general obscenity statute).
425See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(e) (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
235.21 (McKinney Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390(7) (1975). See also
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) ("nature or content")
(general obscenity statute); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-1(4) (Supp. 1974) ("con-
tent or character").
426 This flexibility may be limited somewhat by employing both the terms "charac-
ter" and "content." Used in conjunction with the term "content," the term "character"
suggests that the mens rea extends to at least the erotic quality of the material as
well as its devotion to the subject of sex. See also Lockhart, infra note 431, at 568
(arguing that Mishkin's emphasis, see note 420 supra, on the previous construction
of the state statute as referring to the "character" of the material and the "calculated
purveyance of filth" clearly indicates "that something beyond mere knowledge of con-
tents is needed to satisfy the scienter requirement").
427 In dealing with this and other aspects of obscenity provisions, courts have
tended to interpret the statutes as imposing no more than the minimum constitutional
standards unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. See, e.g., United States
v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 490 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Welke, 298
Minn. 402, 216 N.W.2d 641 (1974).
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Alternatives B and C both attempt to define the scope of the
necessary mens rea with some degree of specificity. With respect to the
sexual content, they require at least reckless disregard that the material
depicts the sexual conduct described in the proposed definition of "sex-
ually explicit matter. '428 Thus, the requisite level of mens rea must be
established for the specific type of activity portrayed rather than just for
the material's general sexual orientation. This requirement follows from
the same rationale that supports the inclusion of a statutory listing of spe-
cific sexual content. 429 A major purpose of listing the encompassed con-
tent is to automatically exclude any general category of sexual content
that is likely to be protected by the tripartite test. If the matter to be dis-
seminated does not depict the particular sexual conduct specified in the list-
ing, then the disseminator need not be concerned with the uncertain pro-
tection afforded by the tripartite test. The requirement of mens rea as to
particular content provides a similar protection. If the disseminator has
good reason to believe that the matter has some sexual content, but does
not depict the particular conduct specified in the listing, he should not be
subjected to liability if his reasonable belief is inaccurate. Imposing liabil-
ity under such circumstances would, in effect, place upon the disseminator
the burden of inspecting almost all sexually related material to ensure that
it did not contain "sexually explicit matter" as defined by the statute.
As suggested by the Smith analysis, the practical consequence of imposing
such a burden could be to inhibit distribution of the very categories of
sexually oriented material that the narrowness of the listing is designed
to protect.
Alternatives B and C also specify the extent to which the mens rea
requirement applies to the presence in the material of those qualities tested
by the tripartite standard. Alternative B of paragraph (d) (ii) requires
"reckless disregard" of a "substantial risk" that the matter appeals to the
prurient interest. Alternative C of paragraph (d) (ii) requires "reckless
disregard" of a "substantial risk" that the matter has all of the qualities
described in the tripartite standard.
Requiring a mental element as to part or all of the tripartite standard is
not inconsistent with the Hamling ruling that the disseminator need not
know that the material is legally classified as obscene. While the tripartite
standard is a legal standard determining the scope of first amendment
protection, it also is included as a factual element in criminal obscenity
statutes.430 No crime has been committed unless the factfinder determines
beyond a reasonable doubt that the matter distributed appeals to the
prurient interest, is patently offensive, and lacks serious social value. In
requiring at least recklessness as to the presence of these elements, Alter-
natives A and B would not require proof that the disseminator was aware
of the tripartite test as a legal standard. It would be sufficient that the
428 See section 1, paragraph (m).
429 See part III A supra.
430 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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disseminator should have been aware of those characteristics of the material
described in the tripartite standard, even though he may have mistakenly
believed that the material was not legally obscene. 43 ' Criminal statutes
often require some level of mens rea with respect to factual characteristics
of legal standards when those facts are also part of the elements of the
offense to be determined by the trier of fact. 4
32
Although the Supreme Court decisions do not speak directly to the
issue, various statements in Smith and later cases suggest that, at least as
to the prurient interest element, some mens rea may be constitutionally
required.4 33 Such a requirement arguably is needed to avoid inhibiting dis-
tribution of various non-erotic books or films that contain sexually ex-
plicit matter. Consider, for example, the bookseller who reasonably be-
lieves that a book is a legitimate scientific text containing sexually explicit
pictures and therefore fails to conduct an inspection that would have
revealed that the book, in fact, only utilized a scientific veneer to convey
pornography. 43 4 Under the rationale of Smith, imposing criminal liability
in such a situation might place booksellers in an improperly inhibiting
position; to avoid possible criminal liability, they would be required to
examine all scientific texts on sex to ensure the legitimacy of such texts,
even though the vast majority would be legitimate and constitutionally
protected. Of course, as a practical matter, the circumstances surrounding
distribution ordinarily will indicate to even the inexperienced bookseller
that a particular text is more likely to be pornographic than legitimately
scientific. 435 Nevertheless, the theoretical potential for inhibiting the sale
of a significant body of protected material suggests that the Court might
require that the prosecution prove at least negligence with respect to the
erotic quality of the material.
Arguably, requiring mens rea as to the erotic quality alone may not
provide sufficient protection for the disseminator under a juvenile ob-
scenity statute. Assuming that minors have a lower threshold for ap-
431 But cf. Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the
First Amendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 562-69 (1975) (suggesting that recognition of
an affirmative defense that the disseminator reasonably believed that the material
was constitutionally protected would "substantially narrow" the range of uncertainty
inherent in the Miller standard).
432 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); PROPOSED MICH. CRIM.
CODE § 3205 (mens rea requirement for receiving stolen property), § 7005 (incest)
(Mich. State Bar 1967).
433 Thus, Smith refers to knowledge of the character as well as the contents of
the material. Used in conjunction with the term "content," the reference to character
suggests some mens rea requirement as to the quality of the sexual content. See
note 426 supra. See also note 420 supra (quoting Mishkin). Note that the Court in
Mishkin also refers to the calculated purveyance of material of a particular quality
("filth") as well as content. See also text accompanying note 422 supra (quoting
Hamling).
434 Cf. United States v. Stewart, 336 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
435See, e.g., the advertising noted in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974); United States v. Gundlach, 345 F. Supp. 709 (M.D. Pa. 1972). Compare
United States v. Stewart, 336 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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peal to their prurient interest,436 it seems likely that constitutional pro-
tection of sexually explicit material distributed to minors will depend
more upon the presence of serious social value than upon the absence of
an appeal to the prurient interest. Recognizing this, booksellers who do not
desire to inspect all sexually explicit materials must rely more heavily
upon the likelihood that a particular book has some social value for
minors than upon its possible lack of appeal to the minor's prurient in-
terest. Accordingly, the argument concludes, where the seller had a
reasonable, though erroneous, basis for assuming that the matter had
serious social value, he should not be held liable because he failed to
inspect that matter. He should be treated in the same manner as the seller
who reasonably failed to inspect for erotic quality. Under this view, some
mens rea should be required for each element of the tripartite standard
because a reasonable reliance as to the absence of any of the three ele-
ments should justify a failure to inspect.
On the other side, the argument can be advanced that requiring mens rea
as to prurient appeal alone relieves the disseminator of any significant bur-
den of self-censorship while avoiding the imposition of unnecessary burdens
upon the prosecution. This position rests in part on the premise that, if
the statute reaches only a narrow range of sexual content (such as visual
depictions of advanced sexual activity), material which is both within
this narrow range and appealing to the prurient interest of minors is not
likely to be protected under the remaining elements of the tripartite test as
applied to minors. Accordingly, the sale of protected material would not
be severely inhibited if the seller were required to inspect a book when he
has reason to believe it contains material which has an advanced sexual
content and is erotic. The burden of inspection would apply only to a
narrow class of materials which is likely to be obscene for minors. More-
over, the need for inspection would exist only where the dealer was sell-
ing the item to minors.
It should be emphasized that the practical significance of a legislative
choice between the positions noted above lies largely in cases involving
a failure to inspect. It is primarily in those cases that requiring mens rea
for each element of the tripartite test may present problems. Where the
seller has examined the material and that fact can be shown, proof of
mens rea is relatively easy under any standard. Even if the jury believes
that the seller inspected and honestly concluded that the material did not
have the qualities emphasized in the tripartite test, the jury's conclusion
that the material is obscene beyond a reasonable doubt suggests that the
seller probably was reckless in his evaluation of the material. 437 At least,
436 The validity of this assumption has not been fully investigated. See I COM-
MISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, TECHNICAL REPORT 16 (1971).
437 But cf. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), in which a jury found "Car-
nal Knowledge" to be obscene as to adults, and Lockhart, supra note 431, at 569,
suggesting that an affirmative defense of reasonable belief that material was not
obscene would provide effective protection to the distributor of "borderline material"
and thereby reduce the "chilling effect of the fear of prosecution on the distribution
of [such] material."
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that is the most likely conclusion of the particular jury which found the
material to be obscene. 438
Where the seller failed to inspect, requiring mens rea as to each ele-
ment of the tripartite test may make proof of liability difficult. 439 In that
situation, the determination of mens rea rests not upon an evaluation of
the actual contents of the book, but upon the inference appropriately to be
drawn from factors known to the dealer, such as the method of distributing
the material and the nature of the advertising. The prosecution would
have to show that such factors so clearly required an inspection that failure
to inspect constituted the required recklessness as to the material's pru-
rient appeal, patent offensiveness, and lack of social value. Of course,
438 Where the standard is that of recklessness-that is, requiring an awareness of
the risk, see note 441 infra, that the material would have certain qualities-the jury
conceivably could find that the individual lacked the mens rea because, though he
inspected the material, he was so dense as not to be aware of the risk. This would be
a most unusual conclusion, however, especially with an experienced bookseller.
439 If a labeling requirement were imposed upon the publisher or wholesale dis-
tributor, the problems of proof discussed in this paragraph would largely be elimi-
nated. Any retailer who failed to examine the contents of material marked "for
adults only" would clearly be in a position of reckless disregard as to all factors
relating to the characteristics of the material. Arguably, any state attempt to impose
such a labeling requirement would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Cf. Hunsaker, supra note 122, at 929-30. Aside from the commerce clause limita-
tions, a labeling requirement probably would have more drawbacks than advantages,
as noted by the Commission on Pornography and Obscenity:
The Commission considered the possibility of recommending the en-
actment of uniform federal legislation requiring a notice or label to be
affixed to materials by their publishers, importers or manufacturers,
when such materials fall within a definitional provision identical to
that included within the recommended state or local model juvenile
statute. Under such legislation, the required notice might be used by
retail dealers and exhibitors, in jurisdictions which adopt the recom-
mended juvenile legislation, as a guide to what material could not be
sold or displayed to young persons. The Commission concluded, how-
ever, that such a federal notice or labeling provision would be unwise.
So long as definitional provisions are drafted to be as specific as pos-
sible, and especially if they include only pictorial material, the Com-
mission believes that the establishment of a federal regulatory notice
system is probably unnecessary; specific definitions of pictorial material,
such as the Commission recommends, should themselves enable retail
dealers and exhibitors to make accurate judgments regarding the status
of particular magazines and films. The Commission is also extremely
reluctant to recommend imposing any federal system for labeling read-
ing or viewing matter on the basis of its quality or content. The pre-
cedent of such required labeling would pose a serious potential threat
to first amendment liberties in other areas of communication. Labels
indicating sexual content might also be used artifically to enhance the
appeal of certain materials. Two Commissioners favor federally im-
posed labeling in order to advise dealers as clearly and accurately
as possible about what material is forbidden for sale to young persons,
placing the responsibility for judging whether material falls within
the statute on the publisher or producer who is completely aware of
its contents and who is in a position to examine each item individually.
OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
Consider also the comments on requiring labeling by mail-order distributors in
part VII D infra.
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the prosecution ordinarily will rely upon such factors even if the required
mens rea does not extend to any of these characteristics of the material.
To establish the requisite mens rea as to the actual content of the material,
the prosecution usually seeks to show that factors known to the dealer
so clearly established the probability of sexually explicit content that the
dealer's failure to inspect reflected recklessness as to content. It is not
clear how much more difficult the prosecution's case would be made if the
prosecution were required to establish a similar recklessness as to the fac-
tual characteristics reflected in the tripartite standard. Certainly, the evi-
dence offered to establish recklessness as to specific content ordinarily
should also show recklessness as to prurient appeal. Arguably, the elements
of patent offensiveness and lack of serious social value are more difficult to
estimate based upon advertising and other factors, but at least the evidence
typically offered in general obscenity prosecutions has tended to establish
reckless disregard of the presence of those characteristics as well as pru-
rient appeal. 440
B. Reckless Disregard
The foregoing analysis assumes, of course, that as to both the sexual
content of the material and its quality under the tripartite test, the requisite
level of mens rea is not limited to actual knowledge-that is, the prose-
cution is not required to prove that the disseminator was actually aware
of the content and character of the material. Although the proposed statute
refers to "knowingly disseminating," all three alternative drafts of paragraph
(d) define "knowingly" as including "reckless disregard." The "reckless
disregard" standard is derived from the mens rea level of "recklessness"
utilized in most modem criminal codes. 441 The actor must have been aware
440See United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959), afl'd, 227
F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1959) (title, illustration, and prices tending to show knowledge
of content); State v. Ward, 512 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1974) (cover depicting
genital in state of sexual excitement); United States v. Mishkin, 317 F.2d 634 (2d
Cir. 1963) (clandestine manner of delivery and defendant's familiarity with the
distribution scheme). See also Note, The Scienter Requirement in Criminal Ob-
scenity Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 791 (1966) (collecting various cases). The
same type of evidence may not be as readily available with respect to the wider
range of material encompassed by a juvenile statute.
In numerous cases, the prosecution has shown that materials were sold by dealers
who were asked by the purchaser for books showing certain sexual activity. See, e.g.,
State v. Richardson, 506 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App. 1974). See also Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 116 (1973); Edmiston, Proof of Scienter in Criminal Obscenity Prose-
cutions, 9 AKRON L. REv. 13 (1975). This type of proof presumably would be
available in juvenile cases. Similarly, in prosecutions for the exhibition of movies,
persons exhibiting X-rated movies could readily be assumed to have recklessly
disregarded the possible presence of the characteristics described in the tripartite
test as applied to minors. See generally State v. American Theatre, 194 Neb. 84, 230
N.W.2d 209 (1975); Locke v. State, 516 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Price
v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 113, 189 S.E.2d 324 (1972).
441 See PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 305(c) (Mich. State Bar 1967):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously dis-
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of a substantial risk of the existence of the circumstances for which mens
rea is required.
Alternative A of paragraph (d) (ii) provides that the individual must
have "recklessly disregard[ed] circumstances suggesting the character and
content of the matter." A more specific definition of recklessness is not
provided, since it would require greater specificity in identifying those
characteristics of the material for which mens rea is required, and Alter-
native A purposely seeks to avoid specificity in identifying those char-
acteristics by using the general terms "character and content. '442 Alter-
natives B and C of paragraph (d) (ii) provide a more detailed definition
of the requisite mens rea. They require that the individual disregard "a
substantial risk" that the publication depicted specified sexual conduct
and had either prurient appeal alone (Alternative B) or all three charac-
teristics reflected in the tripartite standard (Alternative C).443
The standard of reckless disregard clearly meets the level of mens
rea constitutionally required under Smith. Although Smith and later opin-
ions referred to the disseminator's "knowledge" of the content of the ma-
terial sold, 444 those references were not intended to suggest that the dis-
seminator must have actual awareness of the content of the material. Thus,
as Justice Frankfurter noted in his concurring opinion in Smith, the ma-
jority was not suggesting that an individual could avoid liability by
"purposely insulat[ing] himself against knowledge about an offending
book. ' 445 Yet a person who purposely shuts his eyes to the existence of a
possible circumstance cannot be described as having actual "knowledge" of
that circumstance as the concept of "knowledge" is commonly used in
regards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the ... circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that
a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
This definition is taken from the MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
442 See text accompanying notes 425-27 supra.
443 Reckless disregard is reflected most commonly in the failure to inspect, but
since it is not limited to that situation, see text accompanying notes 437-38 supra,
the alternatives do not refer to reckless disregard solely in terms of failure to inspect.
Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975), described
in note 453 infra.
444 361 U.S. at 151-52; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974).
445 361 U.S. at 161.
A bookseller may not shut his eyes to something which he should see,
nor shut his mind to something which he should know, for then the
claimed lack of knowledge is sham and should not be permitted to
defeat the purpose of a statute which seeks to outlaw traffic in obscene
literature.
People v. Schenkman, 20 Misc. 2d 1093, 1099, 195 N.Y.S.2d 570, 576 (Ct. of Spec.
Sessions City of New York 1960). See also Movies, Inc. v. Conlisk, 345 F. Supp.
780, 788 (N.D. Ill. 1971); State v. Thompkins, 263 S.C. 472, 211 S.E.2d 549 (1975).
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modern criminal codes. 446 Such a person is more accurately described as
acting with reckless disregard of the circumstance.
The constitutional acceptability of reckless disregard was given further
recognition in two post-Smith decisions, Mishkin and Ginsberg. In Mish-
kin, the Court accepted a New York scienter requirement that was not
restricted to actual knowledge but extended to those who were aware
of the likely contents of the material.447 In Ginsberg, the Court upheld a
New York juvenile statute which specifically accepted as sufficient mens
rea that the individual had "reason to know" the character of the ma-
terial. 448
Almost all of the state provisions examined apparently accept reckless
disregard as a sufficient level of mens rea. Several of the state statutes
speak of a seller acting "knowingly" and do not include any further defini-
tions of "knowingly" that would encompass reckless disregard.449 But some
of these provisions apparently require awareness only that the material
is sexually oriented, 450 and a person who purposely closes his eyes would
have an "awareness" of that aspect of the material, although he would
not be aware of its specific content, erotic quality, patent offensiveness,
or likely lack of social value. In other statutes that do not define the term
"knowingly," statutory presumptions relating to a bookseller's "knowl-
edge" have, as a practical matter, reduced the effective level of mens rea
to reckless disregard or even negligence. 45 1 Finally, judicial interpretations
of the term "knowledge" often have viewed it as including reckless dis-
regard as well as actual awareness.
452
446 Under PROPOSED MICH. CIuM. CODE § 305(b) (Mich. State Bar 1967) and
most modern criminal codes, "knowledge" requires awareness of a fact as actually
existing. See MODEL PENAL CODE 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955):
As we use the term, recklessness involves conscious risk creation. It re-
sembles acting knowingly in that a state of awareness is involved but
the awareness is of risk, that is of probability rather than certainty...
447 The New York provision, N.Y. PENAL CODE § 1141 (McKinney Supp. 1975),
had been interpreted by the New York courts as applicable to a seller who was "in
some manner aware" of the contents of the material. The New York courts had
clearly indicated that this level of mens rea did not require knowledge of the
specific content but awareness that the publication probably contained "filth." See
People v. Finklestein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1961).
448 See note 420 supra. In Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd on rehearing, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court upheld an
obscenity statute that defined "knowingly" as "having general knowledge of, or
reason to know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection
or inquiry." See also cases cited in note 457 inlra.
449 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(e) (West Supp. 1976) ("being aware of the
character of the matter"); KY. REV. STAT. § 531.030 (Cum. Supp. 1974) ("knowledge
of the content and character"); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-1 (Supp. 1974) ("to have
knowledge or to be aware of the content or character").
450See, e.g., Volkland v. State, 510 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); People
v. Adler, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1972). See also federal
cases cited in note 423 supra.
451 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(i) (McKinney Supp. 1975) and People v.
Kirkpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 17, 295 N.E.2d 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1973); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-8A-4 (Supp. 1974).
452 See, e.g., cases cited in note 445 supra. This broad view of "knowledge" is not
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Other state statutes define mens rea as including less than reckless dis-
regard. These statutes apparently would encompass a mere negligent
failure to inspect the material disseminated. 453 Unlike the "reckless dis-
regard" standard proposed in paragraph (d), some of these provisions
only require that good reason to inspect exist. 4- 4 Under such a standard,
the seller need not have been actually aware of the circumstances suggest-
ing that the material contains sexually explicit matter; it is sufficient that
he should have been aware of those circumstances. Other statutes ap-
parently require that the seller be aware of the circumstances, but do not
require that he appreciate their significance. 45
Modern criminal codes usually require a higher standard of mens rea
than negligence. 45 6 Where a particular harm is an element of the offense,
they ordinarily require either an intent to cause that harm or reckless dis-
regard of a substantial risk that the harm will result. The same mens rea
levels normally also apply to key circumstances that contribute to criminal
liability. In view of the first amendment concerns noted in Smith, cau-
tion suggests that the mens rea level, at least as to sexually explicit con-
tent, should not be placed at a level lower than that applied in criminal
statutes generally.457
limited to obscenity cases. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1972):
The word "knowledge" ... has not always been interpreted as having
the meaning given in the Model Penal Code ... Cases have held that
one has knowledge of a given fact when he has the means of obtaining
such knowledge, when he has notice of facts which would put one on
inquiry as to the existence of that fact, when he has information suffi-
cient to generate a reasonable belief as to that fact, or when the circum-
stances are such that a reasonable man would believe that such a fact
existed.
453 Several states refer to a "ground for belief which warrants further inspection
of... the character and content of any material." See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-7-101(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(l)(g) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-390(7) (1975). See also ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.065 (1974) ("knowing or
having a good reason to know the character of the material furnished"). Other states
refer to the failure to "exercise reasonable inspection." See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-21(b)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) ("recklessly" failing to exercise reasonable
inspection); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 115-1.7(d) (Supp. 1975).
454See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.7(d) (Supp. 1975). Compare UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-10-1021(4) (Supp. 1975) (requiring failure to reasonably inspect
"for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure").
455 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(l)(g) (Supp. 1975).
456 See Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLuM. L. REV. 632 (1963).
457 It should be noted, however, that in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968), the Court upheld a statute containing what was essentially a negligence
standard, although a somewhat higher standard may have been suggested by legisla-
tive interpretation. See notes 420, 447 supra. The Ginsberg statute required a
general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or ground for
belief which warrants further inspection ... [of] the character and con-
tent of any material described herein which is reasonably susceptible
of examination by the defendant.
Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h, [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as amended N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also Huffman v. United States,
470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Newman v. Conover, 313 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (upholding
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Moreover, as a practical matter, requiring proof of reckless disregard,
rather than negligence, is likely to impose an additional burden on the
prosecution only in the most unusual cases. If the jury can be shown that
circumstances were such that a reasonable person would have believed
that the disseminated material probably included sexually explicit matter
of erotic quality, that evidence would be sufficient for a finding of reckless
disregard. The jury may assume, without more, that the defendant was
aware of what a reasonable person would have known.458 Although a con-
trary conclusion might be reached upon a showing that the defendant
lacked the capacity of a reasonable person, the defense only rarely is likely
to make a convincing presentation along these lines.
459
C. Age
The New York juvenile statute upheld in Ginsberg required that the
defendant have "general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or
ground for belief which warrants further ... inquiry" as to the age of the
person to whom the material was sold.460 It also provided that
an honest mistake shall constitute an excuse from liability here-
under if the defendant made a reasonable bona fide attempt to
ascertain the true age of such minor.461
negligence standard in Texas general obscenity statute); Great Speckled Board of the
Atlanta Cooperative News Project v. Stynchcombe, 298 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ga.
1969) (upholding "negligence" standard in Georgia general obscenity statute).
458 To a considerable extent, the jury's willingness to find that the defendant was
aware of what a reasonable person would have known may depend upon the scope
of the definition of sexually explicit material. If that definition encompasses, for
example, books depicting no more than nudity, the statute is more likely to reach
disseminators who do not regularly sell sexually oriented materials that are patently
offensive for minors and who, therefore, are less likely to be aware of those factors
that suggest a particular book should be examined before being sold to a minor. See
text accompanying note 318 supra. It should be noted, however, that such persons
arguably might not be held liable by a jury even under a negligence standard.
Though the title, cover, and other factors strongly suggest a duty to inspect, cir-
cumstances advanced on defendant's behalf may be considered by the jury in
concluding that a reasonable person in defendant's particular situation would not
have inspected. See People v. Engel, 7 N.Y.2d 1002, 116 N.E.2d 845, 200 N.Y.S.2d
48 (1960), reported in Note, The Scienter Requirement in Criminal Obscenity
Prosecutions, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 791, 798 n.48 (1966), where a presumption of
scienter was held to be rebutted by showing defendant worked long hours, seven
days a week, and had so many books and magazines in his luncheonette that he
never had a chance to look at the materials.
459 To some extent, a similar argument might be advanced in favor of requiring
actual "knowledge"-that is, where a reasonable person would have been aware of
the risk and inspected the material, is not the jury likely to find that the defendant
did indeed do so? The defendant should find it easier, however, to make a showing
that he was not actually aware of the sexually oriented content (that is, that he only
suspected and did not actually inspect), than to show, under a reckless disregard
standard, that he did not even suspect a sexually explicit content. The difference is
probably most significant with respect to proof of knowledge of the factors re-
flected in the tripartite test.
46 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h(l)(g), [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as
amended N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See 390 U.S. at 646.
461 Law of June 7, 1965, ch. 327, § 484-h(1)(g)(ii), [1965] N.Y. Laws 480, as
amended N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.20 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See 390 U.S. at 646.
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Since the New York statute contained these provisions, the Court had no
reason to determine whether an obscenity statute would be upheld if it
failed to require some mens rea as to the age of the recipient. 462
In many states, statutes prohibiting dangerous transactions with minors
ordinarily do not require any mens rea as to the victim's age. 46 3 The special
first amendment considerations noted in Smith suggest, however, that a
mens rea requirement would be constitutionally required in a juvenile ob-
scenity statute.46 4 Imposition of strict liability as to the recipient's age
would place upon the seller the burden of determining whether the ma-
terial being sold was obscene for minors even when the purchaser ap-
peared to be above the age of a minor. If the state lacked a general ob-
scenity provision,46 5 the burden would extend to all materials sold. If the
state had a general obscenity provision, the additional burden would be
limited to matter that might be obscene for minors though not for adults.
Of course, under either circumstance, the burden would not be as great
as that held impermissible in Smith,466 since the mens rea requirement as
to the content of the item sold would afford protection where the seller
reasonably believed that the content did not warrant inspection. Also, the
dealer could be almost positive that persons who appeared to be a certain
age, (such as over twenty-five) were not in fact under the statutory age
limit.467 Notwithstanding these limitations, the burden still could be suffi-
ciently inhibiting to lead sellers to refuse to sell potentially questionable
material to a person even though he reasonably appears to be a few years
over the age limit. Moreover, where the seller serves a primarily youthful
clientele, strict liability might lead him to refuse even to stock materials
that might be obscene for minors, although acceptable for adults.
Arguably, imposing strict liability as to age might not create sufficient
potential for restricting the distribution of protected material to adults
462 The defendant in Ginsberg challenged only the "honest-mistake" exception
included in the mens rea requirement. The court rejected as "wholly without merit"
his contention that this provision was impermissibly vague. 390 U.S. at 645.
463 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.137, .141 (Supp. 1975) and People
v. Doyle, 16 Mich. App. 242, 167 N.W.2d 907 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.43(2) (Supp. 1975). There has been
a movement in recent years to recognize reasonable mistake as to age as a defense
in statutory rape cases where the victim was over the age of puberty. S. KADISH &
M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 144 (1975).
464 Though generally taking a broad view of the state's authority to regulate ob-
scenity, Comissioners Hill and Link, in their minority statement, see note 3 supra,
concluded that it was doubtful whether absolute liability as to the minor's age would
be constitutionally acceptable. OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at
472. Compare People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1966), rev'd on rehearing, 23 N.Y.2d 753, 244 N.E.2d 269, 296
N.Y.S.2d 798 (1968) (scienter as to age not constitutionally required) with People v.
Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.E.2d 333, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) (suggesting
otherwise).
465 See note 4 supra.
466 See text accompanying notes 413-16 supra.
467 See People v. Tannenbaum, 18 N.Y.2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1966), rev'd on rehearing, 23 N.Y.2d 753, 244 N.E.2d 269, 296 N.Y.S.2d 798
(1968) (emphasizing both of these factors in distinguishing Smith).
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to render such a provision unconstitutional under Smith.468 Even so, the
incremental enforcement value of strict liability should be weighed, as a
matter of state policy, against the "chilling" impact of such liability.
The various state statutes examined generally reflect a determination
that strict liability as to age is inappropriate. This includes states which
ordinarily impose strict liability as to age in criminal statutes. 469 All but
three of the state statutes examined470 clearly indicate that a reasonable
mistake as to the purchaser's status as a minor would relieve the seller of
liability, at least where proper inquiry as to age was made.471 Many speci-
fically make negligence as to age an element of the required mens rea.412
Others relieve the disseminator of liability only where he
had reasonable cause to believe that the [person] involved was
[not a minor], and such [person] exhibited . . . a draft card,
driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently
official document purporting to establish [that he was a minor]. 473
The scienter requirement in proposed paragraph (d) establishes a
standard of "reckless disregard" of the status of the minor. This standard
is somewhat higher than that applied in other jurisdictions, but, as al-
ready noted,474 requiring proof of reckless disregard rather than negli-
gence does not impose a substantial additional burden on the prosecution.
Moreover, with a reckless disregard standard there is no need for an
exception relating to "honest-and-reasonable mistakes" based upon the
exhibition of draft cards, driver's licenses, or similar documents. Indeed,
under a reckless disregard standard, the mistake need only be honest. If
468 See, e.g., note 416 supra (quoting from Smith). See also People v. Tannen-
baum, 18 N.Y.2d 263, 220 N.E.2d 783, 274 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1966), rev'd on rehearing,
23 N.Y.2d 753, 244 N.E.2d 269, 296 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1968).
469 Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) with
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975); and Wis. STAT. ANN. §
939.43(2) (Supp. 1975) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(l)(h) (Supp. 1975).
470 See note 2 supra for a list of the statutes examined. HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 712-1215 (Special Supp. 1972) specifically requires mens rea as to content, but
makes no reference to mens rea as to age. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-03 (Special
Supp. 1975) prohibits "knowingly promot[ing] to a minor any material.., harmful to
a minor," but the statute does not clearly indicate whether the required mens rea
extends to the age of the minor as well as the character and content of the material.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-01-04(5) (Special Supp. 1975). Compare N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-27.1-01 (Special Supp. 1975) (general obscenity statute). R.I. GEN. LAW
§ 11-31-10 (Supp. 1974) prohibits "willfully or knowingly" engaging in the "busi-
ness" of selling obscene material to minors, and defines the term "knowingly" only
with reference to the content and character of the material sold.
471 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 531.040 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ORE. REV STAT. §
167.085(4) (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-390(7) (1975).
472 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(a) (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-21(e)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206
(Supp. 1975).
473WiS. STAT. ANN. § 944.25(11)(a) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). See also
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.31(B)(3) (Page 1975). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.10 (Supp. 1975)
(requiring reasonable reliance on written statement of recipient that he or she is at
least eighteen).
474 See notes 457-59 and accompanying text supra.
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the person honestly believed that the draft card was genuine, or that there
was a substantial likelihood that it was genuine, then he obviously did not
consciously disregard a substantial risk. 475
D. Mail Distributions
There is no separate provision in the proposed statute for mail dis-
tributions. Sales through the mail would be included under either alter-
native definition of dissemination.4 7 6 If a disseminator of obscene material
recklessly disregards a substantial risk that the receipient is a minor, he
would be liable under section 2. However, the mail-order disseminator
ordinarily will not have before him any information suggesting that the
prospective purchaser is a minor.4 77
It might be possible to condition mail-order dissemination upon the
purchaser's submission of a statement or a formal certification noting
that he is not a minor.478 Alternatively, the disseminator might be required
to place an "adults only" label on each package shipped.4 7 9 Both alterna-
tives present serious drawbacks. Requiring a statement or certification of
age, under penalty for falsification, would place an unrealistic criminal
penalty on the minor, which would probably be an ineffective deterrent.
Such a requirement also would impose a burden on protected dissemination
to adults since, even if checking a box on an application is all that is re-
quired, some adults surely would forget to check the appropriate box and
thereby delay shipment pending clarification of their status.
Requiring an "adults only" label on books or film sent through the
475 If greater protection is needed for the person relying upon such official docu-
ments, then a provision could be adopted simply making the exhibition of such a
document a defense without requiring a showing as to appropriate reliance thereon.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 968.070(2) (Supp. 1974).
476 See paragraph (a) of section 1.
477 See OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 59-60, recommending
against enactment of federal legislation prohibiting the sale of obscene matter to
juveniles through the mail.
Such federal legislation would. .. be virtually unenforceable since
the constitutional requirement of proving the defendant's guilty knowl-
edge means that a prosecution could be successful only if proof were
available that the vendor knew the purchaser was a minor. Except in
circumstances which have not been found to be prevalent, as where
a sale might be solicited through a mailing list composed of young per-
sons, mail order purchases are made without any knowledge by the
vendor of the purchaser's age.
Id. (emphasis added).
478 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21 (d)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975). Cf.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-1.10 (Supp. 1975), described in note 473 supra.
479 Cf. ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.070(2) (1974):
Unless the defendant knows or has good reason to know that the
person to whom the materials are sent is a minor, it is a defense to
a prosecution under this section that the defendant caused to be printed
on the outer package, wrapper or cover of the materials ... in words or
substance, "This package contains material that by Oregon law, can-
not be furnished to a minor."
See also PROPOSED ARIZ. CRIM. CODE § 3505(b) (Ariz. Crim. Comm'n 1975) (con-
taining same provision).
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mail gives adequate notice to parents that the materials are potentially
harmful for minors. But it also announces to the postman and others the
nature of the material ordered by adult as well as minor purchasers. 480
Moreover, it requires the disseminator to make a judgment for every item
shipped as to whether it would indeed be obscene for minors. The store-
owner, on the other hand, need make that judgment only when the
prospective purchaser before him appears to be a minor.
VIII. CRIMINAL PENALTY
The proposed statute makes distributing obscene material to minors
a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year and a
fine up to $10,000. This proposal follows the Oregon provision 481 and
the proposed Michigan code. 4 82 The justification for including a maximum
fine of $10,000 is stated in the Bar Committee commentary to the pro-
posed Michigan code:
Because fines are of central significance in enforcing . . . [ob-
scenity statutes, the proposed statute] provides a basis for ex-
tension of the fine beyond $1,000 . . . in a case, e.g., of a mass
manufacturer of pornographic material. Although the provision
for extension to a $10,000 fine is not limited to this situation,
the specific reference to the judge's duty to consider the scope of
the defendant's commercial activities clearly indicates where the
higher fine would most appropriately be employed. The Com-
mittee believes that consideration of this factor would rebut any
claim that the fine imposes cruel and unusual punishment or is
otherwise unconstitutional.
48 3
The proposed penalty is within the general range of the jurisdictions
examined as to imprisonment, but provides for a higher fine than most of
483See also comments in the OBSCENITY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
quoted in note 439 supra, concerning imposition of a labeling requirement upon
all publishers.
481 ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.065(2) (1974). The Oregon offense is a class A mis-
demeanor, but the statute permits a $10,000 maximum fine rather than the usual
$1,000 maximum for Class A misdemeanors. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00
(McKinney Supp. 1975), discussed in note 483 infra.
482 See PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6310 (Mich. State Bar 1967). The current
Michigan provision permits maximum imprisonment of one year and a maximum
fine of $1,000. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750. 343a, .343e (1968).
483 PROPOSED MICH. CRIM. CODE § 6305, Comment, at 483 (Mich. State Bar 1967).
New York follows a similar approach for all felonies (including dissemination of
obscene materials to minors). See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00 (1975) (permitting fine
not to exceed "double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of
the crime"). People v. Mature Enterprises, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 660, 352 N.Y.S.2d
346 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1974), aff'g 73 Misc. 2d 773, 343 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Crim Ct.
City of New York 1973), held that a fine of $100,000, imposed upon a corporate
defendant, was not excessive where properly related to defendant's commercial gain
from the promotion of an obscene film.
The proposed $10,000 maximum would be subject, of course, to any general
provision permitting the imposition of higher fines for corporate defendants. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(3) (Special Supp.
1975).
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those jurisdictions. Several states permit a one-year maximum for im-
prisonment, with a $1,000 maximum on fines.484 Others provide for im-
prisonment for up to six months and a fine up to $500.481 Several treat
dissemination to minors as a felony punishable by five years imprison-
ment and a fine of $5,000.486
IX. FACILITATIVE MISREPRESENTATION
The proposed statute includes a provision, section 3, making it a mis-
demeanor to falsely represent oneself as a parent or to falsely represent
that a minor is over the statutory age limit in order to facilitate dissemina-
tion of obscene matter to that minor. This provision supplements the pri-
mary criminal provision of section 2, which prohibits illegal dissemina-
tion.487 It is possible that the person making the false representation
could be held responsible under section 2 for the subsequent dissemina-
tion.488 However, that theory of liability, which is based on the conduct of
an innocent agent, is somewhat uncertain and is limited, in any event, to
cases where the falsification was successful. A separate provision is needed
to prohibit the misrepresentation alone. 489
Many states have provisions similar to section 3. Some cover misrepre-
sentation of both a minor's age and status as a parent.490 Others cover only
misrepresentation as to parental status 49I or the prospective recipient's
age.492
484 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 37, § 712-1215(3) (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §
725.22 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.343a, .343e (1968).
485 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(a) (West Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.68.060(3)(d) (Supp. 1974) (first offense); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8A-2 (Supp.
1974).
486 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.012(3) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-27.1-03 (Special Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206(3) (Supp. 1975)
(imposing a minimum fine of $300 plus $10 for each article exhibited). Various
states impose higher penalties for second offenses. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (3 years maximum); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1206(4) (Supp. 1975) (fifteen year maximum, mandatory minimum of one year,
and a mandatory fine of $5,000).
487 In some jurisdictions, the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
might reach such misrepresentation, but that offense often is "extremely elusive to
define." S. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 66 (1971). Cf. Hanby v. State,
479 P.2d 486, 497-500 (Alaska 1970); Commonwealth v. Burak, 18 Pa. Commonw.
Ct. 330, 335 A.2d 820 (1975).
488 See MODEL PENAL CODE 15-18 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953); PROPOSED MICH.
CRIM. CODE 45 (Mich. State Bar 1967) (discussing liability based on conduct of
innocent person).
489 Proposed section 3 would apply to misrepresentation by the minor himself
as well as misrepresentation by another. In this respect the provision is similar to
one making it a misdemeanor for a minor to misrepresent his age to obtain liquor.
See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.141c (Supp. 1975). A minor violating
section 3 would, of course, be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. See note 367
supra.
49OSee, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.013(2)(c), .013(2)(d) (Supp. 1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.33 (Page 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.080 (Supp. 1974).
491 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(b) (West Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-10-1206(1)(c) (Supp. 1975).
492 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-21(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975).
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The penalty for facilitative misrepresentation would be that of the
traditional minor offense in the jurisdiction involved, such as imprison-
ment up to 90 days or a fine up to $100 or both. The difference in the
penalties imposed for dissemination of obscene matter and for facilitative
misrepresentation is similar to the difference in penalties imposed for sale
of liquor to a minor and for misrepresenting a minor's age to obtain
liquor.493 The higher penalty for the dissemination offense reflects the
greater interest in controlling the frequent and often commercial aspect
of distribution as opposed to discouraging the occasional misrepresenta-
tion.4 94
493 Compare, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.141a (1968) with MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 750.141c (1968).
49 4 The proposed statute does not treat the liability of a person who permits a
minor to participate in a sexually explicit performance. Such activity presents con-
cerns beyond those involved in the dissemination of obscene materials to juveniles
and therefore was viewed as outside the scope of this article.
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